St. Croix County v. Cress

• Decision Date: 17 April 2001
• Docket Number: 00-3295
• Citation: 244 Wis. 2d 288,628 N.W.2d 438
• Parties: This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. §808.10 and Rule 809.62. St. Croix County, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Adam Douglas Cress, Defendant-Respondent.STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT III
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.

A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. §808.10 and Rule 809.62

St. Croix County, Plaintiff-Appellant v Adam Douglas Cress, Defendant-Respondent

No. 00-3295

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT III

April 17, 2001

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for St. Croix County: SCOTT R. NEEDHAM, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with directions.

¶1. HOOVER, P.J.

1 St. Croix County appeals an order suppressing evidence based upon the trial court's determination that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe Adam Cress committed criminal damage to property. The County essentially argues that the trial court employed improper standards in making its determination. First, the court considered whether there was probable cause to believe Cress committed a crime, when the real issue was whether there was reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and investigation. Second, the court determined that there was no probable cause because of the officer's subjective determination that Cress did not intend to damage property.

¶2. This court agrees with the County that the trial court should have employed a reasonable suspicion analysis and that under the undisputed evidence, the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop. The evidence resulting from the lawful stop should not have been suppressed. Therefore, the suppression order is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶3. Cress was charged with transporting intoxicants as a minor, contrary to St. Croix County, Wis. Ordinance §54.82. On the trial date, Cress conceded that there was sufficient evidence to convict him if the arresting officer had "probable cause."² Thus the trial court proceeded with a "probable cause" hearing to determine whether evidence seized from Cress should be suppressed.

¶4. Deputy Steven Drost testified that at approximately 12:20 a.m. on May 27, 2000, he was on 170th Avenue just west of 68th Street when he observed a truck turn onto a narrow private driveway and drive about 100 yards. The vehicle then made a wide turn into a farm field adjacent to the driveway. It traveled south through the field, got back onto the driveway and approached 170thAvenue. Drost testified that his attention was drawn to the vehicle because "if a vehicle is traveling on a farmer's hay field, or any other type of field that's used to raise crops, property is going to be damaged." Drost knew there were crops growing in this field.

¶5. After the vehicle passed Drost, he stopped it, encountered Cress and informed him of the reason for the stop.³ Cress identified himself with a driver's license and essentially advised Drost that he had taken a wrong turn looking for a campground.⁴ Drost had Cress step out of the truck and while in the process of questioning Cress about whether he had any contraband, Drost observed a case of beer in the back of the truck. At Drost's request, Cress retrieved the case and other bottles of alcohol and gave them to Drost.

¶6. In response to a question by the court, Drost testified that he did not believe Cress intended to damage property, but rather was turning his truck around. However, he believed "at the time that there was a better way to go about it" and "most people understand if you drive on a farmer's field you are going to damage the property." Further, it was "X Fest" weekend,⁵ during which his department received a lot of property damage and trespass complaints. Indeed, Drost testified that on the farm in question, someone that weekend had driven through a fence, causing cattle to get loose.

¶7. The trial court held that based on Drost's "statement that he reasonably didn't believe [Cress] was intentionally damaging the property I can't find probable cause" because Drost did not believe Cress intended to damage property. It elaborated that there was no probable cause to believe Cress had committed criminal damage to property because Drost did not believe Cress intended damage and such intent is an element of the offense. The court subsequently rendered an order suppressing all fruits of the stop based upon Drost's lack of "a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. Whether a search or seizure violates one's constitutional rights is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. King, 175 Wis. 2d 146, 150, 499 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1993).

DISCUSSION

¶9. The County argues that Drost's observations provided a sufficient basis to perform an investigatory stop and that Drost's subjective belief as to Cress's intent to commit a crime is not relevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis. Cress concedes that driving into a hayfield might give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person was committing criminal damage to property, but that here Drost had already determined that Cress did not enter the field to intentionally damage property. Moreover, according to Cress, once he provided the innocent explanation that he took a wrong turn looking for a campground, Drost had no basis for detaining Cress further.⁶ This court holds that the proper analysis was whether Cress's conduct gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had or was committing a violation, and that neither Drost's subjective belief nor Cress's innocent explanation are relevant to that analysis.

¶10. The temporary detention of individuals during an automobile stop by law enforcement constitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances. Id. at 810. A traffic stop is generally reasonable if the officers have grounds to reasonably suspect a violation has been or will be committed. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Upon stopping the individual, the officer may make reasonable inquiries to dispel or confirm the suspicions that justified the stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).

¶11. The question what constitutes reasonableness is a common sense test that concerns what a reasonable police officer would reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience. State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 83, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990). This common sense approach strikes a balance between an individual's privacy and society's interest in permitting the police a reasonable latitude in discharging their responsibilities. State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).

The societal interest involved is, of course,...