St. John v. J. J. & M. J. Thomson
| Decision Date | 07 January 1936 |
| Citation | 182 A. 196 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | ST. JOHN v. J. J. & M. J. THOMSON et al. |
Appeal from Decision of Commissioner of Industries.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Bertha St. John, dependent widow of Leon St. John, opposed by J. J. & M. J. Thomson, employers, and the Globe Indemnity Company, insurer. From a decision of the Commissioner of Industries granting compensation, the employer and insurance carrier appeal.
Order of Commissioner of Industries annulled.
Argued before POWERS, C. J., and SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and SHERBURNE, JJ.
Willsie E. Brisbin, Charles F. Black, and J. Boone Wilson, all of Burlington, for claimant.
Warren R. Austin, Jr., and William H. Edmunds, both of Burlington, for defendants.
This is an appeal from an award of the Commissioner of Industries, whereby the defendants were ordered to pay compensation to the plaintiff for the accidental death of her husband, Leon St. John. Of the questions certified to this court, only the following are insisted upon:
3. Under the facts found by the commissioner, did the accident and employment come under the jurisdiction of the admiralty, and thereby exclude the jurisdiction of the commissioner?
4. Is the claimant entitled to compensation and burial expenses as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law?
It is quite apparent that if the first of these questions is to be answered in the affirmative, the last one must be answered in the negative; and if the first one is to be answered in the negative, the last one must be answered in the affirmative. It is all a question of the existence and extent of maritime jurisdiction.
The findings of the commissioner show that the Thomsons, husband and wife, were residents of Mt. Vernon, N. Y. They spent a part of the summer of 1934 at the Champlain Club, a summer resort on Lake Champlain, in the town of Colchester, Vt. There they had and used an automobile and a 26-foot motorboat, which was registered and numbered under the federal law, and was used for pleasure only. While in this state, they employed the St. Johns,—Mrs. St. John to serve as maid, and Mr. St. John to serve as chauffeur and to do what was required of him with regard to the boat. He was not a skilled seaman, but was engaged to and did care for the boat, accompany his employers around the lake for fishing and other purposes, raise and lower the anchor, bring the boat to the wharf and take it back to its mooring, and act as handy man around it—all as and when directed by the Thomsons. On July 6, 1934, the Thomsons, with two guests and accompanied by St. John, set out in the boat from the Champlain Club bound for South Hero. Before they reached their destination, the propeller shaft of the boat broke, and of course the boat was wholly disabled. The party paddled the craft to the Vermont shore, a rowboat was procured, and in it Mrs. Thomson went ashore and summoned help. She then returned to the motorboat in the rowboat. As she stepped aboard the former, she handed the painter of the latter to St. John to be made fast to the motor-boat. A little later it was discovered that the rowboat was not so attached and was drifting away. St. John dove overboard in an attempt to retrieve it, and was drowned.
When he engaged with the Thomsons, he was informed by Thomson that he, Thomson, was insured under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Vermont. But it turns out that Thomson, who employed less than ten persons, had never notified the commissioner of his intention to operate under that act, as provided in P.L. 6502, though he had taken out insurance with the corporate defendant, and had filed a copy of his policy with the commissioner as required by P.L. 6562.
St. John's contract bound him to serve on the motorboat when so directed by the Thomsons, and to perform thereon such tasks as might reasonably be required of him. To this extent, his engagement was maritime in character, for it is admitted that Lake Champlain is a part of the navigable waters of the United States, and that the maritime jurisdiction granted to the federal government and its courts by the Constitution and Statutes of the United States applies to it. It is also admitted that in the determination of the question whether or not a contract is maritime, the true test is the subject-matter of the contract—"the nature and character of the work to be done." It is evident that St. John was engaged in maritime service when he lost his life. His immediate effort was being exerted to retrieve the rowboat. But this was an incident of a larger undertaking, which was to repair the boat and make her capable of continuing on her way. To this result, the rowboat was an important if not a necessary adjunct. As stated above, a repair man had been summoned. The use of the rowboat was the only feasible means of getting him from the shore to the craft, or of getting the party from the craft to the shore, if that became necessary. Not only their convenience was, but their safety might become, dependent upon it.
It is urged by the claimant that inasmuch as St. John's duties were predominantly on shore, his unimportant duties afloat should be disregarded and not allowed to characterize his contract of employment at all. This position is untenable. Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 49 S.Ct. 88, 89, 73 L.Ed. 232, involved the accidental death of Charles Strand while working as a stevedore on a vessel lying in navigable waters. His employment contemplated that he should work on both land and water, as directed. In fact, the time spent in work aboard ship amounted to only 2 per cent. of his working time. "The fact," says Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for a majority of the court, It was held that his rights were to be determined by maritime law. Mr. Justice Stone wrote an opinion, with which Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred, in which he contended that Strand's employment being essentially nonmaritime, and the state Compensation Act being a term of his contract, his rights should not be controlled by maritime law. The very fact that the minority took this view shows that the majority wholly rejected it.
Prior to the announcement on May 21, 1917, of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 529, 61 L.Ed. 1086, L.R.A.19186, 451, Ann.Cas.1917E, 900, it was generally understood, and so held by the state courts, that Workmen's Compensation Acts applied to maritime contracts and torts. But that case held otherwise. Jensen was the employee of the Southern Pacific Company, a corporation engaged as a common carrier by railroad. It also owned and operated a steamboat. While this boat was berthed at a pier in the North River and lying in navigable waters of the United States, Jensen was operating an electric truck in aid of the work of unloading the cargo of the boat. He would drive the truck into the ship, where it would be loaded with lumber from the cargo, then he would drive out of the vessel upon a gangway connecting the vessel with the pier, and thence upon the pier, where the lumber was unloaded from the truck. Pursuant to this custom, he started out of the ship with his truck loaded with lumber. He stood on the rear of the truck with the lumber piled thereon about shoulder high. In driving out, his truck became jammed against the guide pieces on the gangway. He reversed his power and backed into the hatchway. As he did so, his head struck a part of the ship, causing his chin to hit the lumber on the truck, and he received injuries from which he died. A dependent widow made a claim for compensation under a New York statute. An award was made which was approved by the Appellate Division (In re Southern Pac. Co. [In re Jensen], 167 App. Div. 945, 152 N.Y.S. 1120) and affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Jensen v. So. Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600, L.R.A. 1916A, 403, Ann.Cas.1916B, 276) on the ground that the state statute applied and that it was not obnoxious to the Federal Constitution. But the Supreme Court of the United States reversed this judgment. The case was carefully and thoroughly briefed, and a brief was filed for the New York Industrial Commission and another by Christopher M. Bradley, as amicus curiæ. It was twice argued before the court. Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for the court, said: Mr. Justice Holmes filed a dissenting opinion in which he characterizes the fear of a lack of uniformity as a "specter," and Mr. Justice Pitney filed an elaborate and carefully prepared dissenting opinion, with both of which Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Clarke agreed.
This case is one of the five to four decisions...
To continue reading
Request your trial