St. John v. Town of Ellettsville

Decision Date05 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. IP 97-1415-C B/S.,IP 97-1415-C B/S.
Citation46 F.Supp.2d 834
PartiesFred ST. JOHN, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF ELLETTSVILLE, by and through its duly authorized and elected Town Council; and Douglas L. Deford, Michael D. Cornman, Herbert E. Ray, Donald Ashley, and D. Geraldine McIntyre, individually, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

David L. Ferguson, Ferguson Ferguson & Lloyd, Bloomington, Indiana, for plaintiff.

Edward J. Liptak, Miller Carson Boxberger & Murphy LLP, Bloomington, Indiana, for defendant.

ENTRY GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARKER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Fred St. John ("St.John"), alleges that the personnel policy adopted by the Ellettsville Town Council conveyed to him a property right in his continued employment as chief operator of Ellettsville's wastewater treatment plant. St. John brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants, the Town of Ellettsville ("Town") and five members of its Town Council in their individual capacities, contending that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by terminating his job without providing him notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In addition to the federal claim, St. John brings a state law claim for breach of contract against the Town, contending that the Town's personnel policy, adopted as a Town ordinance, served as an employment contract that defendants breached by failing to follow the progressive disciplinary steps set forth in the personnel policy. St. John adds two state law claims against Town Council President Douglas DeFord in his individual capacity, defamation and invasion of privacy, which both hinge on a statement he made to a newspaper reporter. Defendants respond to the federal due process claim and the state law breach of contract claim by contending that the Town's personnel policy did not create an employment contract and that St. John was an at-will employee without a property interest in his continued employment. Further, defendants claim that the defamation and invasion of privacy claims must fail since St. John never demonstrated that DeFord's statement placed St. John in a false light. Defendants also invoke various forms of immunity, including qualified, legislative, and discretionary function immunity. Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiff counter-moves for summary judgment on the procedural due process and breach of contract claims. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on the state law breach of contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy claims. Both plaintiff's and defendants' motions for summary judgment are DENIED on the § 1983 due process claim.1

I. Background2

Plaintiff, Fred St. John, operated the Town of Ellettsville wastewater treatment facility from September 17, 1984, until the Town Council voted to eliminate his position on October 9, 1995. See V. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 28. While the job of chief operator of a sewage plant may not to some seem glamorous, an efficient and legally compliant wastewater treatment facility is essential to the successful management and growth of a town or municipality. If a town's sewage plant fails to meet the state's compliance guidelines, a "sewer ban" can, in fact, stop all new development in its tracks. In the midst of such a threat from the Indiana Department of Environmental Management ("IDEM"), the Ellettsville Town Council apparently decided to terminate St. John from his post and get out of the business of managing sewage altogether, by deciding to contract with a private management firm to operate its sewage plant.

In December 1989, the Town Council passed an ordinance amending its personnel policy ("manual") and distributed the revised version to its employees, including St. John.3 See V. Compl. ¶ 11; Pl.'s Ex. A (December 30, 1989 Town Council minutes). On January 25, 1990, St. John signed an acknowledgment that he had received the manual and understood its contents. See Pl.'s Ex. B. The Council subsequently amended the personnel policy at least five additional times between 1990 and 1995. See Pl.'s Ex. C.

The manual addresses a variety of topics, such as hiring practices, promotions, work hours, vacation and sick leave, and, of course, discipline. Id. The manual distinguishes between four groups of town personnel, which include police personnel, fire department personnel, utility office employees, and "[w]ater, [s]ewer, and [s]treet" employees. The manual specifically focuses on police and fire department personnel, as special requirements, procedures, and protections apply uniquely to them.

The "Discipline" section lists thirteen offenses that, if committed by an employee, "shall" result in immediate termination. Id. § 255-50(a). The subsection includes a fourteenth catch-all provision that requires immediate termination for "[a]ny action which, while not a violation of a regularly established rule, regulation, or policy, is so deleterious to efficient Town operation or to the public interest that discipline or discharge could reasonably be expected to result." Id. A second subsection entitled "Uniform Disciplinary Policy" provides for progressive discipline of employees who violate a "regular established policy or procedure." See Pl.'s Ex. C, § 255-50(b). The general "Discipline" section lists only three possible violations that could result in the progressive discipline for sewer workers—tardiness, unexcused absences, and safety violations.4 See Pl.'s Ex. C., § 255-50(c)-(e). In contrast, a separate subsection under the "Discipline" heading, pertaining only to police and firefighters, lists fifty-seven different employee violations, divided into "major" and "minor" offenses, that will result in discipline. See Pl.'s Ex. C., § 255-50(f). Although police officers and firefighters have their own discipline subsection, including much more extensive procedural requirements modeled after a widely-recognized state statute, the "Uniform Disciplinary Policy" presumably applies to them as well.

Discipline ranges from oral reprimands, which a supervisor may give an employee at any time, to immediate termination for a third offense. An employee who commits a second offense within one month of the first will be placed on disciplinary probation and suspended from one to three days or demoted. The manual defines probationary employees as those employees "who do not have any expectation or right to continued future employment. A probationary employee may be terminated for any reason or no reason at all, provided that it is not an unlawful reason, or a reason that violates these policies and procedures or other agreements." See Pl.'s Ex. C., § 255-20.

In addition to being placed on probation for violations of regularly established policies or procedures, an employee is on probationary status during the first six months of any reassignment, caused by such events as promotion, transfer or layoff. Also, all newly hired employees are probationary during their first year of employment with the Town. The manual differentiates between probationary and nonprobationary employees in that the latter are not eligible for maximum pay for the given position until expiration of the probationary year, which may be extended in individual cases. Any of the three types of employees—regular, temporary or seasonal —may begin as probationary or assume that status.

The manual provides for a grievance procedure if "an employee has problems relating to his/her job or fellow employees." See Pl.'s Ex. C., § 255-55(g). The procedure requires a complaining employee first to report the problem to his/her supervisor. If a resolution is not reached within ten days of such notification, the aggrieved party or the supervisor may submit the problem in writing to the Town Board of Trustees, by either certified mail or hand delivery. A member of the Town Board designated as a grievance officer then reviews the matter, when all parties concerned may present their positions concerning the grievance. The Town Board "shall then at a Public meeting take any official action necessary."5 Id.

On the morning of Monday, August 14, 1995, Town Council President Doug DeFord apparently instructed St. John to resign or face termination, telling him that his employment situation would be discussed that evening at a public Town Council meeting. See V. Compl. ¶ 18. That evening, St. John attended the meeting and the Council informed him that there were concerns about his job performance.6 See Pl.'s Ex. J. St. John addressed the Council and demanded a typed list of the "allegations." Pl.'s Ex. E (August 14, 1995 Town Council minutes); see DeFord Aff., Ex. A (August 28, 1995 Ellettsville Town Council minutes).

The Town Council minutes reflect that the Council apparently had discussed reasons for St. John's possible termination at an "executive" Council meeting the previous week, which St. John had not attended. Id. Because the Council had not prepared a typed list of its concerns for the August 14 meeting, it was unable to accommodate St. John's request. Id. St. John also requested a 30-day medical leave from his job, which the Council apparently allowed. St. John further requested that the Council schedule an executive session to discuss the matter, which it set for September 14, 1995, the date St. John's one-month medical leave was due to expire.7 Id. The Council also considered who could substitute as plant operator during St. John's absence. The Council voted 5-0 to appoint a private contractor, Bynum Fanyo Utilities, to oversee the sewer plant operations until the September 14 executive session. As of August 14, 1995, St. John remained in the Town's employ.

In an effort to provide St. John with details about the Council's concerns relating to his operation of the sewage plant, Susan Stevens conducted a site visit of...

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