St. John v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board

Decision Date28 April 1950
Docket NumberCiv. No. 4844.
PartiesST. JOHN et al. v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

Max Raskin, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiffs.

Thomas E. Fairchild, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Attorney for State Official Defendants.

Miller, Mack & Fairchild, Milwaukee, Wis., by J. G. Hardgrove and Vernon A. Swanson, Milwaukee, Wis., Attorneys for defendant Milwaukee Gas Light Co.

Padway, Goldberg & Previant and Shaw, Muskat & Paulsen, Milwaukee, Wis., amicus curiae.

Before DUFFY, Circuit Judge, and STONE and TEHAN, District Judges.

DUFFY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this action individually and as officers of Local 18, United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers (CIO) (hereinafter called the "union"), upon behalf of all the union members who are employees of the corporate defendant. Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction enjoining and restraining the enforcement of subchapter 3 of Chap. 111, Wis.Stats. of 1947,1 sometimes referred to as the Public Utility Anti-Strike Law.2 They also seek a declaratory judgment that said subchapter of the statutes is invalid. Defendants Gooding, Fitzgibbons and Rule are the individual commissioners comprising the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. Defendant Fairchild is the Attorney General for the State of Wisconsin. The corporate defendant (hereinafter called the "company") is a public utility under Wisconsin law, and is the employer of approximately 770 men who are members of the union. The company's utility service is rendered in an area entirely within the State of Wisconsin; however it purchases a substantial portion of its supplies and materials outside the State, and it furnishes gas to manufacturing concerns that produce goods for interstate commerce.

Commencing in June, 1937, and annually thereafter including June, 1948, the union and the company entered into collective bargaining agreements. On August 1, 1943, the union was certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees of the company. The most recent contract expired on June 1, 1949.

In September, 1949, the union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board, charging that the company was guilty of an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union. The National Labor Relations Board did not take any action on this complaint. Thereafter the union and the company did engage in collective bargaining covering wages, pensions and other conditions of employment, but no agreement was reached. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board then appointed a conciliator whose efforts to bring the union and the company into agreement were unsuccessful. On October 3, 1949, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board issued an order listing five names as a panel of arbitrators, and ordering the union and the company each to strike one name therefrom, pursuant to provisions of Sec. 111.55, Wis. Stats. The remaining three were to act as arbitrators. On October 4, 1949, the plaintiffs and other employees, acting in concert and in agreement, left their employment and started picketing the premises of the company.

On October 6, 1949, the union and the company agreed upon wages, hours, and other conditions of employment but did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the pension plan. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board and the Attorney General, so the complaint herein alleges, threatened to compel the plaintiffs to submit the unresolved issues of pensions to arbitrators.

On October 13, 1949, in an action commenced in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, wherein the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board was plaintiff, the plaintiffs herein were enjoined from calling a strike, or going out on strike, or causing an interruption in the service of the company. It was further ordered that certain of the officers of the union notify all employees who had been called out on strike to resume their employment. This order was issued pursuant to subchapter 3 of Chap. 111. The Attorney General and the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board thereafter caused process to issue looking to the punishment of the plaintiffs and other employees for violating said injunction. The Attorney General likewise threatened to invoke criminal penalties.

In the case at bar, after putting in issue various allegations of the complaint, the defendants pleaded that prior to the commencement of the case at bar plaintiffs chose as their forum for the litigation of the same issues the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, in which action, on demurrer, the court entered judgment that subchapter 3 of Chap. 111, Wis.Stats. of 1947, was constitutional and valid. Defendants plead such State court action as res judicata.

We proceed to a consideration of the defense of res judicata. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, which is pleaded as a bar, provided in part, as follows: "It Is Hereby Adjudged and Determined that Chapter 414, Laws of 1947, being Subchapter III of Chapter 111 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 1947, is a valid and constitutional act, and does not violate nor conflict with any of the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Wisconsin, nor with any of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, nor with any amendment thereto, and does not conflict with the United States Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., and does not deny to the plaintiffs nor to any of the employees of the defendant Milwaukee Gas Light Company represented by them, * * * any rights, privileges or protection secured to them under either of said Constitutions or said act of Congress; and that the plaintiffs, the defendant Milwaukee Gas Light Company, and its employees represented by the plaintiffs herein, are subject to and controlled by said Subchapter III of Chapter 111 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 1947."

An appeal from this judgment was taken by the plaintiffs in that case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which court affirmed the Circuit Court judgment. United Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board, 255 Wis. 154, 38 N.W.2d 692. Plaintiffs did not appeal to the United States Supreme Court or seek other relief from the action of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Since the time for appeal to the United States Supreme Court has long since elapsed, the judgment of the Circuit Court, affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, is conclusive. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 189, 67 S.Ct. 657 91 L.Ed. 832. See also: Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 475, 50 S.Ct. 374, 74 L.Ed. 972; Mitchell v. First National Bank of Chicago, 180 U.S. 471, 480, 21 S.Ct. 418, 45 L.Ed. 627.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, is res judicata, and bars a subsequent action in this court, if it falls within the rule that a judgment of a State court of competent jurisdiction is binding and conclusive as to all matters put in issue and decided in the State court, and bars a subsequent action in a federal court if the causes of action, subject matter and parties are the same. Angel v. Bullington, supra, 330 U.S. at pages 192-193, 67 S.Ct. at page 662, 91 L.Ed. 832; Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., et al., 308 U.S. 66, 75-78, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85. Indeed such a judgment is binding as to all relevant issues which could have been raised and litigated therein. Heiser v. Woodruff et al., 327 U.S. 726, 735, 66 S.Ct. 853, 90 L.Ed. 970; Troxell, Administratrix v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 227 U.S. 434, 440, 33 S.Ct. 274, 57 L.Ed. 586; Reinkey v. Wilkins, 172 Wis. 515, 520, 179 N.W. 751.

We think it clear that the causes of action and the subject matter are the same in the two suits. The cause of action in the case at bar is based upon the same facts as in the State court action. This is so even though some of the actions which could only be considered in a prospective way by the State court have since come to pass. The fact that a strike was actually called since the State court judgment was rendered does not create a different situation. The allegations in the pleadings in the two cases are substantially the same. The facts necessary to sustain the two actions are the same. As for the subject matter, the issues in the case at bar and in the State court action arose from the claimed repugnancy of subchapter 3 of Chap. 111, Wis. Stats., to the federal Constitution and to the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, and those issues were decided against the union in the State court action. The questions essential to a determination herein are the same as those of the State court case.

It is true that the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court contains some equivocal language which furnishes some foundation for the contention of plaintiffs herein that all of the issues were not squarely met. Nevertheless it is the action which the Supreme Court took which is important rather than any reasons which it might give for such action. The appeal was from the judgment of the Circuit Court. Included in the issues squarely raised were the claimed repugnancy of subchapter 3 of Chap. 111 to the federal Constitution and to the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was empowered to reverse, affirm or modify the Circuit Court judgment; it did not reverse or modify, but affirmed the judgment without any condition or qualification. The mandate of the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not affirm an order sustaining a demurrer, but rather it affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County in that case. Moreover, it is not important whether we refer to the judgment which was affirmed as a judgment of the Circuit Court or of the Supreme Court.

Plaintiffs' argument that all of the merits of the controversy were not passed upon is conclusively answered in Angel v....

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3 cases
  • Rosenthal v. State of Nev., Civ. No. LV 79-39 RDF.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • May 6, 1981
    ...form of relief is requested in the second action does not preclude the application of res judicata. St. John v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 90 F.Supp. 347, 351 (E.D.Wis.1950). Furthermore, the bringing in of additional parties in the second suit that contributed to the same allege......
  • Larsen v. THE M/V TEAL, A-16000.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Alaska
    • May 15, 1961
    ...issue or points controverted upon the determination of which the prior judgment was rendered. In the case of St. John v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, D.C., 90 F.Supp. 347, it is held that a judgment of a state court is res judicata and bars a subsequent action in the federal court ......
  • St John v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • February 26, 1951
    ...judicata and held, one judge dissenting, that appellants are barred from attacking the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law. 1950, 90 F.Supp. 347. The case is properly here on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1253, 28 U.S.C.A. § We need not linger over the propriety of invoking the doctrine of res j......

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