ST. JOSEPH ABBEY v. CASTILLE

Decision Date08 April 2011
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 10-2717
PartiesST. JOSEPH ABBEY, ET AL. V. PAUL "WES" CASTILLE, ET AL.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

SECTION "K"(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 22) filed by St. Joseph Abbey and Mark Coudrain (Plaintiffs) and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Alternatively, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Rule 12(c) filed by Paul "Wes" Castille, Oscar A. Rollins, Belva M. Pichon, Craig G. Gill, Andrew Hayes, Wall V. McKneely, Margaret Shehee, Kelly Rush Williams, and Louis Charbonnet, in their official capacities as Members of the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors (Defendants or EFD Board). (Doc. 38). The gravamen of this dispute concerns the Benedictine monks of Saint Joseph Abbey and their wish to sell wooden caskets.

On August 12, 2010, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. (Complaint, ¶ 1). Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief against the enforcement of Louisiana's Embalming and Funeral Directors Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:831-:885 ("the Act"), and the practices and policies of the EFD Board which deny Plaintiffs the ability to sell caskets at retail without being licensed as required under the Act. Mark Coudrain ("Coudrain") is an ordained deacon of the Archdiocese of New Orleans and is employed at the Abbey as the director of both the Christian Life Center and Saint Joseph Woodworks which seeks to hand-make and sell monastic caskets to the general public. He is not a licensed funeral director under Louisiana Law. (Complaint, ¶ 7).

Plaintiffs allege that Louisiana's funeral-licensing laws and regulations violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights to Due Process in that:

74. Louisiana's Funeral-licensing laws and regulations violate Plaintiffs' right to due process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983 on their face and as-applied to the extent that Louisiana law requires individuals to be licensed funeral directors merely to engage in the retail sale of caskets, to the extent that Louisiana law requires entities to be licensed funeral establishments to engage in the retail sale of caskets, and to the extent that Louisiana law requires the free storage of purchased caskets to comply with the requirements of a "pre-need" funeral-services contract.

(Complaint, ¶74). And with respect to the violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiffs allege:

77. By requiring the sellers of simple wooden caskets to comply with an arbitrary and irrelevant licensing scheme that is not rationally related to any legitimate public health and safety concerns, but is instead designed for another profession, Defendants, their agents, and employees are treating two distinct and different occupations as the same and therefore violate the rights of Plaintiffs to equal protection of laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

(Complaint, ¶ 77).1

Indeed, under the Act, it is unlawful for anyone to conduct the business of funeral directing or to engage in the business of funeral directing as defined in La. Rev. Stat. 37:831 unless such business is conducted by a duly licensed funeral establishment. La. Rev. Stat. 37:848 (A) and (C). "Funeral directing" is defined in relevant part as "the operation of a funeral home, or, by way of illustration and not limitation, any service whatsoever connected with the management of funerals, or the supervision of hearses or funeral cars, the purchase of caskets or other funeral merchandise, and retail sale and display thereof, . . . ." La. Rev. Stat. 37: 831(35) (emphasis added). "Funeral establishment" is defined as "any place or premises duly licensed by the board and devoted to or used in the care and preparation for burial of the body of a deceased person or maintained or held out to the public by advertising or otherwise as the office or place for the practice of funeral directing." La. Rev. Stat. 37:831(37).

Thus, under the Act, in order to simply sell wooden caskets, the monks of the Abbey and/or Mark Coudrain would have to complete a full-time apprenticeship with a licensed funeral director during which time such person would have to make that his principal occupation and be employed full-time as such. La. Rev. Stat. § 37:842; La. Admin Code tit. 46, § 903(4)-(5). Examinations conducted by the EFD Board concerning sociology, psychology, funeral directing, and funeral-service law, would have to be passed. La. Rev. Stat. § 37:842; La. Admin. Cod tit. 46, §503. Also continuing education requirements pertaining to funeral directing would have to be completed. La. Admin. Code tit. 46, § 709. In addition, the Abbey itself would have to become a licensed funeral establishment and employ a state-licensed funeral director. It would also have to install embalming facilities for the sanitation, disinfection and preparation of a human body. La. Rev. Stat. §37:842(D)(1) and (3). Plaintiffs contend none of these requirements have any rational basis for them to be able simply to sell wooden caskets made by them at the Abbey.

The monks of Saint Joseph Abbey seek to sell these simple wooden coffins which they contend are significantly less expensive than the average coffin sold through the traditional funeral home. They do so to generate income as they are self-sustaining and receive no support from the Catholic church. Their previous method of raising funds-harvesting timber-will not sustain them in the future. They also intended to store pre-need, purchased caskets at no charge for the customer. Plaintiffs contend that this is not analogous to the procedure where a customer pays for a casket on a "pre-need basis" and the seller holds the money in trust until the customer dies and then the seller purchases or in this instance builds the casket. In this regard, Plaintiffs contend that where the Abbey sells a casket prior to the need, it simply provides free storage for that casket. They maintain that the requirements under the Act are onerous and without a rational basis other than pure economic protectionism for the benefit of the funeral industry (Rec. Doc. 33, p. 13).

As Plaintiffs were gearing up to begin this new venture, and before the first casket was sold, the EFD Board ordered them to cease and desist from the direct sale of caskets or other funeral merchandise as they were not in compliance with the law. Nonetheless, the Abbey apparently began selling the caskets. After a complaint from a funeral-home establishment was filed, the Abbey was investigated. The Abbey attempted to obtain a legislative solution for this situation, but to no avail. On March 30, 2010, a Subpoena issued by the EFD Board:

"[i]n that they have allegedly sold caskets to several consumers; and/or, has allegedly violated the provision s of LA R.S. 37:861 in that they have advertised on their website and/or in a brochure that "We encourage you to pay for your casket now to take advantage of the current price. But you don't have to worry about storage. When the time arrives for the need of the casket, you can simply have the funeral home contact us and we will deliver your casket."

Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exh 4. (Doc. 22-2, p. 12 of 13).

The lawsuit was filed on August 12, 2010 and the instant Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed on September 14, 2010, challenging the state licensing laws and regulations which, as previously described, require one to be a licensed funeral director operating through a licensed funeral home to sell caskets directly to the public. In addition, they sought to not be subject to the "pre-need" law which requires them to place all funds paid for any funeral merchandise on a pre-need basis into a special account or insurance policy to be utilized at the time of the consumer's death to pay for such merchandise.

An Unopposed and Incorporated Memorandum to Continue and Reset Hearing (Doc.23) was filed after which the Court held a status conference. The motion was reset to October 13, 2010. (Doc. 25). However, the parties then moved for a further continuance and agreed that the matter would be taken on the papers after all briefing on that motion would be completed by November 12, 2010.

On December 6, 2010, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or alternatively, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Rule 12(c). (Doc. 38). This motion seeks dismissal of the entire matter based on a single legal issue-whether protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition constitutes a legitimate government purpose. While defendants maintain that the laws and regulations at issue herein do not have protection of the funeral industry's monopoly as their sole purpose, they contend that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because such protection is recognized as a sufficient legitimate government interest under the rational-basis test. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, taking Plaintiffs' allegations as true- that these laws and regulations are simple economic protectionism with no other purpose- Plaintiffs have no claim. Plaintiffs contend that such protectionism does not provide a per se rational basis relying primarily on Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). Both cases concern the regulation of casket sales through the use of state laws similar to the ones at issue herein. Thus, there is a circuit split and the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit has not spoken on this issue. So ...

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