St. Louis Housing Authority v. Gordon

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Citation: St. Louis Housing Authority v. Gordon, 382 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App. 1964)
• Decision Date: 25 September 1964
• Docket Number: No. 31379,31379
• Parties: ST. LOUIS HOUSING AUTHORITY, (Plaintiff) Appellant, v. Byron GORDON et al., Defendants, Francis S. Montgomery, (Defendant) Respondent.
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM

Page 451

382 S.W.2d 451

ST. LOUIS HOUSING AUTHORITY, (Plaintiff) Appellant, v. Byron GORDON et al., Defendants, Francis S. Montgomery (Defendant) Respondent.

No. 31379.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Sept. 25, 1964.

Irvin Dagen, Edward C. Cody, Donald Gunn, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas R. R. Ely, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.

GEORGE P. ADAMS, Special Commissioner.

Plaintiff-appellant condemnor appeals from an order sustaining defendant-respondent landowner's motion for a new trial.

On December 30, 1960, a Commissioner's award was made in favor of defendant in the amount of $10,900.00 for damages sustained in the taking of her property by plaintiff.

On trial of exceptions filed by both parties the evidence of market value of the property was $14,000.00 to $14,500.00, $8,200.00, $7,000.00 and $6,900.00.

Over objection of defendant, the court permitted a field supervisor of real estate appraisers connected with the St. Louis City Assessor's office to testify that for the year 1960 defendant's property was assessed for tax purposes $3,200.00.

The jury returned a verdict for $10,000.00.

The trial judge sustained defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground the court erred in admitting evidence as to the assessed valuation of defendant's property.

Appellant says that the trial court erred in sustaining the motion for a new trial, '* * * for the reasons that the assessment was thoroughly explained, the Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the assessor, assessed valuation was distinguished from fair market value, and the Jury was not misled by the admission of this testimony into evidence.'

This question has long ago been settled in Missouri. In Kansas City & G. Ry. Co. v. Haake et al., 331 Mo. 429, 53 S.W.2d 891, 84 A.L.R. 1477, the Supreme Court held that testimony of the assessed valuation of property for tax purposes was incompetent and its admission was prejudicially erroneous.

To avoid the lethal consequences of this case, plaintiff points out (with emphasis supplied by it) that the Court stated, on page 892 of 53 S.W.2d: 'Unless there is something to take this out of the general rule, we think the objections to this evidence should have been sustained' saying that by this language the Supreme Court 'left open' the question of admissibility of such testimony 'under other circumstances.'

The 'somethings' or 'other circumstances' that 'take' the instant case out of the general rule suggested by defendant are:

First, since one witness used the 'income approach' in arriving at value and stated that taxes would have to be considered, then, upon ascertaining the amount of taxes a buyer could '* * * figure out the assessed value.' While this justification for admitting evidence of assessed valuation appears somewhat nonsensical, the same 'reasoning' would, nevertheless, have applied to the facts in the Haake case. Further, the same 'buyer' could also check the real estate records and might find where the property had recently been sold for a price below its market value at auction under the hammer, or had been recently purchased by an heir at an exorbitant price because it was the old family homestead. These transactions and the prices paid might well have been 'discovered', but they would not reflect 'market value' and would have been incompetent.

Next, plaintiff says that the witness testified that assessed valuation for tax purposes was not true market value, and it then 'reasons' that...