St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 25 January 1897
• Docket Number: 759.
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, I.M. & S. RY. CO. v. EDWARDS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

78 F. 745

ST. LOUIS, I.M. & S. RY. CO. v. EDWARDS.

No. 759.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

January 25, 1897

This action las brought in the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Arkansas by J. L. Edwards, the defendant in error, against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain &amp Southern Railway Company, the plaintiff in error, to recover damages for negligently delaying the transportation of 847 head of cattle over the defendants' road. The plaintiff in the action recovered judgment in the lower court, and the defendant sued out this writ of error. The cattle were detained in the defendant's cars 12 or 15 hours in excess of the limit allowed by the act of congress, during the most of which time the cars were standing still. To prove the damage sustained by the cattle by reason of their long and negligent detention in the cars, the plaintiff called a witness, who was shown to have been extensively engaged for many years in buying, selling, and feeding cattle, and in shipping them by rail and attending them in transit, and who attended the shipment of the cattle in controversy, and was familiar with their market value, and the effect upon them of their long detention in the cars, and propounded to him the following questions: 'Q. From your observation of these cattle at that time, and your knowledge of cattle, can you state what damage they had sustained? A. My judgment is, they sustained a damage of three dollars a head. Q. Doctor, state if you can, what the difference in the value of these cattle was per head between the condition in which they arrived as you saw them, and the condition in which they would have arrived had they gone in on proper time, and with proper transportation. A. Three dollars a head. ' The defendant made timely objections to each of these questions upon the ground that 'it was incompetent and improper, and for the further reason that it called for an opinion as to the value which was wholly within the province of the jury'; and it also objected to the answers to each of the questions because 'it was incompetent and improper, and for the further reason that it was an opinion as to value, which was wholly within the province of the jury.' The court overruled these objections, to which ruling of the court the defendant duly excepted, and has assigned the same for error.

Geo. E. Dodge, B. S. Johnson, and J. E. Williams, for plaintiff in error.

T. E. Webber, for defendant in error.

Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.

CALDWELL Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, .

The objection to the testimony was, not that the witness was not qualified to give an opinion as to the damage to the cattle, but it was that the question 'called for an opinion as to values, which has wholly within the province of the jury., The general rule undoubtedly is that witnesses are to testify to facts, and not to give their opinions; but this rule has its exceptions as familiar and well settled as the rule itself. The exceptions rest upon the common ground of necessity. Among these exceptions is this one: That a witness, having special knowledge and experience as to the value of property animate or inanimate, and as to how the value of such property is affected by certain conditions or treatment, may give his opinion as to how much the property was damaged or benefited by such conditions or treatment. In many cases witnesses are allowed to testify to their opinions, not because they are experts in the technical sense of that term, but because they have special knowledge of the particular facts in the case, which the jurors have not. It is manifest that one who has never handled or shipped cattle by rail, and has never looked after and attended them while in the cars en route to their destination, can have no accurate conception of the effect upon cattle of confining them in cars standing still on the track for 10 or more hours at the end of a long journey. It does not accord with reason or experience to say that a jury composed of merchants, bankers, tailors, shoemakers, or others, who know absolutely nothing about raising or shipping cattle, or the effect upon them of detaining them for an unreasonable length of time in cars standing still on the track, are as capable of estimating the effect of such detention as an experienced cattle man, who has been engaged in handling and shipping cattle by the thousands for almost the space of a human life, and who was present with the cattle, attending to them, during their transportation. It is no answer to this to say that perchance there might be on the jury a farmer or cattle man who had had some experience in handling and shipping cattle, for it is a rule that a juryman cannot testify in the jury room, to his fellows about facts within his personal knowledge, and, if he does, the verdict will be set aside. Nor is it any answer to say that the witness can tell the jury how long the cattle were in the cars, or how they looked and acted, and that from that imperfect information the jury may arrive at a correct conclusion as to the damage. The poverty of the English language makes it absolutely impossible for a witness to present to the minds of the jurors the appearance of cattle, and what that appearance denotes, as it is presented to his practiced and experienced eyes. The experience of the witness and the appearance of the cattle cannot be photographed on the minds of the jurors. The knowledge of the condition of these cattle, and how that condition affected their value, must of necessity have existed in the mind of the witness who had had such a large and extended experience in shipping cattle with far greater clearness and certainty than it could have been communicated to the minds of the jurors by any statement he might have made of what he saw merely, however clear and lucid such statement might have been. It is obvious that, if witnesses were to be permitted to state to a jury those facts only of which they have absolute knowledge, not only the range of inquiry, but the province of remedial justice, would be very materially contracted. Gulf, C. & S.R. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 4 U.S.App. 121, 1 C.C.A. 286, 49 F. 347; Harpending v.Shoemaker, 37 Barb. 270. It is clear upon principle and authority that the objections to the questions and answers were rightly overruled.

In Clifford v. Richardson, 18 Vt. 626, the court said:

'The facts are sometimes incapable of being presented with their proper force and significance to any but the observer himself, and it often happens that the triers are not qualified, from experience in the ordinary affairs of life, duly to appreciate all the material facts when proved. Under these circumstances the opinions of witnesses must, of necessity, be received.'

In Shattuck v. Railroad Co., 6 Allen, 115, the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts said:

'It is settled in this commonwealth that where the value of property, real or personal, is in controversy, persons acquainted with it may state their opinion as to its value; also where the amount of damage done to property is in controversy such persons may state their opinion as to the amount of the damage. This is permitted as an exception to the general rule, and not strictly on the ground that such persons are experts; for such an application of that term would greatly extend its signification. The persons who testify are not supposed to have science or skill superior to that of the jurors; they have merely a knowledge of the particular facts in the case which the jurors have not. And as value rests merely in opinion, this exception to the general rule that witnesses must be confined to facts, and cannot give opinions, is founded in necessity and obvious propriety. Walker v. Boston, 8 Cush. 279; Dwight v. Commissioners, 11 Cush. 201; Vandine v. Burpee, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 288; Wyman v. Railroad Co., Id. 326; Clark v. Baird, 9 N.Y. 183.'

And in a later case in the same court (Swan v. Middlesex Co., 101 Mass. 173, 178), the court, speaking by Judge Gray, now Mr. Justice Gray of the supreme court of the United States, said:

'The only objections taken at the trial, so far as they applied to each of the witnesses, were to the admission of the question 'what, in his opinion, would be the effect upon the value of the estate in question,

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