St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. National Refining Co.
| Decision Date | 16 June 1915 |
| Docket Number | 8779. |
| Citation | 226 F. 357 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS, I.M. & S. RY. CO. v. NATIONAL REFINING CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Edward J. White, of St. Louis, Mo., and Henry G. Herbel and Fred G Wright, both of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff.
C. D Chamberlin and Tolles, Hogsett, Ginn & Morley, all of Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.
The court is of the opinion that demurrage was properly chargeable in each instance submitted to it for consideration. Going to the first cause of action, we cannot construe the contract for switch track between the railway company and the defendant as having any other effect than to make the track for all intents and purposes the property of the railway company.
This is not only the result of section 6 of the contract, in which it is specifically provided that the title to the track, with all material entering into its construction and the roadbed and its appurtenances, should belong to the railroad company but section 3 also provides very extensive dominance over the track for use by the railway company in its provision that the track shall be used 'only for the purpose of receiving and delivering shipments made to or by the second party (the defendant) and for use by the railway company for any purpose which in the opinion of its general manager does not unreasonably interfere with the shipments of said second party.'
Whether the 'general manager,' who is to decide the extent to which the railway company may use this track, is the general manager of the railway company, or, as seems more probable, that of the defendant, the effect of this language is to restrict the use by the defendant of the track, as against all other uses by the railway company, to shipment purposes only and not storage purposes. It seems clear that the defendant could not use this track as a storage track for its own cars without infringing upon the rights of the railway company as provided by this section 3.
Now coming to the second cause of action, we find a significant change in the language providing for demurrage on private cars. The older tariff sheets operative under the first cause of action provided more scope for escape from demurrage to private cars than did the tariff in force covering the facts of the second cause of action. We now find that private cars may be subject to demurrage on the private tracks of the owners of the cars,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
National Refining Co. v. St. Louis. I. M. & S. Ry. Co.
...to, we are satisfied that the conclusions, both of fact and law, reached by the learned trial judge and expressed in his opinion (226 F. 357, 358) are According to both the deed and agreement, the ownership of the spur track is in express terms vested in the railway company. We need not att......
-
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St L. Ry. Co. v. Freedom Oil Works
... ... person not a party to the contract ... In ... St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. National Refining Co ... (D.C.) 226 F. 357, under a very similar agreement, ... ...
- The Chinook