St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. United States

• Decision Date: 10 September 1914
• Docket Number: 959.
• Citation: 217 F. 80
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, I.M. & S. RY. CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES (INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Intervener).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Illinois

217 F. 80

ST. LOUIS, I.M. & S. RY. CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES (INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Intervener).

No. 959.

United States District Court, E.D. Illinois.

September 10, 1914

H. G Herbel, of St. Louis, Mo., for complainant St. Louis, I.M. &amp S. Ry. Co.

S. H West and E. A. Haid, both of St. Louis, Mo., for complainant St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.

Joseph W. Folk and Charles W. Needham, both of Washington, D.C., for intervener.

Blackburn Esterline, of Washington, D.C., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Karch, U.S. Atty., of Danville, Ill.

Before BAKER, Circuit Judge, and HUMPHREY and WRIGHT, District Judges.

BAKER Circuit Judge (orally).

If the complainants must obey the Commission's order, it will be necessary for them to prepare tariffs by September 20th, and it is therefore necessary that this application for a temporary injunction promptly be determined. The importance and novelty of the questions involved might well justify a carefully prepared opinion; but having been given a very complete exposition of the case through the able and elaborate arguments of counsel, and having come to the conclusion that an injunction should issue, we proceed, in view of the limited time, at once to enter a decree and to indicate briefly the grounds of our decision.

Beginning with the Abilene Case, and down through the Pitcairn, Robinson, Mitchell Coal & Coke, International Coal, and many other cases, the general principle has been thoroughly settled that the courts of the United States cannot act in these interstate commerce cases as they can in ordinary appeals in equity, where the court may examine the evidence and substitute its finding of facts for that of the original tribunal. Questions of policy and expediency cannot be considered. In short, nothing can be reviewed except questions of law. But in interstate commerce cases, as in all other cases, it is always a question of law whether there is evidence on which the finding can legally be based.

The order attacked by these complainants was entered in a proceeding before the Commission wherein merchants of Metropolis, Ill., were petitioners and a score of railroads were respondents. The petitioners asserted that the railroad rates from Southern and Southwestern lumber territory to Metropolis were wrongful in two respects: First, that the rates in themselves were excessive; and, second, that the rates exhibited an undue preference in favor of Cairo, Ill., and undue discrimination against Metropolis. The Commission found that the first charge was without basis in fact, and placed its order wholly upon the ground of discrimination. All of the respondent railroads, except these two complainants, have apparently acquiesced in the order; and we are of the opinion that the evidence before the Commission was sufficient on which legally to base a finding that discrimination against Metropolis was exercised by some of the railroads which were respondents in the proceeding before the Commission. It is now argued by the defendants in this case that, because there was evidence before the Commission to justify a finding of discrimination by some, the order must stand as against all the railroads which were parties to the hearing. In our opinion this is erroneous. In a civil case against a number of defendants, or in a criminal indictment against numerous defendants, a judgment cannot be permitted to stand against a certain defendant, if there is no evidence against him, merely because there may be evidence which would support the judgment against other defendants. And so we believe that, as a matter of law, an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission must be supported by evidence which is sufficient to warrant a finding separately against each railroad named in the order.

Against neither of the complainants in this cause was there evidence before the Commission which could...