St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Caraway
Decision Date | 06 January 1906 |
Citation | 91 S.W. 749,77 Ark. 405 |
Parties | ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. CARAWAY |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Craighead Circuit Court; ALLEN HUGHES, Judge, affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
B. S Johnson, for appellant.
Plaintiff cannot recover for injuries received while working voluntarily, and in violation of the rules of the company, in a position not required by his duties. 3 Eliott, Railroads §§ 1303, 1313; 1 Labatt, Master and Servant, 843; 70 Ark. 606; 41 Ark. 547. Failure to obey the rules of the company will defeat a recovery by the injured employee, if the injury' was the proximate result of his disobedience. 3 Eliott, Railroads, § 1282, and cases cited; 51 Ark 467; 45 Ark. 318; 51 Miss 641; 50 Wis. 66. The rule will be presumed to be reasonable. 33 Ohio St. 227; 31 Mich. 430; 67 Mo. 239; 55 Ark. 510; 139 U.S. 223. It is not proper to hold that a rule has been abrogated, unless there hos been frequent and long-continued failure to obey it, and such failure is known to the company. 3 Elliott, Railroads, § 1282. The verdict on the second count of the complaint is excessive. 57 Ark. 321; Ib. 384. The act of April 25, 1901, in unconstitutional, citing, art. 4, §§ 1, 2, Const. 1874; 1 Cranch, 137; 1 U.S. S.Ct. 388-390; 1 Ark. 589; 2 Ark. 501; 14 Ark. 698; 5 Ark. 710; 6 Ark. 71; 14 Ark. 568; 16 Ark. 384; 24 Ark. 444; Ib. 91; 25 Ark. 489; 44 Ark. 280; 49 Ark. 492; Ib. 160; 58 Ark. 121; 69 Conn. 594; 11 Pa.St. 194; 36 L. R. A. 105; 84 Mass. 378.
Lamb & Gautney, for appellee.
The rule had been abrogated. 48 Ark. 333; 58 N.Y. 56; 24 S.W. 1053; 1 C. C. A. 625; 32 S.W. 799; 11 S.W. 308; 27 N.E. 1042; 56 N.W. 519; 73 Ind. 261; 65 N.W. 995; 62 N.W. 798; 8 So. 776; 42 S.E. 913; 33 S.W. 1050; 14 So. 209; 71 S.W. 560. The proximate cause of the injury was the negligent placing of the coal car by the switchmen, and the rule, even if in force, had no application. 33 So. 382; 43 S.E. 511; 27 S.W. 476; 9 So. 252; 23 S.W. 633; 44 A. 723; 24 A. 924.
The verdict, under the proof, was not excessive. 57 Ark. 307; 60 Ark. 550; 85 S.W. 68; 63 N.E. 1123; 116 F. 86; 77 P. 1058; 81 S.W. 991; 83 S.W. 34; 68 N.E. 1125; 73 S.W. 654; 82 N. Y. St. 1057; 71 P. 725. The act of April 25, 1901, is not unconstitutional. Citing art 7, § 4, Const. 1874; art. 6, § 2, Const. 1836; art. 6, § 2, Const. 1861; art. 7, § 2, Const. 1864; art. 3, § 2, Const. U.S.; 98 U.S. 398; 7 Wallace, 506; 29 S.W. 465; 37 N.E. 879; 12 S.W. 304; 15 Ind. 246; 39 Ind. 501; 69 Ind. 458; 20 Cal. 196; 61 Cal. 605; 37 N.E. 879.
This is an action brought by the administrator of the estate of H. A. Stephenson, deceased, against the St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of said decedent by the train of defendant. Damages were laid in the sum of $ 25,000, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $ 2,000 to the estate for pain and suffering endured by the decedent after he was struck by the train, and $ 8,000 for the benefit of the widow and child of decedent.
Stephenson was employed by the railway company as brakeman on a through freight train, his run being between Little Rock, Ark., and Poplar Bluff, Mo. As his train came into the terminal yards near Little Rock about midnight, he was struck by a coal car standing on a sidetrack, knocked to the ground, and run over by the cars of his train. From the injuries sustained he suffered great pain, and died a few days thereafter. The coal car had, by other employees of the defendant in the yards, been left so near the end of the sidetrack on which it stood that sufficient space did not intervene between it and cars passing on the adjoining track, and Stephenson was struck by it while he was on the side of a box car of his own train. It is not contended that there was any error in the instructions or verdict as to the question of negligence of defendants servants in leaving the coal car in the position named, or that the position of the coal car did not cause the injury complained of. So those questions may be treated as settled. It is only contended that Stephenson, in leaving his post of duty on top of his train and climbing down the side of the box car, was guilty of negligence which contributed to the injury, and that for that reason no recovery can be had. No one saw Stephenson when he was struck. He was the forward or head brakeman on the train, and one of the other brakemen on the train testified that he saw the swinging light from Stephenson's lantern just before he climbed down the side of the car. Both of the other brakemen testified that they heard his groans as their end of the train passed the spot where he had fallen, that they found him lying on the ground, and that he told them the coal car had knocked him off the side of the box car. They also testified that they saw the position of the coal car, and that it was close enough to strike a man on the side of a passing box car. There was no proof as to the purpose of Stephenson in climbing down the side of the car, except that it was the uniform custom of the brakemen, when they came into the yards at the end of the run, to get down from the train before it stopped, and wait for the caboose to come up, and then deposit their lanterns therein. The proof shows that the rules of the company required them to deposit their lanterns in the caboose before leaving the yards for their respective homes or stopping-places:
Appellant, to establish contributory negligence on the part of Stephenson, introduced in evidence and relied solely upon the following rule of the company. viz.:
It is also shown that Stephenson know of the existence of this rule when he accepted employment from the company, and it is claimed that he was guilty of contributory negligence in violating it.
It cannot be said to be negligence per se for a brakeman on a freight train to climb down the side of a box car. His duties require him to do so frequently, and whether or not it is negligence to do so at a particular time or under given circumstances is a question of fact, for a jury to determine.
The doctrine is well-established that violation by the servant of rules promulgated by the master for the protection, under such circumstances as those attending the injury, of the class of employees to which he belonged is of itself contributory negligence, and should be so declared as a matter of law. I Labatt, Master and Servant, § 365; Dresser on Employers' Liability, § 109.
The rule in question was manifestly adopted, not for protection of the servants, but to measure the servant's duty to the master in the performance of his work. It states, in terms, that the object was to require the brakemen to be in position to handle the train. Whether the violation by the servant of such a rule made solely for the benefit of the master can be held to be negligence per se is another question altogether, and one which it is not necessary to decide in this case. The reason upon which the authorities base the doctrine of contributory negligence in violating rules seems to lead to the conclusion that it would not apply to such a rule as this. 1 Labatt, § 365a, and cases cited; L. R. & F. S. Ry. v. Eubanks, 48 Ark. 460.
Be that as it may, there was proof tending to show that this rule, so far as it required trainmen on entering terminals to remain on top of the train until the switches were cleared, was uniformly, openly and habitually disregarded by the trainmen for a considerable period of time, to the extent that they got off the train and started back to the caboose or waited for it to come up before he train came to a stop.
The court submitted to the jury the question of the abrogation of the rule in this respect, upon the following instruction, to-wit:
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