St. Louis Police Officers' Ass'n v. Sayad
Citation | 685 S.W.2d 913 |
Decision Date | 26 December 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 48258,48258 |
Parties | ST. LOUIS POLICE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION, a not for profit corporation, Donald Schnable, Paul Rea and James Conner, Appellants, v. Homer E. SAYAD, Charles Valier, Thomas W. Purcell, Robert F. Wintersmith, comprising the membership of the Board of Police, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, Respondents. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
C. John Pleban, St. Louis, for appellants.
F. William McCalpin, St. Louis, for respondents.
Appellants, the St. Louis Police Officers' Association and three individual police officers, appeal from the trial court's refusal to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus against the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis. The St. Louis Police Officers' Association is a voluntary not-for-profit association whose membership includes a majority of the police officers employed by the Board. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Most of the pertinent facts are contained in a stipulation of the parties or are documentary in nature.
There exists within the police department a procedure for investigation of complaints made against police officers. In 1974 the then existing Board provided for a procedure for investigation of complaints made by citizens against officers, including certain appeal rights by citizens to the Board itself. One of the new rules enacted at that time was Rule 7.013. It provided:
"7.013 Classification-Complaint Investigation Reports--Each forwarded complaint investigative report shall specify the allegation(s) which are to be classified in one of the following four categories:
(a) Unfounded. The complaint was not based on facts, as shown by the investigation, or the incident complained of did not occur.
(b) Exonerated. The action complained of did occur, but the investigation disclosed that the actions were reasonable, lawful and proper.
(c) Not sustained. Insufficient evidence available to either prove or disprove the allegations in the complaint.
(d) Sustained. Investigation disclosed sufficient evidence to support the allegations in the complaint.
In any instance when a complaint is finally disposed of as 'Unfounded,' or 'Exonerated,' all records pertaining to the complaint and its disposition shall be expunged."
These categories pre-existed the rules change but no expungement was authorized.
The minutes of the Board meeting at which the new procedures were passed, including Rule 7.013, stated:
In 1977 the Board amended Rule 7.013 to add a category of "Complaint Withdrawn" which category was added to those covered by the expungement provision.
Commencing on October 1, 1974 the Department began expunging from departmental records complaints and investigations thereof occurring on or after that date found to be "Unfounded" or "Exonerated." It did the same for "Complaint Withdrawn" dispositions occurring on or after the effective date of the 1977 amendment. No expungement was made from departmental records of complaints in any of the three categories which were disposed of prior to the effective date of the rules. As a result the records of officers having complaint dispositions in any of the three categories for which expungement is now provided still show such complaint dispositions occurring before the effective date of the rules. These records are utilized by the Board in assessing punishment for complaints "sustained" and in determining promotions.
The three individual plaintiffs are all long-time police officers and each has one or more of the now expunged complaint categories reflected in his service record for complaints pre-dating the 1974 and 1977 rules. These plaintiffs and the Association sought mandamus to compel the Board to expunge from all department records complaint dispositions of "unfounded" "exonerated" and "withdrawn" which pre-date the rules changes. They also sought to have all complaint dispositions in the "not sustained" category expunged on due process grounds.
The plaintiffs challenge the trial court's finding that the Association lacked standing to bring this action. The Board has not addressed this issue in its brief. The practice challenged directly affects many members of the Association and if the failure of the Board to expunge is illegal it is a practice which the individual members could properly challenge as it affects their discipline and promotion. The interests which the Association seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose. Neither the relief requested nor the claim asserted requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. In this case the Association meets all the requirements of associational standing. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 344, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) ; Ferguson Police Officers' Association v. City of Ferguson, 670 S.W.2d 921 (Mo.App.1984) ; Pippin v. City of Springfield, 596 S.W.2d 770 (Mo.App.1980) . The case is distinguishable from St. Louis Police Officers' Association v. McNeal, 585 S.W.2d 70 (Mo.App.1979) where the court held no actual controversy in fact existed meaning any decree would be advisory only. Here the relief sought would compel the Board to expunge the records of all the officers in the department affected by the practice challenged. Such a decree is in no sense advisory. The trial court erred in dismissing the Association from the proceeding.
We next turn to the availability of mandamus to obtain the relief sought. "The function of a writ of mandamus is to enforce, not establish, a claim or right and its purpose is to execute, not adjudicate ... The general rule is that a court will issue a writ of mandamus only where it is shown that one requesting the writ has a clear and unequivocal right to the relief requested and a corresponding present, imperative, unconditional duty imposed on the respondent which the respondent has breached." Naugher v. Mallory, 631 S.W.2d 370 (Mo.App.1982) [2-5]; State ex rel. Summers v. Platz, 614 S.W.2d 559 (Mo.App.1981) ; Leamon v. City of Independence, 625 S.W.2d 204 (Mo.App.1981) [2, 3]. To the extent that plaintiffs seek through the writ to establish their right to relief based upon due process or equal protection grounds they are attempting to use the writ to adjudicate not execute, to establish not enforce. They are not entitled to utilize the writ for that purpose. The contentions regarding the "not sustained" category of investigation reports are based...
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