St Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley

• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
• Citation: St Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley, 155 F. 220 (W.D. Mo. 1907)
• Decision Date: 17 June 1907
• Docket Number: 2,988.
• Parties: ST. LOUIS & S.F.R. CO. v. HADLEY, Atty. Gen., et al. (and 17 other cases).

155 F. 220

ST. LOUIS & S.F.R. CO. v. HADLEY, Atty. Gen., et al. (and 17 other cases).

No. 2,988.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division.

June 17, 1907

Frank Hagerman, for complainants.

Herbert S. Hadley, John Kennish, Sanford B. Ladd, and F. W. Lehmann for defendants.

McPHERSON District Judge.

These cases were argued on Saturday and taken under advisement until this time. The situation is such that I must decide the questions to-day. Limited as the time has been, I have an abiding conviction of what should be done, even if the reasons therefor may not be stated with the fullness that the importance of the matters requires. I have been much aided by the arguments, which were strong, eloquent, and powerful, by counsel representing both sides, and, as it seems to me every phase of the questions was so illuminated by the arguments that all possible questions are at an end of debate. The real question here is: Has this court jurisdiction over the passenger fare law of 1907 of the Missouri Legislature, by which it is declared that the legal fare be two cents per mile? A question connected with that is whether the bills tendered are supplemental bills to those filed in the 18 cases two years ago to enjoin the enforcement of the freight tariff law of 1905 now pending before the master.

A supplemental bill usually is where there has been some change in the rights or status of the parties which must be carried forward by a supplemental bill, and usually, when a supplemental bill is thus allowed, matters can be brought in which could have been covered by an amendment to the original bill. These discussions as to supplemental bills, as well as to other bills, are exceedingly technical. It seems to me that the test is, not so much in the way a pleading is styled, as what the allegations of the pleading are. Formerly, discussions as to various bills in equity gave rise to great delay; the results being that years and years would elapse before a chancery case could be concluded. Looking back at those old discussions, it now seems to have been a folly to thus waste the time and energies of the judges and of counsel in determining such technical questions. Such must have been the belief of the Supreme Court when a code of rules in equity was established; the purpose no doubt being to get rid of the old technicalities which served no useful purpose. By the adoption of the rules in equity, we have a system of fact pleading covering almost every phase of equity pleading and practice; and it is only when some question of practice is not covered by the rules that we go back to see what the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England was, and then not as positive rules, but as furnishing just analogies. Rule 90 thus providing was adopted in the year 1842, and the Supreme Court has decided that, when we go to the English Chancery practice, we must take the practice as it existed in England in 1842, when this rule was adopted. By rule 57 it will be seen that the supplemental bill is allowed when any material event has happened after the filing of the original bill. In 1905, the Legislature of Missouri enacted a maximum freight tariff statute as to several commodities. The railways contested the validity of that statute in the 18 actions above referred to, and these actions are still pending. By the act of 1907 the Legislature declared that all railways should charge but two cents per mile per passenger. It seems to me that this is an event happening since the institution of the original suits, and an event that is germane to the original controverted questions. But I do not deem it of much importance to determine whether the pleadings tendered for filing are supplemental bills, or whether they are original bills.

On Tuesday, the 11th inst., the complainants gave notice of filing these bills on Friday, the 14th inst. On Thursday, the 13th inst., the railway companies asked leave to file them. Solely out of courtesy to the Attorney General, who was not then present, this was refused, but the court on its own motion issued restraining orders to keep the matters in statu quo. At the time fixed, Friday the 14th inst., the matter was again delayed for a day at the request of the Attorney General; he still being absent. And on that day bills were filed in the state courts at Saint Louis and Kansas City; the purpose being, as it is said, to bring about the enforcement of this statute in question. And the argument now is that, as these cases were filed in the state courts on Friday the 14th inst., the day before the arguments were had in this court, the same subject-matter was pending in the state courts, and that the state courts would take jurisdiction to the exclusion of this court; the cases being there first pending. But the above statement of facts shows that the cases were pending in this court from Tuesday, the 11th inst., and that orders were made on Thursday, the 13th inst., the day before the cases were lodged in the state courts. If these matters could not be covered by supplemental, they could be covered by original, bills, and they were presented prior to the institution of the cases in the state courts. It is not material whether these supplemental bills, so called, are full and complete as original bills. Defects could be cured upon exceptions or demurrers, or by complainants on their own motion before the filing of an answer. Nor is it material whether these pleadings are filed in the original cases or separately docketed, because, if separately docketed, they will at once for trial purposes be consolidated with the old cases pursuant to section 921 of the Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 685). And whether the contention of counsel for the state officers be technically correct or not, the contention is without substantial merit as to the rights of the parties. These pleadings should be filed and regarded as having been filed on Tuesday, the 11th inst.

The fixing of rates by the Legislature is presumptively correct and the railway companies have the burden of proof of showing that the statute is not remunerative. That the fixing of rates is a legislative act, all agree; but that such rates must be reasonably remunerative cannot longer be discussed. The railways are entitled to cost and a reasonable profit, and no fair-minded man disputes it. How to arrive at the cost and a reasonable profit is a most difficult problem. But, if the statute is challenged, it must be ascertained, and this ascertainment can only be by judicial proceedings, and must be determined by the courts, and ultimately by the Supreme Court of the United States. No skill of the draughtsman by the use of words or phrasing can take this question from the courts. It can never be settled in a criminal case by arresting ticket agents and conductors. The Supreme Court in the end must have the evidence with the right to make the ultimate findings of fact. There is but one orderly and seemly way, and that is in equity with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, as has been said by that court over and over again. All contentions that the courts of the state can decide these questions as well as can the United States courts is not a question for argument, because it is a question of jurisdiction, and in my judgment in these cases this...