St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. United States

• Decision Date: 17 March 1909
• Docket Number: 2,818.
• Citation: 169 F. 69
• Parties: ST. LOUIS & S.F.R. CO. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

169 F. 69

ST. LOUIS & S.F.R. CO. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 2,818.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 17, 1909

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Neither section 2 of article 3 of the Constitution nor the sixth amendment thereto operates to require that an action to recover a penalty incurred out of the limits of a state under the 28-hour law (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3594, 34 Stat 607 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 918)), be brought or tried in the district wherein the violation occurs; and such an action lawfully may be brought and tried in the district wherein the defendant resides or carries on business, as is provided in section 4 of that law.

The words 'knowingly and willfully' in the penal section of the 28-hour law (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 918)) cannot be disregarded because they describe an essential element of every right to the penalty therein prescribed.

'Knowingly,' as used in the penal section of the 28-hour law (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 918)), means with a knowledge of the facts which taken together constitute the failure to comply with the statute, as is the case where one carrier receives from another a car loaded with cattle, and, with knowledge of how long they then had been confined in the car without rest, water, or food, prolongs the confinement until the statutory limit is exceeded.

'Willfully,' as used in the penal section of the 28-hour law (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 918)), means purposely or obstinately, and is designed to describe the attitude of a carrier who, having a free will or choice, either intentionally disregards the statute or is plainly indifferent to its requirements.

W. F. Evans, E. P. Mann, and J. T. Woodruff, for plaintiff in error.

Leslie J. Lyons, Asst. U.S. Atty. (A. S. Van Valkenburgh, U.S. Atty., on the brief).

Before SANBORN and VAN DEVANTER, Circuit Judges, and W. H. MUNGER, District Judge.

VAN DEVANTER, Circuit Judge.

This was an action to recover a penalty for an alleged failure to comply with the provisions of section 1 of the act of June 29, 1906, c. 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907 p. 918), known as the '28-hour law.' The verdict and judgement were against the defendant, and it prosecutes this writ of error.

The alleged failure to comply with the statute occurred in what was then the Indian Territory, and not in the district wherein the action was brought and tried. Because of this, it is urged that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction; the argument being that a failure to comply with the statute is a crime, that an action to enforce the penalty, even though civil in form, is in effect a criminal prosecution, and therefore that section 2 of article 3 of the Constitution and the sixth amendment thereto require that the trial of such a case be had in the district wherein the failure occurs. There is at least one sufficient reason why this objection to the jurisdiction must fail. Section 2 of article 3 declares in respect of the place of trial for crimes:

'But when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.'

And the Supreme Court, in passing upon the effect of that section and of the sixth amendment, has repeatedly held that a crime committed against the laws of the United States, out of the limits of a state, is not local, but may be tried at such place as Congress shall designate by law. United States v. Dawson, 15 How. 467, 487, 14 L.Ed. 775; United States v. Jackalow, 1 Black, 484, 486, 17 L.Ed. 225; Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181, 11 Sup.Ct. 268, 34 L.Ed. 906. In section 4 of the 28-hour law Congress has directed that the action to recover a penalty incurred thereunder be brought in the district where the failure occurs, or in that wherein the defendant resides or carries on business. The defendant is a Missouri corporation, and carries on business within the district wherein the action was brought and tried. If, then, it were conceded, which it is not, that such a failure is a crime and that an action to recover the penalty therefor is in effect a criminal prosecution, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in this instance would still be beyond question.

The government's petition, when stripped of details not here material, charged that the defendant, while carrying upon its railroad certain cattle in transit from Comanche in the Indian Territory to National Stockyards in Illinois, failed to comply with the provisions of section 1 of the act before named, in that it unloaded the cattle into a pen at Seneca, an intermediate station, for rest, water, and feeding when the pen was not properly equipped for these purposes, because, first, it was too small to enable the cattle to obtain required rest; second, there were no water troughs or other facilities in the pen for watering cattle; and, third, there were no hay racks or feed troughs therein into which hay or other feed could be placed for cattle, and that in so failing to comply with the statute the defendant acted both knowingly and willfully. The answer denied each and all of these allegations.

As properly reflecting the position taken by the government in the course of the trial, we extract the following from its brief in this court:

'The issues were confined in this very narrow compass, to wit: Were the cattle unloaded by plaintiff in error into pens properly equipped for rest, feed, and water? No question is presented * * * as to confinement of the cattle for a period greater than that allowed by law, and no question is involved as to the manner of the unloading, or as to the quantity or quality of the feed and water furnished; the sole question being as to whether or not the plaintiff in error unloaded the cattle into pens properly equipped for rest, feed, and water as required by statute.'

At the conclusion of all the evidence the defendant requested that a verdict be directed in its favor, and error is assigned upon the denial of that request. It will be assumed, but without so deciding, that the statute is directed not merely against the continuous confinement of cattle in cars beyond the prescribed period of 28 or 36 hours, as the case may be without rest, water, or food, but also against unloading them for rest, water, and feeding into...