St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 28 November 1927
• Docket Number: No. 207.,207.
• Citation: 30 F.2d 454
• Parties: ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO. v. LAWRENCE et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma

30 F.2d 454 (1927)

ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO. v. LAWRENCE et al.

No. 207.

District Court, N. D. Oklahoma.

November 28, 1927.

C. B. Stuart and Ben Franklin, both of Oklahoma City, Okl. (Edwin Dabney, Atty. Gen., E. T. Miller, of St. Louis, Mo., and M. K. Cruce, of Oklahoma City, Okl., of counsel), for complainant.

T. L. Blakemore and D. A. McDougal, both of Sapulpa, Okl. (Ames, Lowe & Cochran, of Oklahoma City, Okl., of counsel), for respondents.

Before VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judge, and REEVES and KENNAMER, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This action was instituted by the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company on January 11, 1927, against J. F. Lawrence and C. C. Taylor, citizens of the city of Sapulpa, Okl., the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, and the state's Attorney General. Upon the filing of a verified bill of complaint setting forth facts hereinafter detailed, and in accordance with the allegations and prayer of the bill, a temporary restraining order was issued, returnable on the 19th of January, 1927. It was provided in the restraining order that complainant was to take no action in the premises pending a hearing on the application for the temporary injunction. A copy of this order was duly served upon the defendants.

The bill alleged in substance that the plaintiff was a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Missouri, as a railway company engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce, operating in the states of Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Mississippi, and other states; that during the month of February, 1917, defendants J. F. Lawrence and C. C. Taylor, appearing on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of Sapulpa and the citizens of said city, filed a complaint with the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma to prevent the plaintiff railway company from moving its shops and division point from the city of Sapulpa to the city of Tulsa; that the commission, by order No. 1232, temporarily restrained plaintiff from moving its shops or division point on February 15, 1917, as sought in said complaint; that upon an application of defendants Lawrence and Taylor filed on December 29, 1926, the Corporation Commission made and caused to be served upon plaintiff, the following order:

"This cause coming on to be heard on this 29th day of December, 1926, upon motion of the complainants, and it appearing that the defendant is taking steps toward the removal of its shops and division point from the city of Sapulpa in violation of the order of this commission entered on the 5th day of February, 1917, and in violation of the act of the Legislature passed in 1917, it is ordered by the commission that said cause be set down for hearing on the 17th day of January, 1927, and that in the meantime, and until the further order of the commission, the defendant be, and it is hereby prohibited from moving its shops or division point from the city of Sapulpa, from changing the runs of either its passenger or freight trains, or from taking any other steps towards changing its division point for either passenger or freight service from the said city of Sapulpa."

The provisions of the Oklahoma statute relied upon for the jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission were set forth, as follows:

Compiled Oklahoma Statutes 1921: "3482. Removal — Permit. That no person, receiver, firm, company or corporation owning, operating or managing any line of steam railroad in this state shall be allowed to remove railroad shops or division points which have been located at any place in this state for a period of not less than five years without previously securing the permission of the Corporation Commission to make such removal.

"3483. Corporation Commission — Jurisdiction. If, and when any such person, receiver, firm, company or corporation desires to remove any such railroad shops or division point described in section one of this act, it shall be his duty to file an application with the Corporation commission setting forth the present location of such shops or division point and the reasons for such removal, and thereupon the Corporation Commission shall have full power and jurisdiction to entertain such complaint, but before hearing the same or making any order permitting such removal to be made, said cause shall be set down for hearing, not less than ten days' notice shall be given the city, town or village in which or at which such shops or division point have been maintained and after giving all parties interested a full and complete hearing in the premises the commission may in its discretion permit or refuse such request for a removal.

"3484. Hearing — Before Corporation Commission. When an application is filed before the commission for the removal of terminals or car shops, as provided in section two, the commission shall hear evidence on the relative efficiency and expense of handling traffic through the proposed terminal as compared with the present facilities, and shall consider all other facts and circumstances affecting the various interests involved. In determining the adequacy of the present facilities the commission shall consider the same increased by an expenditure equal to an amount necessary to remove the same to the proposed location or an amount equal to the necessary expenditure to establish such facilities at the new location. It is hereby further provided that the commission shall hear evidence and shall make a finding of fact as to the sanitary and habitable conditions of the proposed location with reference to whether the same would endanger the health of the employees of the applicant or the health of their families. If the commission should find that the sanitary or habitable conditions at the proposed location of said terminal facilities would endanger or injuriously affect the health of the employees of said applicant or their families, the commission shall deny said application and order the said terminal facilities and car shops to remain at the present location.

"3485. Proof — Burden upon Applicant. On any such hearing, as provided in this act, the presumption shall be against the removal, and the burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show that such removal ought to be made.

"5548. Transportation Companies Must Maintain Repair Shops in State. Transportation companies operating within this state which now have in existence roundhouses or machine shops for the repairing of locomotives, engines, and cars, or which may hereafter establish such roundhouses or machine shops for such purpose, shall hereafter maintain such shops and roundhouses with sufficient equipment and employees to keep in proper repair all rolling stock, locomotives, engines, and cars used within this state in the transportation of passengers and freight and such transportation companies shall hereafter cause all such rolling stock, locomotives, engines and cars to be repaired at such shops or roundhouses and kept in a safe and serviceable condition and no such repair shall be done outside the state of Oklahoma, if such repairs can be done at such company's shops within this state."

The bill charges that these statutory provisions are unconstitutional, and that the Corporation Commission was without power to act under such statutes, for the reason that they are not a proper exercise of the police power of the state; that they deprive plaintiff of due process of law, and the equal protection of the law; that they are arbitrary, unreasonable, and unnecessary; that said statutes were enacted to serve local interests, and purport to grant to the Corporation Commission authority to regulate interstate commerce. It is then alleged that the shops were located at Sapulpa more than 30 years ago, when that city was the terminus of the line; that the lines have been extended into Oklahoma and Texas; that by reason of the growth of Tulsa, and its attendant increase of business, it has become the center of plaintiff's operations; that Sapulpa has ceased to be the center of its operations, and that it is necessary to remove its shops to Tulsa.

It is further alleged that it is impossible to construct shops sufficient to care for the repairs and business of plaintiff at Sapulpa, and that plaintiff has established shops at Tulsa, and that interstate...