St Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. State of Arkansas

• Decision Date: 04 April 1910
• Docket Number: No. 111,111
• Citation: 30 S.Ct. 476,217 U.S. 136,54 L.Ed. 698
• Parties: ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Piff. in Err., v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

217 U.S. 136

30 S.Ct. 476

54 L.Ed. 698

ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Piff. in Err.,

v STATE OF ARKANSAS.

No. 111.

Argued January 26, 27, 1910.

Decided April 4, 1910.

Messrs. Roy F. Britton, Nicholas J. Gantt, Jr., William T. Wooldridge, Frank G. Bridges, and Samuel H. West for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 137 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Hal L. Norwood, F. E. Brown, and Pettit & Pettit for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 138-139 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

Prior to October, 1905, the railroad commission of Arkansas promulgated a rule by which, within five days after written application by a shipper, it was made the duty of a railway company, under the conditions prescribed in the rule, to deliver freight cars to such shipper, for the purpose of enabling him to load freight. The rule in question, known as order No. 305, is in the margin.

It is ordered by the commission that its rules be so amended that when a shipper makes written application to a railroad company for a car or cars, to be loaded with any kind of freight embraced in the tariff of said company, stating in said application the character of the freight, and its final destination, the railroad company shall furnish same within five days from 7 o'clock A. M. the day following such application. Provided, that when a shipper orders a car or cars and does not use the same, he shall pay demurrage for such time as he holds the car or cars, at the rate of $1 per car per day, dating from 7 o'clock A. M. after the car or cars are placed.

Or, when the shipper making such application specifies a future day on which he desires to make a shipment, giving not less than five days' notice thereof, computing from 7 o'clock A. M. the day following such application, the railroad company shall furnish such car or cars on the day specified in the application.

When freight in car loads or less is tendered to a railroad company, and correct shipping instructions given, the railroad agent must immediately receive the same for shipment, and issue bills of lading therefor; and whenever such shipments have been so received by any railroad company, they must be carried forward at the rate of not less than 50 miles per day of twenty-four hours, computing from 7 o'clock A. M. the second day following the receipt of shipment. Provided, that in computing the time of freight in transit there shall be allowed twenty-four hours at each point where transferring from one railroad to another, or rehandling freight is involved.

The period during which the movement of freight is suspended on account of accident, or any cause not within the power of the railroad company to prevent, shall be added to the free time allowed in this rule, and counted as additional free time.

The commission reserves the right, on its own motion, to suspend the operation of these rules, or any one or more of them, in whole or in part, whenever it shall appear that justice demands such action, and the commission will, upon complaint, hear and act upon application for a like suspension.

Nothing in these rules shall apply to shipment of live stock and perishable freight where the rules of this commission or the laws of the state require the more prompt furnishing of cars or movement of freight than provided for by these rules.

Complaint was made by Philip Reinsch before the commission, charging the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company with having violated this rule, in that it was fifty-one freight cars short in complying with written applications made at various times in October, November, and December, 1905, and January, 1906, for the delivery at a station called Stutt- gart, of a much larger number of freight cars. The commission found that the railway company was short in the delivery of cars, as alleged, and that its failures in that respect not only violated order No. 305, previously referred to, but also § 10 of an act of March 11, 1899, embodied in Kirby's Digest as § 6803. It also declared that by these violations of the statute and rule of the commission the railway company had become subject to penalties in favor of the state of Arkansas, as provided in § 18 of the act of 1899, being § 6813 of Kirby's Digest, which penalties were to be enforced as therein provided. Conformably to the section in question, the prosecuting attorney for the proper county commenced this action in the mane of the state against the railway company, to recover penalties to the amount of $1,950. Rule No. 305 of the commission was recited, the proceedings before the commission were detailed, and the order made by the commission, finding the defaults on the part of the railway company, was set out, and upon these considerations the prayer for the statutory penalty was based.

A demurrer having been overruled, an answer was filed on behalf of the railway company. By that answer it was alleged that the company was engaged in the transportation of interstate shipments of freight over its line of railroad in the states of Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, and Missouri, and that its equipment of freight cars for the transaction of its business, both interstate and state, was ample. That, anticipating the possible increase of business, both interstate and state, and as a precautionary measure, the company had, prior to the autumn of 1905, endeavored to contract for the construction of a large number of additional freight cars, but failed to do so, because the car manufacturers had such a press of work that they were unable to take the order. That thereupon, in an effort to provide for every future contingency, the corporation had, at a very large expense, commenced the construction of a plant of large capacity to enable it to manufacture its own cars, and was pressing the same to completion in the shortest possible time. It was alleged that at the time of the alleged defaults there was an extraordinary demand for cars, both for the movement of interstate and local traffic; and when, as the result of this condition, the shortage developed, the company had equally distributed its cars to the shippers along its line, giving no preference to interstate over local shippers, or to local over those desiring cars for interstate shipments. It was alleged that it would have been impossible for the company to comply with rule No. 305 without discriminating against its interstate commerce shippers, and therefore obedience to the rule would have resulted in a direct burden upon interstate commerce. Referring to the interstate commerce business of the company, which it was alleged moved over its own line through the states of Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, and Missouri, and thence by connecting roads throughout the United States and Canada, it was charged the burden imposed upon the company to deliver cars to local shippers without reference to the effect and operation of such delivery upon the interstate commerce business of the company would be a direct burden upon interstate commerce, and therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that the same result would flow from enforcing the command of the commission as embodied in its rule No. 305. The rule, moreover, was especially assailed as being repugnant not only to the commerce clause, but to the 14th Amendment, both because of the inherent nature of the duty which the rule sought to impose, and also because of the unreasonable conditions which were expressed therein.

There was a trial to a jury. Without going into detail it suffices to say that specific instructions were asked, in reiterated form, by the defendant company, concerning its asserted defenses under the Constitution of the United States; that is, the repugnancy to the Constitution of the rule of the commission and of the statute imposing penalties upon it for its failure to furnish cars. After verdict against the company for $1,350, and judgment thereon, the cause was taken to the supreme court of the state of Arkansas, and from the action of that court in affirming...