St. Louis Steel Range Co. v. Kline-Drummond M. Co.
Decision Date | 16 October 1906 |
Citation | 96 S.W. 1040,120 Mo. App. 438 |
Parties | ST. LOUIS STEEL RANGE CO. v. KLINE-DRUMMOND MERCANTILE CO. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Jesse A. McDonald, Judge.
Action by the St. Louis Steel Range Company against the Kline-Drummond Mercantile Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
On December 18, 1902, plaintiff, a corporation, entered into a contract with the Luyties Mercantile Company, another corporation, by which plaintiff agreed to manufacture exclusively for the Luyties Company a special design of steel range, to be known as "Luyties Malleable," and not to manufacture or sell said range to any mail order house selling direct to the consumer for a period of five years from the date of the contract, the Luyties Company agreeing to take 1,000 ranges of the designated pattern, with the option to take an additional 1,000. The price of all the 1,000 ranges, except 6, was to be $20 each. Those 6 were of superior construction and to bring a higher rate. One hundred ranges were to be furnished to the purchaser each month, and a greater number on 30 days' notice, if more were desired. After 104 ranges had been delivered to the Luyties Company, the contract was assigned by said company to the defendant, the Kline-Drummond Mercantile Company, and the latter company was accepted by plaintiff as a party to the agreement in lieu of the Luyties Company. Deliveries were duly made to defendant until it had received and accepted 289 ranges, when it refused to accept any more. At the time of defendant's default, about 603 ranges were still to be delivered under the contract, and this action is for damages suffered by plaintiff on account of defendant's refusal to take them. After the contract was entered into, plaintiff prepared plans for the ranges, and purchased all the materials, not only for the 1,000 which the defendant, as the successor of the Luyties Company in the contract, was bound to purchase, but for the additional 1,000 which it had an option to purchase. However, the latter fact is immaterial in the present case. The testimony goes to show that the ranges were of unusual construction, in that they were of lighter metal than those commonly sold on the market, and perhaps varied from the ordinary patterns in other respects. Each range was to have on it the letters and the words "Luyties Malleable." As we gather, these brands were to be on label plates fastened on the range, instead of being moulded into pieces of the range itself. At the time of the default about 25 of the unaccepted 603 ranges were finished; that is to say, were put together. All the parts of the others had been manufactured by plaintiff and were on hand, but had not been put together, or "assembled," to use the word of the witnesses. The cost of assembling each range was about $4.07, and the total cost of the construction of each was from $13 to $14. All the ranges received either by the Luyties Company or defendant, were paid for, and $2,500 was paid on those not taken. Plaintiff subsequently sold 10 or 15 to the Lincoln Mercantile Company, thus reducing the number left on its hands. There was testimony that the remainder, or the parts out of which to construct them, were worth about $600 as scrap iron or junk, and had no other value. Defendant's counsel endeavored to adduce testimony respecting the value of the ranges left on hand just as they were— that is to say, with the label plates on them— and also testimony regarding their value with the label plates removed. The court permitted testimony as to what their value was in their actual condition, and also "redressed," as the witness said; that is, with certain shelves, and the name plates taken off and the ranges renickeled. But some testimony was excluded going to show the reasonable market value of the ranges with the name plates off, or that in that condition they had a market value. Defendant excepted to this ruling.
The following instruction on the measure of damages was given at plaintiff's request, the defendant excepting: "The court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence in favor of the plaintiff in assessing its damages you should take into account the total amount plaintiff would have been entitled to receive all told if the defendant and Luyties Brothers Mercantile Company had between them taken the entire 1,000 ranges contracted for, and the jury should deduct from such total amount such sums as have been paid to plaintiff upon said contract, and also such an amount as it would have cost the plaintiff to set up and complete the remaining ranges not delivered under said contract, and also the reasonable selling value of the material on hand out of which to have completed said remaining ranges; and these items deducted from said total amount which the plaintiff would have received if the entire contract had been carried out by Luyties Brothers Mercantile Company and the defendant herein, will show the amount which plaintiff is entitled to recover as the principal sum in this action, if anything; and the jury are further instructed that they should add to such principal sum interest at the rate of 6 per cent. from the first day of November, 1904, to the date of your verdict."
This instruction was requested by defendant, refused, and an exception saved: "The court instructs the jury that if you find for the plaintiff you will assess its damages at such sum as you may find and believe from the evidence to be the difference between the price agreed to be paid in the contract and the reasonable market value of the ranges in question at the time and place of delivery, and plaintiff is entitled only to receive such actual damages as you may find and believe from the evidence will compensate it for the loss sustained, if you find it has sustained a loss, on account of the nonacceptance of the ranges mentioned in the contract sued upon, and you will find accordingly."
The jury's verdict was for $3,659.76 in favor of plaintiff, and, judgment having been entered accordingly, defendant appealed.
M. C. Early, for appellant. S. N. & S. C. Taylor, for respondent.
GOODE, J. (after stating the facts).
We are called on to determine the rule by which plaintiff's damages are to be ascertained. The case is that of a vendee of personal property who has refused to accept the goods bought, and, as different rules for the measurement of damages are laid down in such cases according to the circumstances presented, it is essential to fix in mind the important facts of the present controversy. At the time of ...
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