St. Louis Trust Co. v. Riley

• Decision Date: 30 September 1895
• Docket Number: 607.
• Citation: 70 F. 32
• Parties: ST. LOUIS TRUST CO. et al. v. RILEY.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

70 F. 32

ST. LOUIS TRUST CO. et al. v. RILEY.

No. 607.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

September 30, 1895

U. M Rose, W. E. Hemingway, and G. B. Rose, filed brief for appellants.

William G. Whipple, filed brief for appellee.

Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

Is a claim for damages caused by the negligence of a street-railway company, a mortgagor, five months before a receiver was appointed in a suit to foreclose a mortgage upon its property and income, entitled to be preferred to the mortgage debt in payment out of the earnings of the railroad during the receivership? This is the question presented in this case. It arises in this way. The Capital Street-Railway Company, a corporation, which owned and operated a street railway in Little Rock, in the state of Arkansas, mortgaged its property, franchises, and income on April 2, 1890, to secure the payment of certain bonds it issued. On April 1 1893, it made default in the payment of interest on these bonds, and on April 19, 1893, upon a proper bill for the foreclosure of the mortgage, a receiver of its property and income was appointed by the court below, and that court subsequently appointed a coreceiver. This corporation had, on March 3, 1891, leased its railroad to the City Electric Street-Railway Company, a corporation, which thereafter operated the railway under the lease. On December 1, 1891 the latter company mortgaged its property, franchises, and income to secure the payment of certain bonds which it issued. On June 1, 1893, it made default in the payment of interest on these bonds, and on a bill for the foreclosure of this mortgage the same court directed the receivers of the Capital Street-Railway Company to hold the property and income of the electric company under this bill. In December, 1892, $9,000 was paid by the electric railway company on the interest secured by its mortgage. On October 31, 1892, W. H. H. Riley, the appellee, was injured by the negligence of a motorman of the electric company in operating his car, and on June 19, 1894, he recovered a judgment for $5,000 on account of this negligence against both these corporations. On an intervening petition in the foreclosure suits, and upon the answers of the mortgagees, which disclosed the foregoing facts, the court below held that the claim of the appellee upon the earnings of the property of the railway companies during the receivership was superior to that of the mortgagees, and ordered the receivers to pay it in preference to the mortgage debts. This decision and order are assigned as error.

The proposition that the negligence of a mortgagor may create a claim, and secure that claim by an equitable right to its property and income superior to the lien of a mortgage of the same property and income which it made and recorded years before, is not without interest to those who are accustomed to uphold the obligations of contracts and the validity of contract rights. The counsel for the appellee argues that damages for the negligence of a railroad company are necessary expenses of the operation of its railroad, and rests his proposition chiefly upon the following decisions of the supreme court, and particularly upon this quotation from the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Waite in Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 252, 253:

'When (railroad) companies become pecuniarily embarrassed, it frequently happens that debts for labor, supplies, equipment, and improvements are permitted to accumulate, in order that bonded interest may be paid, and a disastrous foreclosure postponed, if not altogether avoided. In this way the daily and monthly earnings, which ordinarily should go to pay the daily and monthly expenses, are kept from them to whom in equity they belong, and used to pay the mortgage debt. The income out of which the mortgage is to be paid is the net income obtained by deducting from the gross earnings what is required for necessary operating and managing expenses, proper equipment, and useful improvements. Every railroad mortgagee, in accepting his security, impliedly agrees that the current debts, made in the ordinary course of business, shall be paid from the current receipts, before he has any claim upon the income. If, for the convenience of the moment, something is taken from what may not improperly be called the current debt fund, and put into that which belongs to the mortgage creditors, it certainly is not inequitable for the court, when asked by the mortgagees to take possession of the income and hold it for their benefit, to require as a condition of such an order that what is due from the earnings to the current debt shall be paid by the court from the future current receipts, before anything derived from that source goes to the mortgagees. In this way it will only do what, if a receiver should not be appointed, the company ought itself to do. For, even though the mortgage may, in terms, give a lien upon the profits and income, until possession of the mortgaged premises is actually taken, or something equivalent done, the whole earnings belong to the company, and are subject to its control. * * * We think also, that if no such order is made when the receiver is appointed, and it appears in the progress of the cause that bonded interest has been paid, additional equipment provided, or lasting and valuable improvements made out of earnings, which ought in equity to have been employed to keep down debts for labor, supplies, and the like, it is within the power of the court to use the income of the receivership to discharge obligations, which, but for the diversion of funds, would have been paid in the ordinary course of business. This, not because the creditors, to whom such debts are due, have in law a lien upon the mortgaged property or the income, but because, in a sense, the officers of the company are trustees of the earnings for the benefit of the different classes of creditors and the stockholders; and if the court may, upon an adjustment of the accounts, so use the income which comes into its own hands as, if practicable, to restore the parties to their original equitable rights.'

It is an interesting fact that these remarks of Chief Justice Waite, upon which courts are constantly urged to base orders for the preference of unsecured to secured creditors in the distribution of the incomes earned during receiverships, and of the proceeds of foreclosure sales, did not lead to the preference of any such claim in that case. The decision in Fosdick v. Schall was that a claim of the vendor of cars, which had subsequently reclaimed them under its contract, for their rent for six months immediately prior to the receivership, which was by the contract to be paid as a part of the purchase price of the cars, had no equitable claim upon the proceeds of the mortgaged property superior to that of the mortgage bondholders, and the decree of the circuit court which gave it such a preference was reversed. Page 255.

In Fosdick v. Car Co., Id. 256, the supreme court held that the claim of a vendor of cars upon the proceeds of the foreclosure sale was superior to that of a mortgagee, where the cars had been sold under the foreclosure, and the mortgagee had thus received the benefit of their value.

In Huidekoper v. Locomotive Works, Id. 258, an order directing the payment, in preference to the mortgage debt, of an amount found due on account of the purchase of locomotives that had been used by the railway company before the receivership, but had afterwards been reclaimed by the vendor, was reversed by the supreme court.

In Hale v. Frost, Id. 389, 392, that court held that a claim for current supplies, furnished to the machinery department of a railroad company just preceding the receivership, was entitled to a preference over the mortgage debt in payment out of the income earned during the receivership, but that a claim for material for construction purposes was entitled to no such preference.

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