St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States
Decision Date | 14 February 1936 |
Docket Number | No. 10210.,10210. |
Citation | 82 F.2d 61 |
Parties | ST. LOUIS UNION TRUST CO. v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Daniel N. Kirby, of St. Louis, Mo. (Everett Paul Griffin and Charles Nagel, both of St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.
Harry Marselli, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen. (Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key and Lucius A. Buck, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., and Harry C. Blanton, U. S. Atty., of Sikeston, Mo., on the brief), for the United States.
Before STONE, SANBORN, and BOOTH, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court entered September 17, 1934, in an action commenced January 27, 1928, by the United States against Edward Mallinckrodt, Sr., to recover additional income taxes and interest for the year 1920.
Edward Mallinckrodt, Sr., will be hereafter referred to as the taxpayer. He died February 1, 1928, and the St. Louis Union Trust Company, executor of his will, was duly substituted as defendant in the action.
A jury was duly waived and the case tried to the court June 6 and 7, 1933. Final judgment was rendered for plaintiff September 17, 1934, from which judgment the present appeal was taken.
The following facts appear to be undisputed: The taxpayer filed his income tax return for the year 1920 showing a tax due of $7,206.49 which was duly assessed, and paid by the taxpayer. Upon audit of this return, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the tax liability of the taxpayer for 1920 was greater by $61,171.93 than the amount returned, and notified the taxpayer of said deficiency.
January 29, 1925, the taxpayer appealed to the United States Board of Tax Appeals. The appeal was heard May 28, 1925.
The Board of Tax Appeals filed its opinion and its findings of fact September 27, 1926, and thereafter, on January 28, 1927, entered its order of redetermination which contained, among other language, the following: "That for the year 1920 there is no deficiency, but, on the other hand, there is an overassessment and an overpayment in the amount of $3,403.24."
After the order of the Board of Tax Appeals redetermining the deficiency (January 28, 1927), there was apparently not entire harmony of action in the several subdivisions of the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with reference to the matter.
Action by one subdivision (July, 1927), resulted in there being sent to the taxpayer a certificate of overassessment, and a refund by a United States Treasury check in accordance with the order of redetermination.
Action by another subdivision resulted in nonacquiescence by the Commissioner (November, 1927), in the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals; and authorization (January, 1928), of the present suit, which was commenced January 27, 1928.
When the controversy was before the Board of Tax Appeals, it was heard and determined upon a stipulation of facts be-between the parties by their respective attorneys. Upon the trial of the present case in the United States District Court, the stipulation of facts was introduced and also, under objection, other evidence.
Passing to the particular transaction out of which the present controversy arose, the facts, practically undisputed, are substantially as follows, as found by the trial court:
The trial court further found:
There are 43 assignments of error, of which 38 are said to be relied upon.
These assignments of error may largely be grouped under a few points as shown by the discussion in the briefs of counsel.
The suit was brought pursuant to section 283(j) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 63, which contains the following language: "The Commissioner may, within one year from the time the decision is rendered, begin a proceeding in court for the collection of any part of the amount disallowed by the Board."
Appellant contends that this language requires the action to be brought in the name of the Commissioner. We think this contention cannot be sustained. The language quoted merely authorizes the Commissioner to start a proceeding in Court for the collection of the amount.
Section 919, Revised Statutes (28 U.S. C.A. § 732), is pertinent. It reads:
Sections 3213 and 3214, R.S. (26 U.S. C.A. §§ 1640, 1644, 1645 (a, c), are instructive by analogy. The latter section reads in part as follows: (26 U.S.C.A. § 1640).
This latter section, we think, expresses the clear purpose of the second sentence of...
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