St. Louis v. Manly

• Decision Date: 31 January 1871
• Citation: 58 Ill. 300,1871 WL 7925
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, ALTON & TERRE HAUTE R. R. COMPANYv.WILLIAM MANLY.

58 Ill. 300

1871 WL 7925 (Ill.)

ST. LOUIS, ALTON & TERRE HAUTE R. R. COMPANY

v.WILLIAM MANLY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1871.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. JOSEPH GILLESPIE, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. WILEY & PARKER, for the appellant.

Mr. GEORGE B. BURNETT, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action instituted by the appellee against the appellant, to recover for personal injuries to himself and to his property, resulting from a collision of the train as the appellee was about to cross the track of appellant's road, which injuries, it is alleged, were occasioned by the negligence and unskillfulness of the agents and servants of the company.

The accident occurred in July, 1866, within the corporate limits of the town of Bunker Hill. The appellee resided in the town, and had for some six years previous to the accident, and was familiar with the railroad crossings in the vicinity, and with the times of the passing of trains at that station. On the day of the fatal accident, the appellee, with his son, had occasion to go out of town on business, with his horse and wagon, and their route would lead them over the Blackburn road, which crosses the track of the appellant's road. The railroad at that point runs nearly directly east and west, and the wagon road that passes over it does not cross it at right angles, but diagonally, from the southeast to the northwest. The appellee and his son occupied the seat in the wagon, which was loaded with some empty barrels. There was another man in the wagon at the time, but he escaped without injury before the collision occurred. The wagon road, over which the appellee was passing, would lead him in a northwest direction from the town, and the relative position of the wagon road and the railroad would bring the appellee almost facing the train as it came from the west. The train that caused the injury, came from the west in the afternoon, and was a passenger train on its regular time. By the collision, the son was instantly killed, and the appellee was so severely injured that he did not recover his senses for near a month after the accident. The appellee states he did not see the train or hear any signals as he approached the crossing, and that his attention at the instant was attracted to an accident to a load of hay in another direction. He states the object of his trip; that his attention was fixed on his business, and that he was in a hurry to make the trip and return before nightfall; and that, although he knew the hour of the arrival of the train, if his attention had been called to it, still it never occurred to him that a train might then be approaching. The appellee states it was his usual custom to check up his horse before reaching the crossing, and thinks he did so in this instance, but saw nothing, and heard no signals to indicate the near approach of the train, and that the first indication he had of approaching danger, the train was upon him. The witness Lewellyn, who occupied a seat in the wagon between the appellee and his son, states he heard the train coming when they were at some distance from the crossing, and called to the appellee to notify him of the fact. The appellee stopped for an instant, and then moved on, when the witness again called to him that the train was coming, when he stopped the second time, and again started up to go over the crossing. The witness seeing the imminent danger, leaped from the wagon just in time to save his life. The appellee denies he heard the witness, Lewellyn, call his attention to the approach of the train, but states he was in a hurry, and that his attention was directed to a load of hay tipping over in the opposite direction from the approaching train.

The engineer and fireman both testified that the usual signals were given for the requisite distance before reaching the crossing, and that as soon as the appellee was discovered on the track, the engineer put on the brakes and stopped the train as soon as possible. Some of the witnesses, in the vicinity and near the scene of the disaster, state they did not hear the bell or the whistle, but the record contains the affirmative evidence that the bell was rung and the whistle sounded. By this fearful accident the son of the appellee was instantly killed, and severe and permanent injuries inflicted upon appellee; and as to the extent of the injuries sustained, there is no dispute. They caused much mental and physical suffering, and are of a permanent character, from which he will probably never recover.

Upon substantially this evidence, a trial was had, which resulted in a verdict for the appellee for $2,000. The court overruled a motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment on the verdict, to reverse which judgment the appellant brings the cause to this court.

The principal errors relied on to reverse this judgment, are: 1st, that the court gave improper instructions to the jury, at the request of the appellee; 2d, that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

The court, at the request of the appellee, instructed the jury that “the amount of damages to be recovered for personal injuries, rests much in the discretion of the jury, and they have a right not only to compensate the plaintiff for all moneys by him paid out, and for personal injuries, but to punish the defendant according to the circumstances of the case, if the defendant has been guilty of wilful misconduct in perpetrating the injury.”

It is true, that if the agents and servants of the company wilfully and wantonly commit an injury, the party injured may recover in an action for personal injuries beyond the actual damages sustained, in some instances as punitive damages, but certainly by way of compensation for the indignity and outrage committed, and for mental and physical suffering endured. The Chicago & Rock Island R. R. Co. v. McKean, 40 Ill. 218.

Waiving all formal objections that might properly be taken to this instruction, the principal objection lies in the fact that it is not applicable to the facts in this case. As a general rule, instructions must always be founded on the evidence, and although the instruction asked may state a correct principle of law, still, if it is based on a hypothetical state of facts not developed in the case, it ought to be refused. An instruction that embodies a correct principle of law, if not applicable to the facts, may tend to mislead the jury, and for that reason it would be error in the court to give it. It does not appear that the injury complained of was the result of wilfulness or wantonness on the part of the agents and servants of the company, and therefore the attention of the jury was directed by the instruction to the consideration of a question not involved in the case.

It is insisted that the appellant was not injured by the instruction, for the reason that the jury did not award vindictive damages. We have no means of knowing whether they did or not. The attention of the jury was directed to that fact as an element of increased damages, and we may presume that the instruction, coming from the court, had its due influence, and made its impression on the minds of the jury against the appellant. If so, the instruction was clearly erroneous in this instance.

The fifth instruction of the series, given in behalf of the appellee, is still more objectionable. It tells the jury, and correctly, too, that it was the duty of the company to use all reasonable efforts to prevent the injury, but by its phraseology it assumes that the agents and servants of the company, when they saw the wagon approaching the crossing, did not use every reasonable effort to avoid the collision and injury. This was the exact question involved in the case, and it was the exclusive province of the jury to determine that fact. An instruction that, by its terms, assumes the existence of negligence in the servants of the company, invades the province of the jury. The instruction makes this...