St. Martin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.
Decision Date | 10 June 1915 |
Citation | 94 A. 279,89 Conn. 405 |
Parties | ST. MARTIN v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Windham County; Joel H. Reed, Judge.
Action by Frank St. Martin against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by negligence. There was a judgment for plaintiff for $4,000, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.
William L. Barnett, of New Haven, for appellant. Charles A. Capen, of Willimantic, for appellee.
The complaint stated this case: The defendant company owns and operates a steam railroad extending from Willimantic to New Haven. While in the exercise of due care the plaintiff was injured when riding as a passenger on one of the defendant's trains from Willimantic to New Haven. His injuries were caused by a collision between the train on which he was riding and an engine standing on the defendant's tracks. This collision occurred by reason of the negligence of the employés of the defendant. In describing the nature of the plaintiff's injuries the plaintiff alleges that he "has suffered great physical and mental pain and anguish; been to great expense for medicine and medical care; was confined a long time in the Saint Joseph's Hospital in the said city of Willimantic; has been unable since the time of said accident to do any labor or attend to his usual vocation and duties of life and is permanently disabled from ever again performing the same."
Upon the trial of the case to the jury all the allegations of the plaintiff were admitted except the one relating to the plaintiff's injuries. This was denied.
The errors of which the defendant complains are based upon evidence received and the instructions of the court relative to mental pain and suffering.
Against the objections and exceptions of counsel for the defendant the following questions and answers are to be found in the record touching upon the plaintiff's mental condition after he was injured:
In addition against the objection of the defendant, the plaintiff was also allowed to testify that:
The doctrine allowing damages for mental anguish is subject to certain well-settled rules which to some extent restrict its operation. The rule which is most important is that no recovery can be had for the element of damage for consequences which are not the natural and proximate result of the act complained of.
While the precise question so presented has never been directly passed upon by this court, yet we find it stated in the case of Gibney v. Lewis, 68 Conn. 392, 36 Atl. 799:
"That mental suffering * * * may be an element of damages when it is a natural and proximate consequence of some recognized cause of action."
In describing what damages are recoverable for mental anguish, Sedgwick, in his work on Damages (9th Ed., vol. 1,...
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