St. Mary's Health Center of Jefferson City v. Bowen, s. 86-2034
Decision Date | 17 June 1987 |
Docket Number | Nos. 86-2034,86-2033,s. 86-2034 |
Citation | 821 F.2d 493 |
Parties | , 18 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 95, Medicare&Medicaid Gu 36,364 ST. MARY'S HEALTH CENTER OF JEFFERSON CITY, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Appellee. ARCADIA VALLEY HOSPITAL; St. Clare Hospital of Baraboo; St. Francis Hospital of Blue Island; St. Francis Hospital of Marceline; St. Joseph Health Center; St. Mary's Health Center; St. Mary's Health Center; St. Mary's Hospital; St. Mary's Medical Center; St. Mary's on the Mount Rehabilitation Center, Appellees, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and FAGG, Circuit Judge.
In No. 86-2034 EM St. Mary's Health Center of Jefferson City (St. Mary's) appeals and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (the Secretary or the government) in No. 86-2033 EM cross-appeals from an order entered in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granting the government's Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion, denying the hospital's motion to remand to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB or Board), and denying the government's motion for an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal and for entry of final judgment. Arcadia Valley Hospital v. Bowen, 641 F.Supp. 190 (E.D.Mo.1986).
For reversal, on the merits, St. Mary's argues that the district court erred in holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's denial of a good cause extension and that the Board abused its discretion in denying the good The government argues that these appeals should be dismissed as premature because the district court has not yet entered a final judgment and, alternatively, if the district court's February 7 order is a final judgment, the district court abused its discretion in denying the government's motion for a one-day extension of time to file a notice of appeal. St. Mary's argues that February 7 order was a final judgment, from which the government did not file a timely notice of appeal, and that these appeals are from and limited to the June 16 order granting Rule 60(b) relief, not the original February 7 order.
cause extension. St. Mary's expressly invites the court to reconsider St. Joseph's Hospital v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.1986) ( ).
The government argues on the merits that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the Board's denial of a good cause extension was not a final administrative decision subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395oo (f). The government further argues that if the Board's denial of a good cause extension was a final administrative decision, it is not subject to judicial review because it is the kind of decision that has been committed to agency discretion by law and, if subject to judicial review, the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or otherwise abuse its discretion.
Before the appeals were orally argued, the court requested the parties to file supplemental letter briefs on the question of appellate jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that we do not bave appellate jurisdiction and accordingly dismiss these appeals.
On July 25, 1985, St. Mary's and nine other hospitals filed the underlying action in federal district court challenging the validity of the 1979 Malpractice Rule and its application to cost years 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983. The hospitals alleged that the 1979 Malpractice Rule, 42 C.F.R. Sec. 405.452(b)(1)(ii) (1982) (renumbered as 42 C.F.R. Sec. 405.452(a)(1)(ii) (1985)), had been promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and was inconsistent with the Medicare Act and regulations. St. Mary's also challenged the Board's denial of its motion for extension of time to file an administrative appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395oo and 42 C.F.R. Sec. 405.1841(b) ( ).
The 1979 Malpractice Rule "reimburses malpractice premiums based on the ratio of Medicare malpractice claims paid to the total malpractice claims paid during the year for which reimbursement is sought and the preceding four years." Menorah Medical Center v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 292, 293 (8th Cir.1985). The 1979 Malpractice Rule was "intended to prevent Medicare from reimbursing a 'disproportionate' share of the premiums." Id. at 294. Under the prior malpractice regulations, Id.
In October 1985 the hospitals filed a motion for summary judgment because, on July 24, 1985, this court held the 1979 Malpractice Rule was invalid in Menorah Medical Center v. Heckler, 768 F.2d at 295 (following St. James Hospital v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 229, 88 L.Ed.2d 228 (1985)). On February 7, 1986, the district court granted the hospitals' motion for summary judgment. Arcadia Valley Hospital v. Bowen, 632 F.Supp. 4 (E.D.Mo.1986).
On March 31, 1986, the government filed a Rule 60(b) motion for partial relief from summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claims of two of the ten hospitals, St. Mary's and St. Francis Hospital, Blue Island, on jurisdictional grounds. On April 9, 1986, the government attempted to file a notice of appeal from the February 7 order On July 11, 1986, the hospitals filed a Rule 60(b) motion for clarification to limit the June 16 order to the claims of St. Mary's and St. Francis Hospital, Blue Island, for cost year 1980 only. These appeals were filed in mid-August 1986. Thereafter, on September 4, 1986, the district court granted the hospitals' motion for clarification.
but the clerk of the district court refused the notice of appeal because, assuming the February 7 order was a final appealable order, April 9 was the sixty-first day and the notice of appeal was one day late. On April 18, 1986, the government filed a motion for extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and for entry of final judgment. The hospitals also filed a motion to remand their reimbursement claims to the Board. On June 16, 1986, the district court granted the government's Rule 60(b) motion, denied the government's motions for extension of time and for entry of final judgment and denied the hospitals' motion for remand. Arcadia Valley Hospital v. Bowen, 641 F.Supp. at 192-93
We note that on April 1, 1986, the Secretary promulgated the new 1986 Malpractice Rule, 51 Fed.Reg. 11,142-11,196 (effective May 1, 1986) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. pt. 405).
The government argues these appeals are premature because the district court has not yet properly entered a judgment which would trigger the running of the time for appeal. The government argues the February 7 order cannot be a "judgment" because it does not comply with the separate document requirement set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 and was not correctly entered as a judgment on the docket sheet as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a). St. Mary's argues the February 7 order substantially complied with both Rules 58 and 79(a) and is the "judgment" of the district court.
Rule 58(2) provides in part that Rule 79(a) requires the clerk of the district court to enter "the substance of each order or judgment" on the civil docket. "Thus, two procedural requirements exist for entry of a judgment, which triggers the running of the time for appeal: first, a statement of the judgment on a separate document, and second, the entry of the judgment by the clerk on the civil docket." Diamond v. McKenzie, 770 F.2d 225, 228, 248 U.S.App.D.C. 169 (1985) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
The February 7 order, dated and signed by the district judge, stated in full: The February 7 memorandum is reported at 632 F.Supp. 4. The February 7, 1986, docket entry stated in full: "ORDER & MEMORANDUM, fld (JHM) Ptlff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. cc attys."
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