St. Mary's Indus. School for Boys v. Brown

• Decision Date: 22 June 1876
• Parties: THE ST. MARY'S INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL FOR BOYS v. GEORGE S BROWN, WILLIAM G. HARRISON and others. THE MARYLAND INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL FOR GIRLS v. GEORGE S BROWN, WILLIAM G. HARRISON and others. THE ST. VINCENT'S INFANT ASYLUM OF THE CITY OF BALTIMORE v. GEORGE S BROWN, WILLIAM G. HARRISON and others. THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE MECHANIC ARTS v. GEORGE S BROWN, WILLIAM G. HARRISON and others.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

45 Md. 310

THE ST. MARY'S INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL FOR BOYS v. GEORGE S BROWN, WILLIAM G. HARRISON and others.

THE MARYLAND INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL FOR GIRLS v. GEORGE S BROWN, WILLIAM G. HARRISON and others.

THE ST. VINCENT'S INFANT ASYLUM OF THE CITY OF BALTIMORE v. GEORGE S BROWN, WILLIAM G. HARRISON and others.

THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE MECHANIC ARTS v. GEORGE S BROWN, WILLIAM G. HARRISON and others.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 22, 1876

S Teackle Wallis and Fred. W. Brune, for the appellees.

Assuming for the purposes of the argument in its principal aspect that the General Assembly could have endowed the municipal authorities of Baltimore with ample power to make the appropriations in controversy, if it had seen fit to do so the question is whether it has done so in fact.

Has the State authorized the City to burden the taxpayers with a levy for the purpose of supporting or encouraging the institutions whose claims are here set up?

The solicitors for the appellees will assume the law to be well established, that municipal corporations have no inherent right of legislation, and can exercise no powers which are not, in express terms or by fair implication, conferred upon them. These powers must be construed as confined in their exercise to the territorial limits of the municipality, and are not to be extended beyond the proper province of local self-government. Where they are not granted by express language, or fair or necessary implication, they must be either incident to the powers expressly granted, or essential--not simply convenient, but indispensable--to the objects and purposes of the corporation. When the power in dispute is that of taxation, it must especially be held not to exist, unless plainly and unmistakably conferred, and it cannot be collected by doubtful inferences from other powers or powers relating to other subjects, nor can it be deduced from any consideration of convenience or advantage. The rule accepted by all the authorities is, that all powers to tax must be construed with strictness. Minturn vs. Larue, 23 Howard, 435, 6; Thompson vs. Lee County, 3 Wallace, 327, 330; Thomas vs Richmond, 12 Wallace, 349; Booth vs. Woodberry, 32 Conn, 124; Spaulding vs. Lowell, 23 Pick., 71, 74; 2 Dillon's Circuit Court Cases, 354, 359, 360; Cooley's Constit. Limit., (Ed. 1874,) 211 to 213; Sedgwick on Stat. and Constit. Law, (2 Edit,) 397; 1 Dillon on Municip. Corp., ( Ed. 1873,) sec 55; 2 Dillon on Municip. Corp., sec. 605; Cooley on Taxation, 209, 210; Mayor, &c. vs. Clunet, 23 Md., 467; Frederick vs. Groshon, 30 Md., 437; Gill vs. Mayor, &c., 31 Md., 395; Mayor of Cumberland vs. Magruder, 34 Md., 386.

The appellants all claim to be public agencies: the St. Mary's Industrial School as a reformatory institution for juvenile offenders; the St. Vincent's Orphan Asylum as a school and infant asylum, the Maryland Industrial School as the female House of Refuge of the State, and the Maryland Institute as an agency of public education.

No doubt is suggested or entertained by any one as to their usefulness and excellence in their several departments, whatever those may be, nor as to the benevolent and praiseworthy purposes which they labor to promote. The question raised is, not whether they deserve support and praise, but whether the municipal government of Baltimore has the right to tax the people to support them. It is a question of power and nothing else.

The City Council, in the ordinance in question, have not undertaken to classify the appellants, as they describe themselves. The ordinance assumes to provide for them as "City Poor" and not otherwise. It does not profess to derive the power which it assumes for their benefit, from any other source than that of pauperism. It does not assert, in their behalf, the special powers which they invoke, nor does it act under them. It does not deal with them as houses of correction, hospitals or schools. Now, while it is very clear that if a municipal corporation assumes to exercise a power, without stating the particular basis of such exercise, the Courts will refer the same to any basis of authority, sufficient to support it, which the corporation may possess; yet if the act is rested, in terms, by the corporation, upon a basis which will not support it, the act must be held void. This proposition is sustained by two express opinions of this Court, and is adopted by the elementary writers as clear law. Mayor vs. Moore, 6 Harr. & Johns., 380-381; Method. Church vs. Mayor, &c., 6 Gill, 399; 1 Dillon Municip. Corpor., sec. 252.

The appellants must, consequently, stand upon the powers which the city may lawfully exercise for the support and care of its poor, and upon those only.

Under the powers conferred by law upon the city corporation in respect to its poor, the city has no authority to make provision for that class, except in its Almshouse, or in some other place erected, established or provided by the city and governed by its ordinances, or under the care and charge of the Trustees of the Almshouse, and regulated by such by-laws as they may enact. (Art. 4, sec. 45, 2 Code, 158.) Inasmuch as neither of the appellants derives its existence from the Mayor and City Council, or has been "established" or ""provided" by it in any sense, or--what is absolutely indispensable under the statute--is governed by its ordinances or is under the care, charge or administration of the Trustees of the Almshouse, it would seem to follow, of necessity, that the corporation is entirely without power to appropriate money for their benefit, as is sought to be done by the ordinance under discussion. Indeed, it would be difficult for legislation to make it more apparent than it is on the face of the Code, that the whole system of pauper support and government in the City of Baltimore was intended to be administered by the city itself, in its own municipal establishments, regulated exclusively by its own officers and laws.

But the claims of the St. Mary's school, as well as the St. Vincent's Asylum and the Maryland Institute are urged upon the further ground that they are schools. But are these appellants or is either of them, as a school, within the scope of municipal support? St. Mary's Industrial School, unlike the other two, is situated outside of the corporate limits of the city, several miles in Baltimore County, and its inmates if they are scholars, may come from the whole State. It is plainly, therefore, in no sense a city school. Is either of the other appellants?

Art. 8, sec. 1, of the Constitution, requires the General Assembly, at its first session, to establish by law a thorough and efficient system of free public schools through the State, and to provide by taxation for their maintenance. Under the Acts of 1868, ch. 407, and 1872, ch. 377, the Mayor and City Council have conferred upon them full power and authority to establish such a "system" in the city, and to regulate the same and levy taxes for its support. The Treasurer is likewise directed to pay to the city its portion of the school fund. The Mayor and City Council have accordingly exercised their powers and established their "system" and a very complete one, by ordinances, which will be found in the City Code, pp. 658 to 668, and Supplement to City Code, pp. 238 to 240. The appellants are not, any of them, embraced in this system or connected with it, or governed by the ordinances or officers controlling it. In the very ordinance now under consideration, in which the appellants are classified among the "City Poor," the "Public Schools" are otherwise specifically provided for, and a separate and distinct appropriation of more than half a million of dollars is made for their support. It is submitted, therefore, that none of the appellants are schools, such as the city has a right to maintain or pretends to maintain, and that being no part of the "system" which alone the city may create and must govern, they are no more entitled to its support, through taxation, than any other private institutions, under the charge of private individuals. The powers of the city, in that direction, are exercisable only in the organization of the "system" required by the Constitution, and independent schools, under private control but supported by taxation, are in direct and pointed antagonism to the whole policy of the Constitution and the statutes. Jenkins vs. Andover, 103 Mass., 94, 96, 101, 103; Curtis vs. Whipple, 24 Wisconsin, 353; Loan Association vs. Topeka, 20 Wal., 669; Merrick vs. Amherst, 12 Allen, 502.

ALVEY J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question of jurisdiction was rather suggested than seriously argued by the counsel for the appellants. Since the case of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore vs Gill, 31 Md., 375, the question of jurisdiction in a case like the present must be considered as settled in this Court. Parties in the position of the appellees in this case may invoke the restraining powers of a Court of equity, and that Court will entertain jurisdiction of their suit against municipal corporations and their officers whenever the latter are shown to be acting ultra vires, or are assuming or exercising a power over the property of the citizen, or over corporate property or funds, which the law does not confer upon them, and where such unathorized acts may affect injuriously the rights and property of the parties complaining. This is the principle settled by the case to which we have referred, and in addition to the authorities therein cited, we may refer to the cases of Mercer County vs. Pittsburgh and Erie R. Co., 27 Penn. St., 404; Mott vs. The Pennsylvania R. Co., 30 Penn. St., 90; Page vs. Allen, 58 Penn. St., 338, and Newmeyer vs. The Missouri and Miss. R. Co., 52 Mo., 81...