St. Patrick's Church Corp. v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 06 April 1931
• Citation: 154 A. 343,113 Conn. 132
• Parties: ST. PATRICK'S CHURCH CORPORATION v. DANIELS et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

154 A. 343

113 Conn. 132

ST. PATRICK'S CHURCH CORPORATION v. DANIELS et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 6, 1931

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Allyn L. Brown, Judge.

The board of appeals of the city of Hartford granted a permit under a zoning ordinance, and St. Patrick's Church Corporation appealed to the superior court, opposed by Frank K. Daniels and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Granting permit to use lot for automobile parking station held not so lacking in factual support as to be subject to court's interference on appeal.

John C. Blackall, of Hartford, for appellant.

Jacob Schwolsky and Lucius F. Robinson, Jr., both of Hartford, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

HINMAN, J.

By an act approved June 19th, 1925 (19 Special Acts of 1925, p 987) the common council of the city of Hartford was given authority to divide the municipality into districts and regulate the erection, construction, alteration, or use of buildings or structures and the use of land therein. It was provided, in section 3, that " such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and shall be designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; *** to facilitate the adequate provision for transportation *** and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the municipality." It was provided (section 1)that " such regulations may provide that a board of appeals may determine and vary their application in harmony with there general purpose and intent, and in accordance with general or specific rules therein contained." Detailed provision was made for the appointment and duties of such a board, which shall hear and decide appeals from orders or decisions made by administrative officials and " all matters referred to it or upon which it shall be required to pass."

The zoning ordinance was approved February 9, 1926, and has been amended from time to time. It provides, in section III, as amended that: " In a business zone *** no building or premises shall be used *** for any of the following specified trades, industries, or uses: *** Motor vehicle parking station or storage and sale of used motor vehicles, except as permitted in Section XV." Section XV provides that " The board of appeals may in a specific case after public notice and hearing and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards determine and vary the application of the regulations herein established in harmony with their general purpose and intent, as follows: *** 13. Permit in a business zone the use of premises for a motor vehicle parking station or for the storage and sale of used motor vehicles."

The finding states that under these provisions William H. Russack applied to the board of appeals for permission to use a lot, on Church street, in a business zone for a parking station for automobiles. On December 3, 1929, after due notice, the board heard the application, and on December 12th voted to disapprove it. On June 11, 1930, one Santora as lessee of the same lot, applied for permission to use it for a parking station. At a meeting of the board of appeals held June 26th, it was voted " that the applicant be given permission to withdraw application as no additional evidence was submitted to the board for consideration since the former refusal of the board for such use at such location." No public hearing was held with respect to this application, and the application was not pressed. At a meeting of the board held July 15th, the application of Santora again came before the board, and on July 29th the board voted as follows: " Approved for six months only with provision that fence be erected separating this property and the school property; that all advertising on wall adjoining this property is to be removed; the wall painted and no other advertising put on this wall at any time. Station to be kept in a manner satisfactory to the board at all times. Certificate of Occupancy to be obtained."

From this action the appellant, which owns land with a parochial school thereon adjoining the lot in question and other land, a church edifice and other buildings in the vicinity, took an appeal to the superior court. That court, after full hearing as to the physical situation and other relevant facts, reached the conclusion that the granting of the permit was not, as claimed, illegal, unreasonable, or arbitrary or an abuse of discretion by the board of appeals. This was the controlling question before the trial court. Holley v. Sunderland, 110 Conn. 80, 147 A. 300. The soundness of this conclusion, when tested and measured by the facts set forth in the finding, is questioned by this appeal.

It appears from the vote of July 30, 1930, that the permission granted was limited in duration to six months from that time; this period had expired before the hearing in this court. It was stated in argument and has been stipulated that on January 15, 1931, Santora made application for permission to continue the use of the lot as a parking station, and on February 3, 1931, the board of appeals granted such permission " with the provision that the station be maintained at all times satisfactory to the board." As the order which was appealed from has expired by lapse of time, this appeal has become academic as applied thereto; we determine it on its merits only because it embraces questions of some general interest and importance in the administration of zoning ordinances and regulations, which are numerous and steadily increasing in this jurisdiction.

The facts found relating to the situation of the premises in question, the uses made of other property, including the number of parking stations in the immediate vicinity, and the extent and urgency of the need for additional parking space outside of the highway limits are sufficient to sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the granting of the permit was not shown to be so lacking in factual support as to be subject to interference upon appeal. " Courts cannot set aside the decision of public officers in such a matter unless compelled to the conclusion that it has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety, or the public welfare in its proper sense." Nectow v. Cambridge, 260 Mass. 441, 157 N.E. 618, 620: DeFlumeri v. Sunderland, 109 Conn. 583, 145 A. 48.

The main dependence of the appellant is not upon this broad ground of attack, however, but is directed to the course of the board in taking cognizance of and acting upon successive applications for the same privilege upon the same premises. This occasions an inquiry as to the powers and duties of the board of appeals (and other boards similarly constituted and empowered) regarding applications of the same tenor and relating to the same premises as others previously decided. The appellant's contention is that such repeated resort to the board is precluded or at least subject to reasonable limitations; otherwise, it is urged with reason parties interested adversely to the privilege or modification sought may be unduly harassed and...