St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Meador

• Decision Date: 11 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 2-97-089-CV,2-97-089-CV
• Citation: 990 S.W.2d 362
• Parties: ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Valerie MEADOR and the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 362

990 S.W.2d 362

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Valerie MEADOR and the Texas Workers' Compensation

Commission, Appellees.

No. 2-97-089-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Fort Worth.

March 11, 1999.

Bishop & Hummert and Alexander N. Beard and Darryl J. Silvera, Dallas, for Appellant.

Lombrano-Williamson and Assoc. and Barbara Lombrano-Williamson, Irving, for Appellee Valerie Meador.

Dan Morales, Attorney General, Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, Laquita A. Hamilton, Deputy Attorney General for Litigation, Nelly Herrera, Chief, Tort Litigation, Harry Deckard and Joseph A. Pitner, Assistant Attorney's General, for Appellee Texas Workers' Compensation Commission.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice.

The primary issue in this workers' compensation case is whether timely filing of a petition with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission is jurisdictional in nature. Because we conclude the filing requirement of section 410.253 of the Texas Labor Code is not jurisdictional, we reverse the dismissal judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Valerie Meador ("Meador") claimed to have sustained compensable injuries under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act on September 23, 1992. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company ("St.Paul") provided workers' compensation insurance coverage for Meador's employer. After a contested case hearing, the hearing officer of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission determined that Meador sustained an occupational disease in the course and scope of her employment. On March 25, 1996, the Appeals Panel of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission ("Appeals Panel") affirmed that decision.

On April 23, 1996, St. Paul sought judicial review of the Appeals Panel's decision by timely filing its original petition against Meador in the district court of Parker County. ¹ On June 18, 1996, the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission ("TWCC") filed a petition in intervention asserting the decision of the Appeals Panel is correct and should be upheld. ²

Both Meador and TWCC then filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging St. Paul had not complied with Labor Code section 410.253 by filing its petition with TWCC within 40 days from the date of the Appeals Panel's decision. ³

II. THE HEARING ON TWCC'S MOTION TO DISMISS

On January 28, 1997, the court held an evidentiary hearing on TWCC's motion to dismiss. TWCC introduced the following exhibits which were attached to its motion to dismiss:

• The decision of the Appeals Panel filed March 25, 1996, ruling in favor of Meador.

• A copy of St. Paul's original petition, filed April 23, 1996.

• A May 23, 1996 letter from St. Paul's attorney to TWCC reciting in full "[e]nclosed for your information and file is a copy of the petition which has recently been filed in the above-referenced matter in the 33 rd Judicial District Court of Burnet County, Texas."

• A "Certification of Specified Instrument(s)" signed January 16, 1997 by TWCC's custodian of records, stating that St. Paul's original petition was received by TWCC on May 28, 1996.

St. Paul offered the affidavit of Lenette Sadler, a legal secretary for the attorney representing St. Paul, dated January 27, 1997. Sadler recited that she was responsible in this case for preparing the filing letter and sending St. Paul's original petition to the court and TWCC. She stated that on April 22, 1996, on the same date St. Paul's original petition was sent to the trial court, "a copy of the petition was mailed to the TWCC in Austin, Texas." Sadler recited that thereafter, TWCC contacted her and asked for a copy of the petition, and she sent a duplicate copy to them on May 23, 1996. ⁴

At the conclusion of the hearing the court held it did not have jurisdiction over this case because St. Paul's petition was not filed with TWCC within 40 days after the date on which the decision of the Appeals Panel was filed. ⁵ Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

III. THE TEXAS LABOR CODE

Several relevant sections of the Texas Labor Code are contained in Subchapter F, entitled "Judicial Review--General Provisions":

§ 410.251. Exhaustion of Remedies

A party that has exhausted its administrative remedies under this subtitle and that is aggrieved by a final decision of the appeals panel may seek judicial review under this subchapter and Subchapter G, if applicable. ⁶

§ 410.252. Time for Filing Petitions; Venue

(a) A party may seek judicial review by filing suit not later than the 40 th day after the date on which the decision of the appeals panel was filed with the division. ⁷

§ 410.253. Service

A copy of the petition shall be simultaneously filed with the court and the commission and served on any opposing party. ⁸

IV. ST. PAUL'S PROCEDURAL COMPLAINTS

In points one through four, St. Paul raises various procedural complaints regarding the manner in which the trial court dismissed its petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Is the trial court's jurisdictional review limited solely to

the pleadings?

In its first two points, St. Paul contends the trial court erred because it did not limit its jurisdictional review solely to the pleadings, but instead erroneously considered extraneous evidence offered by the parties.

In its original petition, St. Paul recited that "all jurisdictional prerequisites for filing of this suit have been complied with by Plaintiff, and that this suit and request for review are timely" and that "[a]ll jurisdictional requirements for appeal of the foregoing Appeals Panel Decision have been complied with by Plaintiff."

In support of its argument that the trial court's review was limited to plaintiff's pleadings, St. Paul cites Firemen's Insurance Co. v. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System for the proposition that "[i]n a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court must base its decision solely on the allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings." ⁹

The question of whether St. Paul timely filed its petition with TWCC depends on evidence relating to when or if its petition was filed with TWCC. We do not find guidance from the quoted statement from Firemen's Insurance because it dealt with the issue of sovereign immunity, not with limitations or statutory filing deadlines. St. Paul's argument is essentially a claim that Meador and TWCC waived the right to contest jurisdiction.

Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be waived. ¹⁰ Were we to hold, as St. Paul contends, that the trial court could only look to plaintiff's pleading in determining fact questions pertaining to jurisdiction, then any allegation of jurisdiction would suffice, whether jurisdiction actually exists or whether a defendant can prove it does not. This is not the spirit or intent of Texas jurisdictional law. ¹¹

St. Paul further asserts that the allegations in its petition are conclusive regarding jurisdiction because neither Meador nor TWCC properly challenged St. Paul's jurisdictional allegations by specifically denying that all conditions precedent had been performed by St. Paul. Neither did they specifically deny that St. Paul had properly and timely filed its suit to set aside the Appeals Panel's decision. Specifically, St. Paul maintains Meador and TWCC were required to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction by complying with rule 93(13) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure:

In the trial of any case appealed to the court from the Industrial Accident Board [the predecessor to TWCC] the following, if pleaded, shall be presumed to be true as pleaded and have been done and filed in legal time and manner, unless denied by verified pleadings:

....

(e) Filing of suit to set aside the award. ¹²

There is no dispute in the instant case that St. Paul filed suit to set aside the award within the 40-day period mandated by section 410.252. Rule 93 does not mention the need for a verified denial in a situation where a defendant asserts the plaintiff failed to file a copy of the petition with TWCC.

We conclude there is no logical basis for St. Paul's assertion that rule 93(13)(e) applies to this situation because the rule by its very language only purports to apply to "[f]iling of suit to set aside the award." ¹³ Therefore, rule 93(13)(e) created no presumption that St. Paul timely filed a copy of its original petition with TWCC.

We hold the trial court did not err in considering TWCC's evidence that it did not receive a copy of St. Paul's petition until more than 40 days after the filing of the decision of the Appeals Panel. We overrule St. Paul's first and second points.

Was the trial court required to permit St. Paul to amend

prior to dismissing?

In its third point, St. Paul contends that even if the trial court did not err in looking beyond the pleadings in resolving the jurisdictional issue, before the trial court could dismiss for lack of jurisdiction St. Paul should have been permitted to cure any jurisdictional deficiencies by amending its pleadings. In support of its argument, St. Paul cites Ramirez v. Lyford Consolidated Independent School District. ¹⁴ In Ramirez, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction averring plaintiff had failed to exercise all administrative remedies before filing suit. ¹⁵ The trial court granted the motion without holding a hearing or giving plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleadings. ¹⁶ On appeal, the court held the trial court erred in not permitting plaintiff to amend because omitting an element of a cause of action does not deprive a court of jurisdiction; it is merely a defect in pleading subject to special exceptions and amendment. ¹⁷

Ramirez is factually and procedurally inapposite to the case at bar. Unlike Ramirez who omitted an element of his cause of action, St. Paul's pleadings were not deficient. Further, in...