St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Lack

• Decision Date: 29 March 1973
• Docket Number: 72-2295.,No. 72-2294,72-2294
• Citation: 476 F.2d 583
• Parties: ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. Herbert Phillip LACK, Appellant, v. Charles M. IVEY, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Mary Carolyn Lack, Appellee. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Herbert Phillip LACK, Appellee, and Charles M. Ivey, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Mary Carolyn Lack, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

476 F.2d 583 (1973)

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. Herbert Phillip LACK, Appellant, v. Charles M. IVEY, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Mary Carolyn Lack, Appellee.

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Herbert Phillip LACK, Appellee, and Charles M. Ivey, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Mary Carolyn Lack, Appellee.

Nos. 72-2294, 72-2295.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued February 5, 1973.

Decided March 29, 1973.

Joseph E. Elrod, III, Greensboro, N. C. (Perry C. Henson and Joseph E. Elrod, III, Greensboro, N. C., on brief), for appellant in No. 72-2294.

William D. Caffrey, Greensboro, N. C. (Eugene W. Purdom and Jordan, Wright, Nichols, Caffrey & Hill, Greensboro, N. C., on brief), for appellant in No. 72-2295.

Martin W. Erwin, Greensboro, N. C. (Jack W. Floyd, Smith, Moore, Schell & Hunter, Greensboro, N. C., on brief), for appellee Charles M. Ivey, Jr., in No. 72-2294 and for appellees in No. 72-2295.

Before RUSSELL and FIELD, Circuit Judges, and BRYAN, District Judge.

ALBERT V. BRYAN, Jr., District Judge:

Herbert Phillip Lack (Lack), after fatally shooting his wife during a marital dispute, pled guilty to the charge of "voluntary manslaughter." Charles M. Ivey, Jr., the Administrator of the Estate of Mary Carolyn Lack (Administrator), then instituted in a North Carolina state court a civil suit for wrongful death against Lack alleging negligence. The St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) had previously issued an insurance policy to the decedent, agreeing to pay on her behalf, all amounts which she, or her spouse, should become legally obligated to pay in a personal injury action. The policy relieved the company of the duty to defend or pay if the act giving rise to the action was intentional.

Contending that it was not obligated under this exclusionary clause to defend or cover any judgment against Lack since he had "intentionally" killed his wife, St. Paul sought a declaratory judgment against Lack in the District Court to this effect. The District Court stayed the state court proceedings, and allowed the Administrator to intervene and assert a cross-claim against Lack for wrongful death. In a bifurcated procedure, a jury found that Lack unintentionally killed his wife and therefore St. Paul was obligated to extend coverage and to defend him. A second jury then held Lack, and consequently St. Paul, liable in damages to the Administrator for the decedent's wrongful death.

I.

The first issue presented is whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury that "voluntary manslaughter" could be interpreted as an admission to either the intentional or culpably negligent killing of a person without malice. Under North Carolina law it appears that voluntary manslaughter is the intentional unlawful killing of a human being and therefore an instruction incorporating culpable negligence as an alternative finding is improper since it does not require intent as a necessary element. See State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 185 S.E.2d 129 (1971); State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 185 S.E.2d 221 (1971).

Although this instruction may have been improper it does not constitute reversible error. It is apparent by a reading of the charge in its entirety that the jury was explicitly told to base its verdict, when weighing the admission of guilt, on what Lack "intended at the time he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter" rather than upon definitional distinctions; and that the issue upon which the case turned, namely, Lack's intent or absence of it at the time of the killing, was adequately put to the jury.

II.

The jury was also instructed to construe any exclusion under the terms of the policy in favor of the insured and against St. Paul. Even if this was error because no ambiguity existed in the policy, it is harmless when the charge is considered as a whole. The jury was adequately charged that the quantum of proof to be met by the plaintiff, St. Paul, was no more than a preponderance of the evidence.

III.

St. Paul contends that Lack's guilty plea should have been conclusive as to his intent and binding in a subsequent civil suit. Since jurisdiction here is based on diversity, the law of the state where the District Court sits, North Carolina, controls questions of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965).

Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 125 S. E.2d 373 (1962), establishes that a criminal conviction precludes relitigation of the same issue in a civil suit where one stands to profit from his own wrong. This, however, is distinguishable from the circumstances at bar. Here we have the product of a plea bargaining arrangement rather than a result of litigation of the issues which determine guilt. Consequently, application of the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel would serve only to frustrate the expeditious administration of criminal justice accomplished through the plea bargaining process. Stout v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co., 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962), is not to the contrary. There, the court's holding was limited to a...