St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lippincott

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Riley
• Citation: St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lippincott, 287 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2002)
• Decision Date: 19 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-3200.,01-3200.
• Parties: ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. Charles LIPPINCOTT, Dr.; Barbara J. Lippincott, Appellants.

287 F.3d 703

ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. Charles LIPPINCOTT, Dr.; Barbara J. Lippincott, Appellants.

No. 01-3200.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 13, 2002.

Filed: April 19, 2002.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied: June 19, 2002.

Kathi L. Chestnut, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Russell F. Watters, argued, T. Michael Ward, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellee.

Before: MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, HEANEY, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Charles and Barbara Lippincott (the Lippincotts) appeal the district court's¹ grant of summary judgment to St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul). St. Paul brought a declaratory judgment action for a determination that the Lippincotts' claim was not covered under either of two insurance policies issued by St. Paul. We affirm.

This action is related to a suit Steve and Bonnie Thompson (the Thompsons) filed against the Lippincotts in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri. The Thompsons sued the Lippincotts for fraud and recision, alleging the Lippincotts intentionally and negligently concealed structural damage to a house they sold to the Thompsons. Before listing the house for sale, the Lippincotts patched a structural crack with spackling, covered a crack with carpet, and then filled a room with boxes, making it difficult to discover the cracks. In selling the home to the Thompsons, the Lippincotts completed a disclosure statement falsely representing that they were not "aware of any past or present cracks or flaws in the walls or foundations." St. Paul defended the Lippincotts in the Thompsons' suit, but reserved the right to deny liability, disclaim indemnity, and withdraw from the defense at any time. The court in Greene County entered judgment in favor of the Thompsons on the negligent misrepresentation claim. The court awarded the Thompsons $75,000, consisting of $47,900 for repairs and $27,100 for diminution of fair market value.

St. Paul brought this declaratory judgment action against the Lippincotts seeking a judicial determination whether the basic insurance policy and a personal umbrella policy covered the judgment against the Lippincotts in the underlying suit. The district court granted St. Paul's summary judgment motion and entered a declaratory judgment that under the basic insurance policy and the personal umbrella policy, St. Paul had no liability to the Lippincotts for the Thompsons' judgment.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Casteel v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 273 F.3d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir.2001). In this case, summary judgment was appropriate as the facts were undisputed and the issue was purely the interpretation of the contractual terms of the two insurance policies.

The Lippincotts argue the Thompsons' judgment was covered under the insurance policies issued by St. Paul. The primary insurance policy covered "legal liability resulting from an occurrence in which there is actual accidental property damage." The Lippincotts argue the umbrella policy expanded the definition of "occurrence" in the primary policy to include "anything that causes property damage, personal injury or death without your expecting or intending it." They contend that, under Missouri law, a negligent misrepresentation qualifies as "anything that causes property damage." The Lippincotts may be correct that a negligent misrepresentation claim qualifies as an "occurrence." Wood v. Safeco Ins. Co., 980 S.W.2d 43, 52 (Mo.Ct.App.1998). However, we need not decide that issue because the Thompsons' judgment was clearly not a recovery for "property damage" under the policies.

An essential premise of the Lippincotts' position is that the Thompsons' judgment was an award for "property damage" as defined under the...