St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warren

• Decision Date: 29 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 4:98CV2126SNL.,4:98CV2126SNL.
• Citation: 87 F.Supp.2d 904
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Parties: ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Derrick WARREN, Defendant.

87 F.Supp.2d 904

ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Derrick WARREN, Defendant.

No. 4:98CV2126SNL.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

November 29, 1999.

Russell F. Watters, Managing Principle, Brown and James, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, plaintiff.

Gordon E. Freese, St. Louis, MO, for Derrick Warren, defendant.

MEMORANDUM

LIMBAUGH, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (hereinafter referred to as St. Paul) has filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that no coverage exists for defendant Warren's claim for defense and indemnification under the homeowner's insurance policy issued to defendant by St. Paul. Warren's claim for defense and indemnification arises out of a wrongful death lawsuit filed by Warren's live-in girlfriend Melba Wilkes for the deaths of two of her children who were residing in Warren's residence at the time of their deaths. This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (# 17 and # 20), filed August 19, 1999 and August 20, 1999 respectively.¹ This cause of action is set for trial on the Court's trial docket of December 13, 1999.

Courts have repeatedly recognized that summary judgment is a harsh remedy that should be granted only when the moving party has established his right to judgment with such clarity as not to give rise to controversy. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 554 F.2d 896, 901 (8th Cir.1977). Summary judgment motions, however, "can be a tool of great utility in removing factually insubstantial cases from crowded dockets, freeing courts' trial time for those that really do raise genuine issues of material fact." Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988).

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). The burden is on the moving party. Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 273. After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in its favor to allow a jury to return a verdict for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir.1983). The court is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir.1976). However, summary judgment is proper when a plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on an essential element of his or her case. Helfter v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir.1997) citing Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir.1995).

The matter before the Court involves the construction of an insurance policy, specifically a "household exclusion" clause contained within the policy. The Court's construction of this clause is determinative of coverage for defendant with regard to Ms. Wilke's claim for the wrongful deaths of two of her children. In Missouri, summary judgment is routinely used in the context of insurance coverage questions, especially with regard to issues of ambiguity. Lang v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Mo.App.1998).

In 1991 defendant Warren and Ms. Wilkes began a significant personal relationship which continues to this day.² When they first met, Ms. Wilkes already had two children, Rhonda and Rhoneshia Butler. Rhonda was approximately fifteen (15) months old and Rhoneshia approximately six (6) months old.³ By 1993, Ms. Wilkes and Warren had two (2) children together, Derrick and Dericka. Plaintiff's Exhibit B — Deposition of Defendant Warren, pgs. 21, 23.

Prior to 1996 Ms. Wilkes (along with all four children) and defendant resided in separate residences. In 1996, defendant bought a home located at 3647 East Edgar, St. Louis, Missouri 63121. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Wilkes and all four children moved into this residence, along with defendant. Defendant's Exhibit B, pgs. 20-21. In March 1996, defendant obtained a homeowner's policy for this residence from St. Paul. This policy (Policy No. PH 24-519733) was effective from March 22, 1997 through March 22, 1998. Defendant Warren was the only "named insured" on the policy. Plaintiff's Exhibit A.

The policy provides in the section entitled Definitions that "[i]n this policy, `you' and `your' refer to the `named insured' shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a resident of the same household. `We', `us' and `our' refer to the Company providing this insurance. In addition, certain words and phrases are defined as follows:

2. Bodily injury means bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services, and death that results.

4. Insured means you and residents of your household who are:

a. your relatives; or

b. other persons under the age of 21 and in the care of any person named above."

Plaintiff's Exhibit A.⁴

The policy furthermore in Section II — Liability Coverage provides in pertinent part:

Coverage E — Personal Liability

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:

1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which an insured is legally liable ...

2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or defends ends when the amount we pay or tender for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limits of liability.

The policy furthermore in Section II — Exclusions provides in pertinent part:

2. Coverage E — Personal Liability, does not apply to:

f. bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of part a. or b. of insured as defined.

Rhonda and Rhoneshia shared a bedroom, while Derrick had his own bedroom.⁵ Rhonda and Rhoneshia permanently stayed in this residence, except for occasional "sleep-overs" at their grandmother's home. Plaintiff's Exhibit B, pgs. 50-51.

Before Warren and Wilkes began co-habitating, Warren was paying child support for Derrick and Dericka of approximately $400.00 per month. However, after Wilkes and Warren began co-habitating, Warren did not pay any further child support for the care of Derrick and Dericka. After 1996, Wilkes received no child support or AFDC⁶, other than food stamps, for all four children. Plaintiff's Exhibit B, pg. 21; Plaintiff's Exhibit C — Deposition of Melba Wilkes, pg. 51.

Warren and Wilkes shared household expenses with Warren paying the rent, Wilkes paying the gas and electric bills, and both of them sharing the remaining utilities' expenses. Wilkes was primarily responsible for the purchase of groceries and clothing for the children. Plaintiff's Exhibit B, pgs. 28, 32-33; Plaintiff's Exhibit C, pgs. 52-55. Warren added Rhonda and Rhoneshia to his employment health insurance plan on October 21, 1996. Plaintiff's Exhibit D. He also identified Rhonda and Rhoneshia as his "stepdaughters" and beneficiaries on his employment life insurance plan. Plaintiff's Exhibit D.

Warren assisted in looking after the children. He loved all four children and tried not to treat Rhonda and Rhoneshia differently because he was not their natural father. Plaintiff's Exhibit B, pgs. 30, 50-51. The children got along well with each other, and with Warren. Rhonda and Rhoneshia called Warren "Big Daddy". Plaintiff's Exhibit B, pg. 52.

On November 27, 1997 the children were left in the home with Wilkes' uncle while Warren and Wilkes were out. A fire broke out killing all four children. Plaintiff's Exhibit B, pgs. 35-40. Rhonda and Derrick were buried in a single grave and Rhoneshia and Dericka in another. The order of burial was based upon the closeness between the children. Plaintiff's Exhibit B, pg. 41.

In May 1998, Wilkes filed a wrongful death lawsuit in state court against Warren for the deaths of Rhonda and Rhoneshia. She alleged that Warren was negligent in telling Wilkes that the stove had been turned off.⁷ Plaintiff's Exhibit F. Warren made a claim indemnification and defense which resulted in St. Paul defending Warren under a reservation of rights. Plaintiff's Exhibit G.

In September 1998, Warren gave a recorded statement to St. Paul. Plaintiff's Exhibit E. He stated that he provided housing and financial support for all the children, including Rhonda and Rhoneshia. Plaintiff's Exhibit E, pgs. 4-5, 7. He described his relationship with Rhonda and Rhoneshia as "It was, I mean, it was trust, love, great love. Great trust, it was like, like a father almost." Plaintiff's Exhibit E, pg. 5.

On March 5, 1999 Warren signed a document terminating the representation by the attorneys for St. Paul. Plaintiff's Exhibit G. Said attorneys withdrew their representation. Plaintiff's Exhibit I. On March 22, 1999 Warren and Wilkes entered into a Missouri statutory agreement under § 537.065 R.S.Mo., limiting any recovery under...