St. Peter v. Colville Confederated Tribes, (1993)

• Decision Date: 28 September 1993
• Docket Number: AP93-15400,AP93-15507,AP93-15508,AP93-15509,AP93-15510
• Parties: DAVID L. ST. PETER, APPELLANT, v. COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES, APPELLEE.
• Court: Colville Confederated Tribes Court of Appeals

DAVID L. ST. PETER, APPELLANT,
v.
COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES, APPELLEE.

Nos. AP93-15400, AP93-15507, AP93-15508, AP93-15509, AP93-15510

Colville Confederated Tribes Court of Appeals

September 28, 1993

Trial Court Case Numbers 92-15400, 92-15507 to 92-15510

Arguments heard May 28, 1993

Frank LaFountaine, Office of Public Defender, Colville Confederated Tribes, Nespelem Wa, counsel for Appellant. Tim Liesenfelder, Office of Prosecuting Attorney, Colville Confederated Tribes, Nespelem Wa, counsel for Appellee.

Before Chief Judge Collins, Judge Baker and Judge Bonga

COLLINS, C.J.

This matter was brought before the Appellate Panel seeking review of five maximum sentences imposed by the Trial Court in the above cases. In her Memorandum Opinion; Judgment And Sentence, dated February 2, 1993, Judge Elizabeth Fry imposed maximum jail sentences for two counts of Disorderly Conduct, Assault, Trespass To Buildings, and Resisting Arrest, and specified that each sentence would run consecutively to any other incarceration.

The appellant alleges that the Trial Court erred by imposing excessive sentences which are arbitrary and capricious and constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and claims his rights were violated under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. Sections 1301-1303 (ICRA) and the Colville Tribal Civil Rights Act, Title 56.01 et seq. (CTCRA). Appellant raises various issues in support of his Assignment Of Error concerning sentencing by the Trial Court. These issues will be addressed by the Panel.

The Appellate Panel first observes that the myriad of issues raised on this appeal were not fully researched or briefed by Appellant's counsel. Consequently, the Judges have expended considerable time and effort reviewing decisional law and secondary authority bearing on the issues raised on appeal. Many matters addressed herein are vital to the Colville Confederated Tribes and issues of first impression for the Tribal Court. The Panel believes that when such constitutional issues are raised, Appellant's counsel must engage in thorough analysis and briefing during the course of the review process.

I.

The appellant first contends that because the term "sentence" is not defined in the Colville Tribal Code, the term must be given meaning under the laws of the State of Washington. The appellant urges the Court to adopt RCW 9.94A.400 in order to give meaning to the term. The term "sentence" is not defined in the Tribes' sentencing statute, CTC 2.6.07 and the Panel has not found a definition of the term elsewhere in the Tribal Code. The Panel also has not found a definition for "sentence" in the State sentencing statute, RCW 9.94A.400.

The Colville Tribal Code provides that the Principles of Construction at CTC 1.1.07(e) are to be followed when a term is not clear on its face or in the context of the Code.

"Whenever the meaning of a term used in this Code is not clear on its face or in the context of the Code, such term shall have the meaning given to it by the laws of the State of Washington, unless such meaning would undermine the underlying principles and purposes of this Code." CTC 1.1.07(e).

The question Appellant raises is whether the term "sentence" used in CTC 2.6.07 means fine, jail term, or both. Because the appellant contends that the term, as used in that section, is subject to more than one interpretation, we refer to the pertinent sections of the Code and other authority for guidance.

The Principles of Construction direct the Court to follow the plain meaning of terms found in the Code.

"Words shall be given their plain meaning and technical words shall be given their usually understood meaning where no other meaning is specified." CTC 1.1.07(b).

Moreover, the Principles of Construction also direct the Court to "[c]onstrue the Code as a whole to give effect to all of its parts in a logical, consistent manner." CTC 1.1.07(d).

The Court will look to the laws of Washington only when the meaning of a term is unclear on its face or in context of the Code. Further, the rules of construction instruct the Court to use the definition of a term given by the State only if such meaning would not undermine the underlying principles and purposes of the Code. CTC 1.1.07(e). In addition to the direction provided by the Principles of Construction, the Court Rules provide that we may look to other authority for an appropriate definition. CTC 4.1.11.

The Panel believes that the term "sentence", both by its facial definition and in the context of 2.6.07, unambiguously means punishment. In that regard, the Plain Meaning Rule in CTC 1.1.07(b) is controlling. It is equally clear that the term "sentence" used in CTC 2.6.07 refers to the punishment to be imposed by the Court in a criminal matter following a defendant's conviction of violating a criminal statute. The remaining question is whether the term refers only to confinement in jail.

In reviewing Chapter 5.7 Penalties of the Code, usage of the term "sentenced" indicates that the Tribal Council intended the term to include "[i]mprisonment..., or a fine..., or both imprisonment and a fine." CTC 5.7.01, 5.7.02, 5.7.03. When CTC 2.6.07 is read together with CTC 5.7.01 et seq., as provided by the Rules of Construction, 1.1.07(d), we believe the meaning of the term "sentence" includes imprisonment, a fine, or both.

Even if we assume that the term "sentence" is not sufficiently clear by definition or usage in the Code, we note that our interpretation of the term is the same as under Washington and Federal decisional law. The Washington courts have defined "sentence" in State v. King, 18 Wash.2d 747, 140 P.2d 283 (1943). In that case Washington Supreme stated as follows:

"In its technical legal signification "sentence" is ordinarily synonymous with "judgment" and denotes the action of a court of criminal jurisdiction formally declaring to the accused the legal consequences of the guilt which he has confessed or of which he has been convicted." 18 Wash.2d at 753, citing 24 C.J.S. 15 Criminal Law, Sec. 1556.

Further, the term "judgment" has been defined by the Washington courts as a "determination or sentence of the law, pronounced by a competent judge or court, as the result of an action or proceeding instituted in such court." State v. Siglea, 196 Wash. 283, 82 P.2d 583.

The federal courts have taken a similar view. A sentence in a criminal case is the action of the court fixing and declaring the legal consequences of predetermined guilt of a criminal offense. Barnes v. United States, 223 F.2d 891 (5th cir. 1955), citing 24 C.J.S. Sec. 1556. In Subas v. Hudspeth, 122 F.2d 85 (10th cir. 1941) the court differentiated between usage of the term "sentence" as an active verb and as a noun. In a legislative context, the latter denotes the punishment to be imposed on the accused by the court as part of the judgment after conviction of a criminal offense. The punishment or penalty imposed by the trial court must be within statutorily prescribed limits authorized by legislative branch. United States v. Elkin, 731F.2d 1005 (1985), cert. denied 469 U.S. 822, 105 S.Ct. 97, 83 L.Ed.2d 43. Therefore, it is the language of the statute which prescribes the punishment or penalty which may be imposed at sentencing. Further, the statute may provide punishment consisting of a fine, imprisonment, or both.

The legislative branch of government may create a broad sentencing range within which a judge may fix a particular sentence. United States v. Butler, 763 F.2d 11. Within the sentencing range prescribed by the legislative body, the judge has broad discretion in determining the sentence. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592.

Although the Panel considers state and federal decisional law to be only advisory, we find that the definition of "sentence" used by those courts is the same as under Tribal law. Thus, whether or not the term "sentence" is subject to construction, the Court finds that "sentence" means an essential part of a judgment in a criminal case which involves the legal consequences of a confession of guilt or a finding of guilt, punishment. From our reading of the Code, it is clear that the Tribal Council intended, and the Panel holds, that "sentence" also means punishment consisting of a fine, a jail term, or both. CTC 5.7.01 et seq.

The Panel does not read CTC 1.1.07(e) to mean that the Court must adopt the Washington sentencing statute, RCW 9.94A.400, in order to give meaning to the term. The Panel declines the appellant's invitation to do so. Such a strained application of the Principles of Construction would seriously undermine the principles and purpose of the Code.

II.

We next turn our attention to review of sentences imposed upon the appellant and the sentencing procedures used by the Trial Court. Appellant contends his right to due process and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were contravened under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1302 (7),(8) and the Colville Tribal Civil Rights Act, Title 56.02 (g),(h). Because the appellant claims a violation of his civil rights based upon Tribal and federal statutes, our review will necessarily include principles of Tribal and federal law. In Trial Procedure set forth in Chapter 2.6 of the Tribal Code provides as follows:

"All accused persons shall be guaranteed all civil rights secured under the Tribal Constitution and federal laws specifically applicable to Indian tribal courts." CTC 2.6.09.

We interpret CTC 2.6.09 to mean that a reviewing court must apply the Tribal Constitution, Tribal statutory and common law, and the Indian Civil Rights Act. We will also examine principles applied by the federal courts in sentencing review under the United States Constitution. The federal law principles for sentencing review cited infra, are not "specifically applicable to Indian tribal courts", CTC 2.6.09...