St. Pierre v. Norton, Civil Action No. 03-1057 (GK).

• Decision Date: 31 July 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 03-1057 (GK).
• Citation: 498 F.Supp.2d 214
• Parties: Cecilia ST. PIERRE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gale A. NORTON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

498 F.Supp.2d 214

Cecilia ST. PIERRE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.Gale A. NORTON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 03-1057 (GK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 31, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Randell Charles Ogg, Bode & Grenier, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Stacey Bosshardt, DOJ-Environment & Natural Resources Div. Natural Resources Section, Edward J. Passarelli, DOJ-Environment & Natural Resources Div. General Litigation Section, Allen Vern Farber, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KESSLER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Cecilia St. Pierre and Leonard L. Prescott, are members of the Shakopee Mdewakanton (Dakota) Sioux Community ("SMSC", "Tribe" or "Community").Defendants are Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, and David Anderson, Assistant Secretary — Indian Affairs of the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") of the United States Department of the Interior("DOI").Plaintiffs bring suit under the Administrative Procedure Act("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, challenging Defendants' decisions and actions with respect to the Tribe's membership.

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("Defendants' Motion"), [#24].Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion is granted.

I.BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiffs are individual members of the Shakopee Mdewakanton (Dakota) Sioux Community ("SMSC"), an Indian tribe federally recognized under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479.The SMSC controls the Mystic Lake Casino, which is "one of the largest gambling venues in the United States."Pls.' Second Am. Compl. ("Compl.")¶ 16.In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' actions "allowed unqualified [Tribe] members to illegally gain control of the Community and the substantial gaming revenues of the Community."Id. at 2.

Plaintiffs allege that in 1991, in an election in which unqualified individuals were wrongly allowed to vote, Stanley Crooks was elected Chairman of the Tribe.Id.¶ 16.According to Plaintiffs, from this time forward, "Mr. Crooks and his allies embarked on an illegal and unconstitutional scheme to wrest control of the Community from the majority of the true Mdewakanton Sioux and to take control of the Community's gaming resources."Id.¶ 18.

Plaintiffs' claims stem from a dispute regarding the interpretation of two provisions of the Tribe's Constitution.The first, Article II, Section 1, provides that members of the Tribe shall consist of:

(a) All persons of Mdewakanton Sioux Indian blood, not members of any other Indian tribe, band or group, whose names appear on the 1969 census roll of Mdewakanton Sioux residents of the Prior Lake Reservation, Minnesota, prepared specifically for the purpose of organizing the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community and approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

(b) All children of at least one-fourth (¼) degree Mdewakanton Sioux Indian blood born to an enrolled member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community.

(c) All descendants of at least one fourth (¼) degree Mdewakanton Sioux Indian blood who can trace their Mdewakanton Sioux Indian blood to the Mdewakanton Sioux Indians who resided in Minnesota on May 20, 1886, Provided,they apply for membership and are found qualified by the governing body, and provided further, they are not enrolled as members of some other tribe or band of Indians.

Id.¶ 7.

The second provision, Article II, Section 2, provides that the General Council"shall have power to pass resolutions or ordinances, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, governing future membership, adoptions and loss of membership."Defs.' Ex. Aat 1;seeCompl.¶ 8.Plaintiffs' position is that adoption ordinances, which have been passed under this section, may not eliminate the 1/4 degree blood quantum requirement contained in ArticleSection I.

In 1993 the SMSC, led by Crooks, passed an adoption ordinance under Article II, Section 2 which attempted to eliminate the ¼ degree blood quantum requirement for membership in the Tribe.Compl.¶ 19("First Adoption Ordinance").The BIA disapproved the ordinance and it never became effective.Id.¶ 20.

On November 30, 1993, the SMSC enacted a second adoption ordinance ("Second Adoption Ordinance") which also attempted to eliminate the ¼ degree blood quantum requirement.Again, it was submitted to the BIA and disapproved.Id.¶ 21.Crooks appealed this decision, and in February 1995, an administrative law judge of the Interior Board of Indian Appeals("IBIA") reversed the Area Director's disapproval of the Second Adoption Ordinance and remanded with instructions to the Area Director to approve it.Id.¶ 22.

In that litigation, the SMSC and the BIA disagreed as to whether an adoption ordinance passed under Article II, Section II of the tribal Constitution could eliminate the ¼ degree blood quantum requirement.The administrative law judge of the IBIA reasoned that since both the SMSC's and the BIA's interpretations of the tribal Constitution were reasonable, deference should be given to the SMSC's interpretation under the "rule requiring deference to the tribe's interpretation of its own laws," especially on matters related to tribal membership.Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. Acting Minneapolis Area Director, BIA,27 IBIA 163, 171-72(1995).Plaintiffs were not permitted to intervene in that appeal.

In July 1996, Plaintiff St. Pierre and her sisterWinifred Feezor filed suit in this Court challenging, among other things, the IBIA's approval of the Second Adoption Ordinance.Feezor v. Babbitt,953 F.Supp. 1(D.D.C.1996).Judge James Robertson remanded the case to the DOI for supplementation of the administrative record on certain issues, one of which was why the IBIA decision overturning the Area Director's decision occurred after the 90-day time period during which such IBIA action is permitted.Id. at 6.

On May 23, 1997, before the DO] had responded to Judge Robertson's remand, the SMSC passed a third adoption ordinance ("Third Adoption Ordinance"), which was substantially similar to the Second Adoption Ordinance.Compl.¶ 32.The Third Adoption Ordinance was submitted to the BIA, approved, and went into effect.Id.

On February 2, 1999, in response to Judge Robertson's remand in Feezar, then Assistant Secretary — Indian Affairs Kevin Gover reversed the IBIA's approval of the Second Adoption.Ordinance because the 90-day time period in which to review the Ordinance had expired.As a result, the Second Ordinance did not go into effect.Compl.¶ 34; Defs.'Ex. O.With this reversal, however, Defendants' positions with respect to the Second and Third Adoption Ordinances, which the parties agree were substantially similar, were, on their face, in conflict.

Thereafter, on December 8, 1999, Plaintiffs in Feezor returned to Judge Robertson with a Motion to Enforce and Reopen for Amended Relief.Judge Robertson denied that Motion on September 30, 2000.

Plaintiffs St. Pierre and Feezor also challenged the validity of the Second and Third Adoption Ordinances in tribal court, making many of the same arguments they make here, and lost.Defs.' Ex. H, Feezor v. SMSC Bus. Council, No. 311-98(SMSC Tr. St.May 19, 1999).The tribal court held that "the [Third Adoption] Ordinance was validly enacted by the Community."Id. at 14.It also rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Third Adoption Ordinance was invalid pursuant to Gover's rejection of the Second Adoption Ordinance.The tribal court reasoned that "since the interpretation of the Community Constitution is clearly a matter of tribal law, and this court has jurisdiction to interpret the Community Constitution pursuant to Section II of the Tribal Court Ordinance, this Court, not the Assistant Secretary — Indian Affairs, is the proper forum for final interpretation of the Community Constitution."²Id. at 18.Plaintiffs did not appeal this 1999 tribal court decision.

In this lawsuit, filed in 2003, Plaintiffs again allege that "the adoption policies that are presently being followed, but which were illegally instituted, patently violate the Community's Constitution by denying the enrollment of many who are qualified and by allowing unqualified members to control every decision regarding the Community."Compl. at 2.They base their APA claims on the inconsistency in Defendants' final positions with respect to the Second and Third Adoption Ordinances.³

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that for a motion to dismiss.Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Medical Colleges,339 F.Supp.2d 26, 35(D.D.C.2004).Accordingly the factual allegations of the complaint must be presumed true and liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff.Shear v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am.,606 F.2d 1251, 1253(D.C.Cir.1979).

When reviewing actions by an administrative agency, courts are bound by the highly deferential standard embodied by the APA.5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).Under this standard an agency action may be set aside only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."Id.If the "agency's reasons and policy choices ... conform to `certain minimal standards of rationality' ... the [agency decision] is reasonable and must be upheld."Small Refiner Lead Phase Down Task Force v. EPA,705 F.2d 506, 521(D.C.Cir.1983)(citation omitted).

III.ANALYSIS

A.Count I of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Must Be Dismissed UnderFRCP 19

Count I of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, which is titled "Violation of the Administrative Procedures [sic]Act Due to Defendants' Departure from Policy Without Valid Supporting Reasons," challenges Defendants'...