St. Thomas-St. John Hotel v. U.S. Virgin Island

• Decision Date: 16 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.1999-54.,CIV.1999-54.
• Citation: 216 F.Supp.2d 460
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands
• Parties: The ST. THOMAS - ST. JOHN HOTEL & TOURISM ASSOCIATION, INC., The St. Thomas-St. John Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and The St. Croix Hotel & Tourism Association, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. The GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLAND by and through VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and Euleteria Roberts, in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, Defendants, Elsa Huggins and Ladiah White, Intervenors.

216 F.Supp.2d 460

The ST. THOMAS - ST. JOHN HOTEL & TOURISM ASSOCIATION, INC., The St. Thomas-St. John Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and The St. Croix Hotel & Tourism Association, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. The GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLAND by and through VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and Euleteria Roberts, in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, Defendants Elsa Huggins and Ladiah White, Intervenors.

No. CIV.1999-54.

District Court, Virgin Islands, D. St. Thomas and St. John.

August 16, 2002.

Charles E. Engeman, St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the plaintiffs.

Carol S. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the defendants.

Kathleen Navin, Richard Austin, Legal Services of the Virgin Islands, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for the intervenors.

MEMORANDUM

MOORE, District Judge.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs brought this action seeking to permanently enjoin the Government of the Virgin Islands ["government"] from conducting any preliminary or formal hearings on wrongful discharge claims premised on the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act ["WDA"], 24 V.I.C. §§ 71-76, on the ground that the WDA is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act ["NLRA"], 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. In light of its earlier decision in Bell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 40 F.Supp.2d 307 (D.Vi.1999), this Court entered an order on June 2, 1999, enjoining the Virgin Islands Department of Labor from conducting any formal wrongful discharge hearings regarding employees covered by the NLRA until the issue could be resolved by trial or otherwise. The government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that Bell v. Chase was incorrectly decided and that the WDA is not preempted by federal law. On June 30, 2000, the Court of Appeals vacated the preliminary injunction, rejecting this Court's reliance on its analysis in Bell v Chase and holding that the WDA is not, as a general matter, preempted by the NLRA. See St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Assoc., Inc. v. Government, 218 F.3d 232, 246 (3d Cir.2000). Expressly left open was the question whether the application of the WDA to supervisors would conflict with federal labor law. See id. at 246 (leaving open the question whether section 14(a) of the NLRA prohibits the application of the WDA to supervisors). The case was remanded to this Court for further proceedings consistent with that decision.

On remand, I accordingly denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the question of general preemption and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the question whether the application of the WDA to supervisors is consistent with federal labor law. Not long after the supplemental briefs were filed, the Virgin Islands Legislature amended the definition of an "employee" under the WDA to exclude from the Act's coverage "any individual employed in a bonafide position in an executive or professional capacity." See Fiscal Year 2001 Omnibus Authorization Act, No. 6391, § 3(b)(4), 2000 V.I.Sess.Laws 430, 487-88 (amending V.I.Code Ann. tit. 24, § 62)). Still before the Court is whether supervisory employees who are not "employed in a bonafide position in an executive or professional capacity" are nevertheless "employees" protected by the WDA. For the reasons that follow, I will deny the plaintiff associations' request for a permanent injunction enjoining the Department of Labor from enforcing the WDA on behalf of supervisors and grant summary judgment to the defendants.

DISCUSSION

According to the plaintiffs, the WDA does not afford protection to supervisors for two reasons. First, they argue that supervisors are "employers" as that term is defined in section 62, chapter 3 of title 24 of the Virgin Islands Code because in the exercise of their duties, supervisors necessarily act "in the interest of an employer." See 24 V.I.C. § 62. Thus, supervisors are not "employees" as defined by section 62 and unprotected by the WDA. Second, they argue that the application of the WDA to supervisors would be inconsistent with the express exclusion of supervisors from the protection of the NLRA because it would force employers to retain a supervisor with divided loyalties. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) ("[N]o employer shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining."); see Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, 416 U.S. 653, 662, 94 S.Ct. 2023, 40 L.Ed.2d 443 (1974) (holding that state law cannot afford supervisors a cause of action that they would not have under the NLRA as section 14(a) relieves "the employer of obligations under any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining").

The defendants agree that a supervisor can indeed act "in the interest of an employer" in exercising her supervisory authority, but argue that when that same supervisor is herself discharged by her own employer, she is necessarily discharged in her capacity as an "employee" and thus is covered by the WDA.¹ The defendants further argue that the application of the WDA to supervisors is not generally inconsistent with section 14(a) of the NLRA because the WDA does not, on its face or as allegedly applied, afford a cause of action to supervisors that they would not have under the NLRA.

A. Supervisors Are "Employees" Protected by the WDA.

The WDA provides that "any employee discharged for reasons other than those stated in subsection (a)² of this section shall be considered to have been wrongfully discharged." 24 V.I.C. § 76(c). Section 62 of chapter 3 of title 24 defines the term "employee" as including "any employee," except those specifically excluded from the definition. 24 V.I.C. § 62 (emphasis added).³ An "employer" defined in relevant part as including "any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly." Id.

In support of their argument that the term "supervisor" is in effect synonymous with "employer," the plaintiffs point to section 2(11) of the NLRA, which sets forth the definition of "supervisor" for purposes of federal labor law:

The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.

29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (emphasis added). According to the plaintiffs' logic, if a supervisor is a "supervisor" under federal labor law when she acts "in the interest of the employer," she must then be an "employer" under Virgin Islands law, as that term is defined to mean "any person acting in the interest of an employer." 24 V.I.C. § 62. Although this analysis has some superficial appeal, its restricted focus on the supervisor's authority to act in the interest of her employer ignores the fundamental fact that she is still an employee who, like any other employee, acts under the ultimate control of the employer and who can be fired by the employer. Thus, although a supervisor may act "in the interests of her employer" in performing her duties, she necessarily performs those duties as an "employee" subject to the control of the employer. There is nothing about the definition of "employee" in section 62 that would preclude this commonsense conclusion.

Section 62 plainly and unambiguously includes within the term "employee" those individuals who may work as supervisors. The term "employee" for purposes of title 24 is defined broadly as "includ[ing] any employee." 24 V.I.C. § 62 (emphasis added). Since supervisors are not among the specific statutory exceptions that are excluded from the definition, and with nothing in the text that would render it the least bit ambiguous, I must conclude that supervisors are employees protected by the WDA. Faced with the plain and unambiguous statutory language, I need not make any further inquiry. See Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. Richardson, 344, 894 F.Supp. 211, 216 (D.V.I.App.Div.1995) ("[Where] the language of the statute is clear and without ambiguity[,] ... there is no need to review the ... legislative history.").

Although I need not look beyond the unambiguous language of the statute, I nevertheless draw support from evidence that the Legislature obviously knew how to exclude certain classes of individuals from the statutory definition of employee, most recently in the amendment enacted while this case was pending, which excludes executives and professionals from the definition of employee. See Act No. 6391, § 3(b)(4), 2000 V.I.Sess.Laws 430, 487-88 (amending 24 V.I.C. § 62). The Legislature's recent action to exclude some classes of individuals from the definition, but not supervisors, inescapably implies that the legislators decided to treat supervisors as employees for purposes of the WDA. Availing here is the application of the well-established principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the Legislature's explicit expression of one thing, here, certain exceptions to the definition of "employee," implies an intention not to except other categories of workers from the broad definition. See, e.g., Keeley v. Loomis Fargo & Co., 183 F.3d 257, 265-66 (3d Cir.1999) (applying the maxim to conclude that the New Jersey legislature's express exclusion of certain employers from statutory overtime requirements indicates its intention to include a non-excluded industry in the statute's overtime coverage). Although the maxim is merely a canon of statutory construction and not a rule of substantive law, I draw comfort that its application is entirely consistent a plain reading of the unambiguous...