St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine

• Citation: 144 N.E. 537,195 Ind. 350
• Decision Date: 26 June 1924
• Docket Number: No. 24077.,24077.
• Parties: ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL v. STINE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

195 Ind. 350

144 N.E. 537

ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL

v.STINE.

No. 24077.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 26, 1924.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hendricks County; Z. E. Dougan, Judge.

Action by Robert Stine against St. Vincent's Hospital. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, with instructions.

Bernard Korbly and John G. McNutt, both of Indianapolis, and George W. Brill, of Danville, for appellant.

Chas. M. Reagan and Beckett & Beckett, all of Indianapolis, for appellee.

GAUSE, J.

Appellee sued appellant to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained as the result of the negligence of a nurse of appellant while appellee was in appellant's hospital as a patient.

The third paragraph of complaint, upon which the cause was tried, alleges: That appellant is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of Indiana, and conducts a hospital in the city of Indianapolis for the treatment of patients requiring operations and other medical attention. That appellant has authority to hire agents, to pay them out of moneys derived from charities, bequests, and pay patients. That it has power to make contracts with patients for services and treatment in such hospital, and derives its funds largely from charges and fees for services to patients. That appellee went to said hospital for an operation and entered into a contract whereby appellant, in consideration of the sum of $20 per week, agreed to furnish appellee a room in said hospital, together with good and skillful nurses to take care of and nurse him, and that it then became the duty of appellant to exercise reasonable care and skill to take care of and nurse appellee while he was under treatment in said hospital. It is then alleged that, while under an anæsthetic, administered for the purposes of performing said operation, a servant of appellant who was employed by it to care for the patients negligently placed in the bed where appellee was confined, a bottle filled with water which was too hot for such purpose, and placed the same against the foot of appellee, and that appellee's foot and leg were burned thereby to such an extent that his leg had to be amputated in order to preserve his life.

Appellant filed an answer in denial and also a special answer, denominated a fourth paragraph of answer to the third paragraph of complaint, and which alleged, in substance: That appellant was incorporated on July 28, 1884, under the laws of Indiana. That the object of its organization, as stated in its articles of association, is as follows:

“The object of said association or corporation is to found and sustain a hospital in the city of Indianapolis, Marion county, Indiana, for the relief of the sick and destitute and in aid of benevolent and charitable purposes.”

That since its organization it has owned and operated a hospital in said city for the relief of the sick and destitute and in aid of benevolent and charitable purposes, and maintained and operated said hospital as a charitable institution. That it has no capital stock and pays no dividends and has not been and is not operated for profit. That it is managed and operated by a number of women belonging to the society of the Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, and known as Sisters of Charity, and who give their time, service, and labor in the management and operation of said hospital without pay or remuneration, and not for profit. That much of the property, including the buildings and equipment used by appellant, was donated by charitably inclined persons for the purpose of being used for charitable purposes. That some of the persons who become patients at said hospital pay the board, lodging, and other services rendered them, but that at all times said hospital is open for the reception of any person of whatever color, race, or religion who is destitute or unable to pay, and that it has many patients who are unable to pay and have not paid and are not expected to pay appellant for said services, but that such services are furnished gratuitously. That the primary purpose for which said hospital is maintained is to render such gratuitous service to those who are destitute and unable to pay. That all money received from pay patients is placed in a common fund with all money received as donations and bequests from charitably inclined persons, and the expenses of furnishing services to both the destitute, and the pay patients are paid out of said common fund.

Facts are then alleged showing that the said servant of appellant whose negligence is alleged to have caused the injury to appellee was a skillful and experienced nurse, and that appellant used due care in selecting him.

A demurrer was sustained to this paragraph of answer.

A trial by jury resulted in a verdict for appellee, upon which judgment was rendered.

Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the correctness of certain rulings upon the admission and rejection of evidence, and also assigned certain alleged misconduct of one of appellee's counsel during the trial.

The motion for a new trial was overruled.

The principal question for decision, and which arises both because of the sustaining of the demurrer to the special answer and the overruling of the motion for a new trial, is whether a corporation organized and operating a hospital in the manner alleged in the special answer is liable for an injury to one of its patients caused by the negligence of its employees.

Appellant contends that it is a charitable hospital, and that such an institution is not liable in damages for an injury to a patient resulting from the negligence of its servant.

Appellee contends: First, that the facts alleged in said answer do not show that appellant is operating a charity; and, second, that, if it is, such an institution is liable for the negligence of its employees the same as any other corporation or individual.

It is necessary first to consider whether, under the facts alleged in the special answer (and appellant offered evidence to prove the allegations thereof, but the offer was refused), appellant is a charitable institution.

Appellant was organized in 1884. It is sued as a duly organized corporation. The only law existing at such time which authorized the organization of any such an association as appellant was the act of 1881 (Acts 1881, p. 712; section 3502, R. S. 1881), which was an amendment of the act of 1867 (Acts 1867, p. 223). Under this statute any number of persons were authorized to associate themselves by written articles for either one of several specified purposes. The only purpose specified in said statute under which appellant could have been organized with the object stated in its articles is under the fifth subdivision of said statute, which authorized the forming of charitable associations or orders. As heretofore set out, the purpose of said association as stated in its articles is as follows:

“The object of said association or corporation is to found and sustain a hospital in the city of Indianapolis, Marion county, Indiana, for the relief of the sick and destitute and in aid of benevolent and charitable purposes.”

Said appellant has no capital stock and pays no dividends, and its term of existence is not limited. It is alleged that a large part of its property, including the buildings and equipment used as a hospital, was donated by charitably inclined persons for charitable purposes alone. It is operated by persons who serve without pay.

Hospitals maintained, not for pecuniary profit, but to relieve the destitute and deserving, are generally classed as public charities. It has been said that the true test of an institution is its origin and objects. If it is founded on donations, and has for its purpose the accomplishment of a charity by the distribution of alms to the needy, or the relief of the destitute and distressed, it is most unquestionably eleemosynary. American Asylum v. Phœnix Bank, 4 Conn. 172, 10 Am. Dec. 112;Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 650, 15 Atl. 553, 1 L. R. A. 422, 6 Am. St. Rep. 745.

It was held by this court in the case of Richards v. Wilson (1916) 185 Ind. 335, 112 N. E. 780, which was a case to determine the character of the Winona Technical Institute, that an institution which arose out of donations for a charitable purpose, and is carrying out that purpose, does not lose its character as a charitable institution because it receives a revenue from some of the recipients of its bounty.

The Supreme Court of Ohio, in considering a similar question regarding the Protestant Hospital Association of that state in a case parallel to the case at bar, and in which an answer had been filed setting up facts similar to the special answer in this case, used this language:

“We think this hospital owned and operated in the manner set out is a public charity and this without reference to whether some of the patients are what are termed pay patients or not.” Taylor v. Prostestant Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427.

Appellee urges the case of Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass'n, 32 Utah, 46, 88 Pac. 691, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161, as a case strongly supporting the proposition that appellant is not a charitable institution. In that case, which was decided in 1907, the Hospital Association had been organized under the laws of Indiana, and it appears that in the articles of association its object was stated to be to maintain and operate hospitals; but it is not stated, as in the case at bar, that its object was to relieve the destitute, or that it was organized in aid of benevolent or charitable purposes. There was nothing in the articles of the association in the Utah case which indicated it was in any sense organized for any charitable purpose. It was also stated in that case that the law under which it was incorporated required:

“That, if the corporation is organized for...