Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud

• Decision Date: 18 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. A09–1335.
• Citation: Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012)
• Parties: Alice Ann STAAB, Appellant, v. DIOCESE OF ST. CLOUD, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

813 N.W.2d 68

Alice Ann STAAB, Appellant,

v.DIOCESE OF ST. CLOUD, Respondent.

No. A09–1335.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 18, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

When a jury attributes 50% of the negligence that caused a compensable injury to the sole defendant in a civil action and 50% to a nonparty to the lawsuit, Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2010), requires that the defendant contribute to the award only in proportion to the fault attributed to the defendant by the jury.Kevin S. Carpenter, Carpenter Injury Law Office, St. Cloud, MN, H. Morrison Kershner, Pemberton, Sorlie, Rufer & Kershner, PLLP, Fergus Falls, MN, for appellant.

Dyan J. Ebert, Laura A. Moehrle, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, MN, for respondent.

Richard J. Thomas, Bryon G. Ascheman, Corinne Ivanca, Burke & Thomas, PLLP, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

This appeal requires us to interpret the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2010), to determine whether a defendant must pay an entire damages award when a special jury verdict attributes 50% of the negligence to the sole defendant and 50% of the negligence to a nonparty to the lawsuit. Appellant Staab brought suit against respondent Diocese of St. Cloud for injuries she sustained on premises it owned and operated. The district court ruled that Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, does not apply in an action against only one defendant and ordered the defendant to pay the entire damages award. The court of appeals reversed, holding that under the plain language of section 604.02, subdivision 1, the defendant must pay only in proportion to the percentage of fault attributed to the defendant by the jury. We affirm the court of appeals under a different analysis and remand to the district court to enter judgment in favor of appellant consistent with this opinion.

According to the complaint, on April 9, 2005, appellant Alice Ann Staab and her husband, Richard Staab, attended a social event at the Holy Cross Parish School in Kimball, Minnesota. The school is owned and operated by respondent Diocese of St. Cloud's Holy Cross Parish. Appellant relies on a nonmotorized wheelchair for mobility. As appellant was leaving the school, Richard Staab pushed her wheelchair through an open doorway, and the wheelchair went over what has been described as an unmarked 5–inch drop-off. Appellant fell forward out of her wheelchair onto a cement sidewalk and was injured as a result of her fall.

After her fall, appellant brought an action against the Diocese, alleging that the Diocese failed to use reasonable care to protect her from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by the conditions at the school. Richard Staab was not named as a party to the lawsuit by the appellant or the respondent. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Respondent requested and the district court approved a special verdict form that asked the jury to separately determine whether the Diocese was negligent when appellant was injured and, if so, whether the negligence of the Diocese directly caused appellant's injuries. Similarly, the jury was asked to determine whether Richard Staab was negligent when appellant was injured and, if so, whether the negligence of Richard Staab directly caused appellant's injuries. Finally, the special verdict form asked the jury to attribute to the Diocese and to Richard Staab a percentage of the negligence that directly caused appellant's injuries.

The jury found that the Diocese and Richard Staab each were negligent and that the negligence of each directly caused appellant's injuries. The jury attributed 50% of the negligence that directly caused appellant's injuries to the Diocese and 50% to Richard Staab. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $224,200.70: $50,000 for past pain, disability, disfigurement, embarrassment, and emotional distress; and $174,200.70 for past health care expenses. The district court adopted the special verdict as its findings of fact, concluded that appellant was entitled to judgment against the Diocese in the amount of $224,200.70, and ordered entry of judgment for $224,200.70 plus costs and disbursements.

The Diocese moved for amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, asking the district court to reduce the judgment against the Diocese to 50% of the damages award. The Diocese argued that Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, limits the liability of the Diocese to the percentage of fault attributed to it by the jury. The district court denied the motion. The court concluded that because subdivision 1 addresses contributions to awards “[w]hen two or more persons are severally liable,” it did not apply in this case because “[l]iability arises only where there is a judgment. In this case, Richard Staab was not a party in the lawsuit and therefore cannot be held liable.” As a result, the district court held the Diocese responsible to pay all of the $224,200.70 award.

The Diocese appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 780 N.W.2d 392, 396 (Minn.App.2010). The court observed that “the statute is not a model of clarity,” but concluded that requiring the Diocese to pay 100% of the damages award “does not comport with the plain language” of subdivision 1. Id. According to the court, the Diocese and Richard Staab are each “persons” within the meaning of the statute, and “[u]nder the plain language of the statute, they are ‘each’ to ‘contribute’ to the damages ‘award’ ‘in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each.’ ” Id. at 394. Therefore, the court concluded that the Diocese is severally liable for 50% of the damages award. Id. We granted appellant's petition for further review.

I.

This appeal presents the court with its first opportunity to interpret Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, as amended by the Legislature in 2003. At issue in this appeal is whether the sole defendant, the Diocese of St. Cloud, although found by the jury to be only 50% at fault, must pay 100% of the $224,200.70 jury award because Staab elected not to join her husband as a defendant.¹ The outcome turns on whether Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, is interpreted to require that a sole defendant in a lawsuit is liable for a nonparty's liability.

The goal of all statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010); Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn.2010). We give words and phrases in a statute their plain and ordinary meanings, and “technical words and phrases ... are construed according to [their] special meaning or their definition.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2010); accord Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999). Further, we construe the statute to give effect to all its provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.16.

Our first step in interpreting a statute is to examine the statutory language to determine whether the words of the law are clear and free from all ambiguity. Id. The words are not free from ambiguity if, as applied to the facts of the particular case, they are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Amaral, 598 N.W.2d at 384. If the words are free of all ambiguity, we apply the statutory language. SeeMinn.Stat. § 645.16. If the words are not free of ambiguity, the court may look beyond the statutory language to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Id.

Generally, statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed. Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn.2004). Therefore, we presume that statutes are consistent with the common law, In re Shetsky, 239 Minn. 463, 469, 60 N.W.2d 40, 45 (1953), and do not presume that the Legislature intends to abrogate or modify a common law rule except to the extent expressly declared or clearly indicated in the statute, Do v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 779 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn.2010). It is undisputed that Minn.Stat. § 604.02 was intended to modify the common law rule of joint and several liability in Minnesota. Thus, we must carefully examine the express wording of the statute to determine the nature and extent to which the statute modifies the common law. See id.

II.

Minnesota Statutes § 604.02, subd. 1, states:

When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that the following persons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award:

(1) a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent;

(2) two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan that results in injury;

(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or

(4) a person whose liability arises under [certain environmental laws].

The language of subdivision 1 presents two fundamental challenges that must be resolved in order to ascertain its meaning. First, subdivision 1 does not explain the meaning of “[w]hen,” that is, the point in time the statute is applicable to determine whether “persons are severally liable.” Specifically, subdivision 1 does not explain whether liability for purposes of the statute is determined at the time the tort is committed, at the time of judgment in a civil action, or at some other point in time. The answer to the question of when liability is determined for purposes of the statute directly impacts whether a sole defendant in a lawsuit must pay more than its equitable share of a judgment as measured by the percentage of fault apportioned to it by the jury. Thus, in order to interpret the statutory phrases “persons are severally liable” and “persons are jointly and severally liable,” we must examine when “persons are ... liable” at common law and determine whether the statute modifies the common law rule.

At common law, “liability is created at the instant [a] tort is committed.” White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 371, 137 N.W.2d 674, 679 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., ...