Staats v. Brown
| Decision Date | 06 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 65681-9.,65681-9. |
| Citation | 991 P.2d 615,139 Wash.2d 757 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jack STAATS and Sherry Ann Staats, husband and wife, Respondents, v. James BROWN and the State of Washington, Department of Fish and Wildlife, Petitioners. |
Christine Gregoire, Atty. Gen., Carl B. Paul, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for Petitioners.
Henderson & Grow, Clinton James Henderson, Neil Presley Cox, Jr., Clarkston, for Respondents.
A riverbank confrontation between property owner Jack Staats and fish and wildlife officer James Brown spawned this action for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and violation of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At issue is whether a fish and wildlife officer may effect a warrantless arrest for unlawful resistance based upon failure to provide information; whether this arrest, lawful or not, was accomplished through the use of excessive force; and, ultimately, whether Officer Brown enjoys immunity from suit under state and/or federal law. The trial court dismissed the action based upon state and federal claims of qualified immunity, whereas the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded for trial. We granted the petition for review filed by Officer Brown and the Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife, and now affirm in part and reverse in part.
On June 1, 1993 Washington state wildlife agent Ken Woltering observed construction work on the bank of the Snake River near Heller Bar in Asotin County as well as debris which he believed had been pushed into the river by the work. The property was owned by Jack Staats; however, it is not claimed Staats personally performed any of the work. Woltering believed Staats had unlawfully caused construction work below the high watermark of the Snake River without that permit required by former RCW 75.20.100 (1992). Thereafter neither Staats, nor anyone on his behalf performed any construction work within or below the high watermark.
On the same day Woltering initially contacted Staats, June 1, 1993, Woltering also contacted fisheries patrol officer James Brown, the officer responsible for investigating alleged fisheries violations. Brown observed the construction site, spoke with Staats about the permitting process, and advised Staats he should apply for a permit. At no time did Staats engage in any shoreline construction work while in Brown's presence, or thereafter.
On June 8 Brown again returned to the site, this time with Roger Wilms, regional habitat manager for the department of fisheries, but again observed no work in progress.
On September 3, 1993 Brown returned for a third time to inspect the site and issue a citation to Staats for commencing construction without a permit. He had neither arrest nor search warrant. No work was in progress at that time, nor is it claimed any work had been performed below the high watermark after the initial June 1 contact. Staats emerged from his trailer and ordered Brown off the property. Brown refused to leave, informing 62-year-old Staats he intended to cite him for the construction violation, demanding further identification and information to fill out the citation. Staats refused to provide the requested identification. Brown wrote in his incident report he considered leaving and coming back at a later time, but rather determined he "now could deal with the situation" and, after some apparently quite heated discussion, arrested Staats for "refusing to cooperate to receive a citation," contrary to former RCW 75.10.040 (1992), repealed by Laws of 1998, ch. 190, § 124, which prohibits resistance to a fisheries patrol officer while performing his duties. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 53. In response Staats sidestepped and attempted to walk away only to be physically subdued by Officer Brown.
Brown reported Staats CP at 54. Staats claims Brown placed him in a choke hold, forced him to the ground, dragged him backward across the rocks "and then threw Mr. Staats down face-first across a two foot boulder," CP at 4, and then "slammed Mr. Staats' head down into the two-foot boulder," id., causing his forehead to bleed. Allegedly Brown knelt on Staats' back and, when Staats tried to get up, grabbed his head and pushed him back down into a rock which painfully pressed against his chest. Brown also allegedly pulled Staats' ears straight out from his head causing extreme pain and suffering. Id.
Brown then allegedly searched Staats' residence and confiscated Staats' wallet after which Staats was transported to the Asotin County sheriff's office, processed, and released.
Subsequent to arrest for failure to provide information, but prior to release, Staats was cited for three misdemeanors: (1) commencing unlawful construction in violation of former RCW 75.20.100; (2) unlawful resistance by refusal to give information to an officer performing his duties, contrary to former RCW 75.10.040; and (3) resisting arrest, contrary to RCW 9A.76.040. Staats moved to dismiss all charges in Asotin County District Court pursuant to State v. Knapstad, 41 Wash.App. 781, 706 P.2d 238 (1985),aff'd,107 Wash.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986). The court granted the motion, concluding unlawful resistance by refusal to provide information did not occur as a matter of law.
The state appealed to the Asotin County Superior Court which affirmed the dismissals, adopting all of the criminal trial court's findings and conclusions. The criminal matter ended when the Court of Appeals denied the state's request for review.
Staats then filed a civil complaint in Asotin County Superior Court alleging three violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Officer Brown in his personal capacity: (1) unconstitutional search, (2) unconstitutional seizure, and (3) unconstitutional use of excessive force by Brown. Staats also alleged state tort claims against Brown and the Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife for false arrest, false imprisonment, and against Brown individually for assault and battery.
Staats moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the result reached in his criminal trial collaterally estopped Brown from denying liability for either the illegal arrest of Staats or the use of excessive force against Staats. Brown cross-moved for summary judgment of dismissal on grounds of qualified immunity. The trial court denied Staats' motion, granted Brown's, and dismissed Staats' suit with prejudice on immunity grounds. Staats appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court's denial of Staats' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding the elements of collateral estoppel had not been satisfied, but reversed the trial court's dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, remanding for trial. CP at 6, 8. We granted Brown's petition for review to reconsider his claims of immunity.1
Claims of qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 must fail if the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the act. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We review claims of qualified immunity based on the assumption that all facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint are true. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S.Ct. 502, 505, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 637 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). Claims of qualified immunity under state law are subject to the ordinary summary judgment standard which requires all facts and inferences to be construed most favorably to the nonmoving party. CR 56.
The threshold issue is whether Staats' arrest for refusal to provide identification, allegedly contrary to former RCW 75.10.040, was unlawful. In pertinent part former RCW 75.10.040 provides:
It is unlawful to knowingly or wilfully resist or obstruct a fisheries patrol officer in the discharge of the officer's duties.
Former RCW 75.10.040(3).
Thus the statute requires the presence of two statutory elements: (1) knowing or willful resistance to (2) the discharge of the officer's duties.
The district court found both elements absent as a matter of law, reasoning: (1) one cannot "resist" by simply withholding identification or other information; and (2) the officer was not lawfully entitled to issue the citation for which he sought information and thus was not acting in the discharge of his "duties." If the district court was correct on either ground, Officer Brown's arrest of Staats was without legal authority.
As to the first point—simple refusal to provide identification or information for a citation cannot constitute resistance under this statute—the district court relied upon State v. White, 97 Wash.2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982) for the proposition that "a detainee's refusal to disclose his name, address, and other information cannot be the basis of an arrest." Id. at 106, 640 P.2d 1061.
In White a transient was arrested for failure to provide information contrary to RCW 9A.76.020. This statute provided in pertinent part:
White, 97 Wash.2d at 95-96, 640 P.2d 1061 (quoting former RCW 9A.76.020). The issue we there resolved was "whether criminal sanctions...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bradford v. City of Seattle
...plaintiffs assault and battery claim is not appropriate. Nor is qualified immunity proper under state law. See Stoats v. Brown, 139 Wash.2d 757, 780, 991 P.2d 615, 627-28 (2000) (holding that state qualified immunity is not available "for claims of assault and battery arising out of the use......
-
In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 68216-0.
...... principle is "a statute will not be construed in derogation of the common law unless the legislature has clearly expressed that purpose." Staats v. Brown, 139 Wash.2d 757, 766, 991 P.2d 615 (2000) . See also Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash.2d 206, 213, 867 P.2d 610 (1994) . . The ......
-
State v. Monroe
...procedure or circumstance controls over the provisions of statutes of more general application. Staats v. Brown, 139 Wash.2d 757, 789, 991 P.2d 615 (2000) (Talmadge, J., concurring/dissenting). Applying these two principles here reveals that RCW 9.94A.712(3) does not grant a sentencing cour......
-
Bosteder v. City of Renton
...defense "must fail if the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the act." Staats v. Brown, 139 Wash.2d 757, 763, 991 P.2d 615 (2000); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The government official......