Stabenow v. State
Decision Date | 14 July 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 2-985-A-282,2-985-A-282 |
Citation | 495 N.E.2d 197 |
Parties | Joel STABENOW, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Robert W. Hammerle, John S. Nimmo, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-appellant Joel Stabenow (Stabenow) brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence relating to charges of dealing in cocaine, a class A felony, 1 and possession of a controlled substance, a class D felony, 2 claiming that cocaine found in the trunk of his automobile was wrongly seized because the warrant authorizing the search of the automobile was issued on less than probable cause and that valium tablets found in his luggage were the product of an improper detention and nonconsensual search.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
As presented at the much-continued suppression hearing, the evidence most favorable to the decision of the trial court reveals that on November 27, 1984, Indianapolis Police Officer Ronald Schmidt (Schmidt) and Indiana State Police Trooper Frederick Warren (Warren) were assigned to a multi-agency airport drug interdiction detail at the Indianapolis International Airport. Stabenow had apparently been under investigation by police authorities for some time because of his frequent short-duration flights to Florida and his behavior at the airport upon returning from those sojourns.
On the above date, Schmidt and Warren detained Stabenow after he returned on an airline flight from Florida. Schmidt and Warren, both plainclothes officers, stopped Stabenow at the curb outside the departure area of the terminal where he was waiting for a shuttle bus to his car, which was parked in the long term parking lot of the airport. Although both were armed, there is no indication either officer exhibited his firearm. The officers identified themselves and asked Stabenow if he would mind answering a few questions. Stabenow assented.
Stabenow denied having an airline ticket; however, when asked to produce a baggage claim check, he also produced a ticket stub in a name other than his own. According to Schmidt, Record at 58. Schmidt further elaborated that "[p]rior to asking for the consent to search I advised him that the purpose of the questioning was concerning narcotics investigation." Record at 58. Although Warren disagreed, Schmidt indicated he informed Stabenow "[t]hat he was not being detained, that he could leave at anytime." Record at 59. Warren searched Stabenow's carryon luggage and found a vial of valium tablets secreted in a stick deodorant container. Stabenow admitted having no prescription for the valium and was placed under arrest. In response to Schmidt's question, Stabenow stated that he did not have a vehicle at the airport. However, Stabenow's automobile had been parked in the airport long term parking lot for several days and was under periodic police surveillance.
Stabenow's car was towed to a police garage. Later the same day, Warren prepared an affidavit seeking a search warrant for the vehicle and presented the same to a judge of the Marion County Municipal Court. In its entirety, the affidavit states:
Record at 13. At the suppression hearing, Warren testified this was the first probable cause affidavit he had personally prepared. He indicated the prosecutor's office in the county where he normally was assigned prepared the affidavit and presented the request to the magistrate. Moreover, Warren stated that he had additional information which would supplement that contained in the affidavit but presented none of that information to the judge, who issued the search warrant for the vehicle solely on the basis of the affidavit presented by Warren. Cocaine in an amount over three grams was found in the trunk of Stabenow's automobile.
Following the denial of Stabenow's motion to suppress, this interlocutory appeal ensued.
Stabenow presents two issues for our consideration:
1. Did the trial court err by denying Stabenow's motion to suppress the cocaine obtained from the search of the trunk of his automobile?
2. Did the trial court err by denying Stabenow's motion to suppress the valium procured from a search of his luggage?
ISSUE ONE--Did the trial court err by denying Stabenow's motion to suppress the cocaine obtained from the search of the trunk of his automobile?
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS--Stabenow asserts that the search warrant is not valid because the affidavit was not supported by probable cause. Stabenow further argues that Indiana should reject any "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule on the basis of the Indiana Constitution and IC 35-37-4-5 (Supp.1985). Even under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Stabenow argues, suppression remains the appropriate remedy in this case.
The State counters that the affidavit did in fact establish probable cause and thus supports the validity of the search warrant. However, assuming arguendo that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause, the State contends the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to prevent suppression of the cocaine. 3
CONCLUSION--The search warrant was not supported by probable cause, and suppression of the evidence remains the appropriate remedy under the facts of this case.
This issue requires a two-part inquiry. First, we must ascertain whether the search warrant was issued on less than probable cause. If so, we must consider the appropriate remedy for that transgression.
Turning first to the validity of the search warrant, it is axiomatic that a court of review will " 'not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.' " Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (quoting United States v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684). We have previously discussed the analysis utilized to review a magistrate's determination of probable cause:
Layman v. State (1980), Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 259, 263, trans. denied (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). See also Carnes v. State (1985), Ind.App., 480 N.E.2d 581, trans. denied; IC 35-33-5-2(a) (Supp.1985).
Our review of the probable cause determination is limited to an examination of the same information that was before the magistrate when the warrant was issued. Ruth v. State (1984), Ind.App., 462 N.E.2d 269, trans. denied; Flaherty v. State (1982), Ind.App., 443 N.E.2d 340, trans. denied. In this instance, the only information presented to the magistrate was that contained in the affidavit prepared by Warren.
We conclude that the information contained in the affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause. Neither the facts set forth in the affidavit, nor any reasonable inference arising from those facts, create either a connection between the automobile and any criminal activity or a possibility that evidence of a conspiracy to violate the controlled substance laws would be found in the automobile. The affidavit reveals that Stabenow was arrested at the Indianpolis airport for some unspecified violation of the controlled substance laws. It also divulges that Stabenow was seen on earlier occasions leaving the airport in a car. Finally, the affidavit establishes that Stabenow, at the time of his arrest, denied having a car. The information in the affidavit does not disclose the location of Stabenow's car at the time of his arrest. Thus, the magistrate could not know whether the car was even at the airport or at some other location. The affidavit neither reveals why Stabenow had been under investigation for a month previous to his arrest, nor does it reveal that Stabenow used the automobile in connection with any criminal act. Moreover, it does not establish that Stabenow had any contact with his car on the date of his arrest. The mere driving of a car on previous occasions, without more, does not create any reasonable inference that the automobile was connected with criminal activity or that any evidence of criminal activity would be found in the automobile.
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