Stacey v. Jones

• Decision Date: 17 December 1912
• Citation: 180 Ala. 231,60 So. 823
• Parties: STACEY v. JONES.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

60 So. 823

180 Ala. 231

STACEY v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 17, 1912

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Monroe County; W. G. McCorvey Judge.

Bill by James W. Jones against Travis Stacey. From a decree overruling a demurrer, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Inge &amp McCorvey, of Mobile, for appellant.

W. B Merrill, of Heflin, and Stevens, Lyons & Dean, of Mobile, for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

This is a statutory bill to "settle the title to lands, and to clear up all doubts or disputes concerning the same," as is authorized by section 5443 et seq. of the Code.

The bill contains all the averments which the statute requires and a great many more. More than two-thirds of the bill is a statement of the sources and character of the complainant's title and possession, which, of course, is unnecessary, but does not destroy the equity of the bill. The bill not only sets out all the sources, as well as the character, of the complainant's title, but also sets out the sources and the character of the respondent's titles, claims, and demands in and to the lands, and then concludes with this averment: "That all relevant facts and transactions affecting or bearing upon the title to the said lands are herein set forth and alleged, and the title to said land depends and rests exclusively upon said facts and transactions. Wherefore, the premises considered, your orator respectfully prays as follows," etc.

If the respondent had answered, admitting the allegations of the bill, and had submitted the case for decision on the bill and answer, then the trial court could and would have determined and "settled the titles and cleared up all doubts or disputes between the parties concerning the same," as the statute authorizes. The respondent, however, did not do this, but demurred to the bill on the following grounds: "(1) Because said bill of complaint shows on its face that the complainant has no interest in the lands described in the bill of complaint. (2) Because the said bill of complaint shows on its face that the complainant, James W. Jones, only had an estate for the life of Mary Jane Stacey in the lands described in the bill of complaint, which estate terminated on the death of Mary Jane Stacey. (3) Because said bill of complaint shows on its face that the defendant, Travis Stacey, is well vested of a title in fee simple to the lands described in the bill of complaint." The court overruled the demurrers, and from that decree this appeal is prosecuted.

There was no error in this ruling or decree. The bill did aver that complainant was in the peaceable possession of the land, claiming to own it in fee, and that the respondent was not in the possession, but was claiming, or was reputed to claim, some right, title, or interest in the land. This is exactly what is required by the statute, which reads as follows: "The bill must describe the lands with certainty, must allege the possession and ownership of the complainant, and that the defendant claims or is reputed to claim some right, title, or interest in or incumbrance upon such lands, and must call upon him to set forth and specify his title, claim, interest, or incumbrance, and how and by what instrument the same is derived and created." Code, § 5444.

It is true that the special prayer of the bill is not exactly what the statute directs, but no objection was taken thereto; and if such had been taken it would not go to the equity of the bill. As was said by this court in Bledsoe v. Price, 132 Ala. 621, 625, 32 So. 325, 326: "The nature and character of the bill must be determined from a consideration of the facts averred in it. And if, upon the facts stated, the bill has equity, the special prayer will not destroy that equity." McDonnell & Co. v. Finch, 131 Ala. 85, 31 So. 594.

As before stated, the bill contains a great many unnecessary statements as to the source and character of complainant's title, as well as that of the respondent; but these do not destroy the equity of the bill if it is otherwise shown by its alleging all that the statute requires. This was so decided in the case of Bledsoe v. Price, supra, 132 Ala. 624, 32 So. 326, where it is said: "Confessedly, the averments of the bill, in stating how, in what way, and from what source the complainants became the owners of the land, and in describing the claim of the respondent, go beyond the requirements of a bill framed under section 809 et seq. of the Code. Interstate B. & L. Ass'n v. Stocks, 124 Ala. 109, 27 So. 506. The fact that it contains these things, in connection with the averment that complainants are in peaceable possession of the land, does not impair its efficiency as a bill under the statute."

The same rule of practice was declared in the cases of Adler v. Sullivan, 115 Ala. 582, 22 So. 87, and Vaughan v. Palmore, 57 So. 488, 489. In the latter case the former is reviewed; it being there said, among other things: "If the complainant be in the peaceable possession of the land, claiming to own it in his own right, and the land is also claimed by the respondent, but no suit is pending to test the validity of the claim, this gives the complainant the right to test the validity of the respondent's claim or title. The purpose of the original bill is to ascertain what title, claim, interest, and incumbrance the respondent has, and not that of the complainant, and how and by what interest his title is derived. If the respondent desires to so test the complainant's title or claim, he must do so by a cross-bill. As was said by this court in the case of Adler v. Sullivan, 115 Ala. 582, 22 So. 87, though a bill sets out the source of the complainant's title and possession, and thus serves to give notice to the respondent of the title and possession on which the complainant relies, in opposition to any claim or title that the respondent may assert in his answer, yet the source and character of such title or possession is not necessary to the equity of the bill. In that case, as in this, the respondent objected to the bill because the allegations as to the tax title of the complainant showed an invalid claim under such tax title, and therefore no right or title to or possession of the land. But such contention was held to be not availing, on demurrer to the bill, in a suit under this statute."

It has been frequently pointed out by this court...