Stacy v. La Belle

• Decision Date: 03 May 1898
• Parties: STACY ET AL. v. LA BELLE.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

99 Wis. 520

75 N.W. 60

STACY ET AL.

v.LA BELLE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 3, 1898.

Appeal from circuit court, Shawano county; John Goodland, Judge.

Action by W. H. Stacy and another against Thomas La Belle. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.E. M. Wescott and F. M. Guernsey, for appellants.

G. C. Dickinson, for respondent.

CASSODAY, C. J.

This action is to recover the balance of $279.65 due on account for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered by the plaintiffs, as co-partners, to the defendant, between July 1, 1888, and October 17, 1889. The defendant answered, and alleged, in effect, that he bought the goods, wares, and merchandise as partner with another, and that he was an Indian belonging to the Menominee tribe; that he resided with the tribe upon the reservation; and that the same was under the charge, direction, and control of the United States Indian agent,--and prayed that the action be abated and dismissed. The cause was thereupon referred to a referee to hear, try, and determine; and, upon the cause being tried before the referee, he found, as matters of fact, in effect, that there was due to the plaintiffs from the defendant the amount claimed, with interest from October 17, 1889; that the defendant was an Indian, and belonged to the tribe, and resided upon the reservation; that there was nothing in any treaty with the tribe, nor any act of congress, to prevent the state courts from taking jurisdiction; and hence that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment. The trial court modified the findings of the referee, but not essentially as to any question of fact, but found more in detail as to the status of the defendant as an Indian, and to the effect that the tribe held the reservation by treaty for their exclusive use and occupancy; that the same was under the charge, direction, and control of an Indian agent of the United States; that the goods and merchandise mentioned were furnished, sold, and delivered to the defendant by the plaintiffs on the reservation while Stacy was engaged in business as Indian trader on the reservation under and by virtue of the permit and license issued by the United States to him, as such Indian trader; that the defendant was a Menominee Indian, and a member of the tribe, born upon the Menominee reservation, and enrolled as such; that his mother lived upon the reservation, and was a member of the tribe; that his father was a white Frenchman, and not a member of the tribe. As conclusions of law, the court found, in effect, that the treaties and acts of congress precluded the state courts from taking jurisdiction in a case like this, and that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the defendant in this action, and ordered judgment against the plaintiff, dismissing this action, but without costs. From the judgment entered thereon accordingly, the plaintiff brings this appeal.

Undoubtedly, congress has power “to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.” Const. U. S. art. 1, § 8. Under this clause of the constitution, it must be conceded that congress has power to regulate all traffic and commercial intercourse among or with Indians, even when the tribe is located wholly within the limits of a single state. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419;U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407;U. S. v. Mayrand, 154 U. S. 552, 14 Sup. Ct. 1212. In making such regulations, congress may, undoubtedly, give to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. State courts may be precluded from taking jurisdiction in such cases, not only by congressional enactments, but by treaty between the particular tribe and the federal government; since such treaty, when made, under the constitution, becomes a part of “the supreme law of the land.” Const. U. S. art. 6; Worcester v. State, 6 Pet. 515;U. S. v. 43 Gallons of Whisky, 93 U. S. 188; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 3 Sup. Ct. 396;Farrington v. Wilson, 29 Wis. 383. But it does not follow from such mere grant of such powers to the federal government that the state courts are precluded from taking jurisdiction in such cases, as seems to have been held by the trial court. On the contrary, the supreme court of the United States has frequently held, as was declared in the Federalist before the adoption of the constitution, in effect, that the powers delegated to the federal government were exclusive of the powers reserved to the states in only three classes of cases. One class is where the particular power granted is therein expressly stated to be exclusive; another class is where the power is granted in one clause, and then in some other clause or clauses the states are expressly prohibited from exercising the like authority; and the other class is where the power granted is, inherently and absolutely, repugnant to the exercise of a like power by the states,--as, for instance, powers which cannot be fully exercised within the limits of a single state, like the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.” No. 31 Dawson's (No. 32) Federalist; Cooley v. Board, 12 How. 318;Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713;Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259;Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691;Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 108, 109, 10 Sup. Ct. 681. Manifestly, the case at bar does not belong to either of those classes. In this last case the distinction is clearly made by Chief Justice Fuller. Acting upon the principles suggested, congress has expressly provided that “the jurisdiction vested in ...