Stacy v. F. M. Hoyt Shoe Co.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1928
• Citation: 141 A. 467
• Parties: STACY v. F. M. HOYT SHOE CO.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

141 A. 467

STACY

v. F. M. HOYT SHOE CO.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Hillsborough.

April 3, 1928.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hillsborough County.

Action by Ilene D. Stacy, administratrix, against the F. M. Hoyt Shoe Company, wherein Norman L. Stacy was permitted to intervene as guardian. Order sustaining a general demurrer to the statement of defense, and defendant excepts. Exception overruled.

Case for negligence to recover for the death of the plaintiff's intestate. The writ alleged, in substance, that the decedent was an employee of the United Shoe Machinery Company, and that while making repairs upon a machine owned by that company but leased to the defendant, he was killed through the negligence of the defendant's agents in starting the machine. The action was commenced by the widow of the deceased, as administratrix, July 28, 1925, and subsequently leave to intervene and prosecute said action was granted to Norman L. Stacy, guardian of the children of the deceased by a former marriage. The defendant filed a brief statement of defense which reads as follows:

"1. That on the 19th day of December, 1924, the plaintiff's intestate was killed while in the employ of the United Shoe Machinery Company, lessor of the machine upon which plaintiff's intestate was working when he met his death.

"2. That on the 28th day of July, 1925, the plaintiff in consideration of the sum of three thousand ($3,000) dollars gave a release under seal to the said United Shoe Machinery Company and in the terms of the said release made the following agreement, 'It is further agreed that his release expresses a full and complete settlement of a liability, claimed and denied * * * '

"Wherefore, the defendant says that the said administratrix of the estate of John Forrest Gardner Stacey, having settled with and released the United Shoe Machinery Company is precluded by said release from seeking damages from the F. M. Hoyt Shoe Company for said intestate's death, arising out of the same accident."

The essential portions of the release read as follows:

"Know all men by these presents that I, Ilene D. Stacey of Medford, county of Middlesex, and commonwealth of Massachusetts, formerly of Manchester, county of Hillsborough and state of New Hampshire, administratrix of the estate of John Forrest Gardner Stacey * * * late of said Manchester deceased ——— being of full age, in consideration of the sum of—— Three Thousand—— Dollars ($3,000), to me paid by United Shoe Machinery Corp. of——, a corporation duly established by law, the payment and receipt of which consideration is hereby acknowledged do hereby release, acquit and discharge the said—— United Shoe Machinery Corp. —— from all claims and demands, actions and causes of action, damages, costs, loss of service expenses and compensation on account of, or in any way growing out of, an accident which occurred on the 19th day of December, 1924, at the shoe factory of J. F. Hoyt Shoe Company in said Manchester, by reason of which the said John Forrest Gardner Stacey, received injuries from which he died. This payment is made under New Hampshire Public Statutes Laws 1911, chapter 163, and amendments thereto known as Employer's Liability and Workmen's Compensation Act —— and do hereby for myself, and my heirs, executors and administrators covent with said United Shoe Machinery Corp. to indemnify and save harmless the said United Shoe Machinery Corp.—— from all claims and demands, actions and causes of action, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation on account of, or in any way growing out of—— said injuries and consequent death.

"It is further agreed that this release expresses a full and complete settlement of a liability claimed and denied and that there is absolutely no agreement on the part of the said United Shoe Machinery Corp. ——to make any payment or to do any act or thing other than is herein expressly stated and clearly agreed to. "Witness my hand and seal this 20th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and twenty-five. Ilene D. Stacey. [Seal.]

"Manchester, N. H. April 20, 1925."

To the brief statement of defense the plaintiff filed a general demurrer which was sustained by the court (Oakes, J.) and the defendant excepted.

James A. Broderick, of Manchester, for plaintiff.

Lucier & Lucier and Alvin A. Lucier, all of Nashua, for defendant.

BRANCH, J. The defendant contends that the release above set forth constitutes a bar to the present action as a matter of law. It bases its argument upon the rule that "the release of one joint tortfeasor is a bar to a suit against the others." The law was thus stated in Wheat v. Carter, 79 N. fit. 150, 106 A. 602, and this statement may have its uses as a concise formula by which reference may be made to a number of legal doctrines incapable of compression into such limited compass, but as pointed out in that case, it cannot be accepted as an accurate exposition of the law. It must constantly be borne in mind that the release is not, in and of itself, a bar to a subsequent suit against a joint wrongdoer. It is rather the satisfaction of the claim for the injury sustained which bars further actions. Wheat v. Carter, supra; Carpenter v. W. H. McElwain Co., 78 N. H. 118, 97 A. 560; Masterson v. Ry., 82 N. H. ——, 139 A. 753. A release of one jointly liable may or may not establish such satisfaction. Masterson v. Ry. supra. It should also be observed that the reference to "joint tortfeasors" does not mean that satisfaction for an injury by one, inures only to the benefit of others who are in fact and in law jointly liable for the wrong. It is sufficient if a claim of liability for the wrong in question was made against the releasee and included in the settlement with him.

"When a pretended claim for a tort has been settled by treaty, and satisfaction rendered the claimant by one so connected with the trespass, as to be reasonably subject to an action and possible liability, as a joint tortfeasor, the satisfaction rendered will release all who may be liable, whether the one released was liable or not."

Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 171 Ind. 417, 425, 86 N. E, 485, 488 (131 Am. St. Rep. 258); Carpenter v. W. H. McElwain Co., supra, 78 N. H. 124, 97 A. 562, 563.

In the present case, the defendant seeks to secure the benefit of the release of the United Shoe Machinery Corp. upon the ground that it evidences satisfaction of a wrong for which the defendant and the releasee were jointly liable. Before the defendant can avail itself of the rule thus invoked, it must be made to appear that the liability released was of the kind to which the rule applies, viz., that the wrong was one for which the Machinery Corporation and the defendant were, or might have been jointly liable, or that a claim of liability for this wrong was made against the releasee by the plaintiff, when the settlement with it was negotiated. In other words, the subject-matter of the contract releasing the Machinery Corporation must be ascertained and defined in order to establish the defendant's right to claim under that contract. The language of the release itself is inadequate for this purpose. The phraseology indicates that it is very likely an adaptation of a printed form, and its terms are so broad as to be inconclusive for the purpose of determining, what specific liabilities or claims of liability were actually dealt with at the time of its execution. There is nothing in the release to show either, that the Machinery Corporation was jointly liable with the defendant for the death of the intestate, or that a claim of liability for causing his death was made against it by the plaintiff and discharged by the release. In fact it contains recitals that may mean that such was not the fact it recites that the payment is made under the Employers' Liability and 'Workmen's Compensation Act. This statement is ambiguous because the statute referred to (P. L. c. 178) as indicated by its title, is of a dual character. It provides compensation to injured workmen in certain employments and under certain conditions, and establishes a new rule of liability for damages to injured employees if compensation is not available to them. There is nothing in the statement above quoted to indicate whether the payment was made in settlement of a claim for compensation with which the defendant could have no concern, or a claim for damages for which the defendant might be jointly liable. Either of these claims might have been made under the statute referred to.

In Wheat v. Carter, supra, which was a petition for an injunction to restrain the prosecution of an action at law by Carter against Wheat, upon the ground that he had already released his...