Stader v. State
Citation | 453 N.E.2d 1032 |
Decision Date | 22 September 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 2-1082A356,2-1082A356 |
Parties | Jay W. STADER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Ind., David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
A jury found appellant Jay W. Stader guilty of confinement while armed with a deadly weapon under Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-3-3 (1982 Burns Supp.). The jury further found that Stader was mentally ill at the time of the crime pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 35-5-2-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.). 1 As a result, Stader received a seven and one-half year sentence from which he presently appeals.
Stader first maintains that the jury verdict was contrary to law because the evidence established that he was insane at the time of the offense. One who raises the defense of insanity in Indiana also bears the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-4-1(b) (Burns 1979 Repl.); Basham v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206. The standard for appellate review for this defense was clearly delineated in Turner v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 1244, at 1246, where the Supreme Court of Indiana stated:
While Stader correctly states this standard of review, the record does not indicate that the verdict was contrary to law. Four psychiatric experts testified concerning Stader's mental state at the time of the crime. Although all four experts agreed that he was suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder, they were unable to give the jury a uniform opinion as to his sanity at the time of the criminal act. Dr. Caudill stated that:
Dr. Yarling commented as follows:
"... I could not develope any line of reasoning which would lead me to an opinion that he was at anytime in the past insane, whether it be at that particular time of the alleged incident or at any other time."
Dr. Davis' testimony was that:
"...
For purposes of the insanity defense, the term "mental disease or defect" has been legislatively defined by Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-3-6(a) (Burns 1979 Repl.):
"A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
Under this standard, the expert testimony clearly supports the jury determination that Stader was not insane at the time of the crime. Because there was evidence to support the jury's decision, its verdict must be sustained. Taylor v. State, (1982) Ind., 440 N.E.2d 1109; Thomas v. State, (1981) Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1216.
Next, Stader asserts that the trial court erred in denying the ground in his motion to correct errors premised on bailiff misconduct. Prior to jury deliberations, juror John Hirtzel asked the bailiff, John Nicewander, if the jury could have "transcripts of the testimony." Nicewander replied that there were no transcripts. Stader now contends that Nicewander should have relayed this question to the trial judge, and the jury should have been returned to the courtroom in the presence of the parties for the response to the question.
The standard for appellate review applicable in such situations was established by the Supreme Court in Conrad v. Tomlinson, (1972) 258 Ind. 115, 279 N.E.2d 546. The Conrad court held that:
258 Ind. at 122-123, 279 N.E.2d at 551.
This standard requiring a presumption of prejudice only applies in cases in which the bailiff gives an answer to a legal question amounting to an illegal instruction. Wallace v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 344, 363 N.E.2d 956. In the Wallace case, the jury foreman asked if they could have written copies of the instructions, to which the bailiff replied that they could not. The Supreme Court held:
266 Ind. at 347, 363 N.E.2d at 957.
In the case at bar, Hirtzel's request for transcripts is of no greater legal significance than asking for written instructions. While it is not the position of this Court to sanction the bailiff's behavior, no prejudice is present requiring reversal.
Stader's next allegation of error is premised on affidavits executed by two jury members. In reliance on the factual allegations contained in these affidavits, Stader attempts to prove that he has been denied a fair trial.
It has long been held in Indiana that affidavits of jurors will not be considered to impeach their verdict. Wilson v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 585, 255 N.E.2d 817; Jessop v. Werner Transp. Co., Inc., (1970) 147 Ind.App. 408, 261 N.E.2d 598. The logic behind this rule is clear and has been repeatedly stated as follows:
(Citations omitted.) 253 Ind. at 591, 255 N.E.2d at 821.
Being somewhat overzealous, Stader's trial attorney improperly solicited affidavits from two jurors, and his appellate counsel now attempts to base his legal arguments on this information. While Stader will not be prejudiced or penalized by this action, his trial and appellate attorneys are reminded of this Court's strong disapproval of such action. Jessop, supra.
Next, Stader contends that the trial court erred by strictly prohibiting him from informing the jury on the procedures to be followed upon a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill. The Supreme Court of Indiana has consistently held that it is erroneous to inform the jury of the possible penalties which may be imposed upon conviction. State v. Williams, (1982) Ind., 430 N.E.2d 756. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to instruct on the consequences of these verdicts if it deems it appropriate. Montague v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181; Lockridge v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 678, 338 N.E.2d 275. However, such instruction...
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