Stadt v. State
| Decision Date | 19 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-01-01272-CR.,14-01-01272-CR. |
| Citation | 120 S.W.3d 428 |
| Parties | RICHARD STADT, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
On Appeal from the 179th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 859,259.
Panel consists of Justices Yates, Anderson, and Frost.
Appellant Richard Stadt was convicted by a jury of criminally negligent homicide. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.05(a) (Vernon 1994). The trial court sentenced appellant to three years' confinement, but suspended the sentence and placed appellant on community supervision for three years. Asserting three points of error, appellant appeals his conviction. We affirm.
On January 31, 2000, appellant was driving a tractor-trailer rig southbound in the right lane of Interstate 45 as he approached the Spring-Stuebner overpass in Spring, Texas. This particular stretch of highway is considered to be very dangerous. Because of construc-tion, there were no shoulders along the highway at this location. Instead, there were concrete barriers located along the right edge of the roadway.
As appellant crossed the overpass, he changed lanes in an attempt to pass a slower-moving vehicle. Although the posted speed limit is 55 mph, the State's witnesses testified appellant was traveling between 65 and 75 mph. His tire hit the right concrete barrier near the top of the overpass causing the front right portion of his truck to rise up. His truck ricocheted to the left, climbed over the guardrail and became airborne into the oncoming northbound traffic. It hit a white pick-up truck driven by complainant Dale Turner and a maroon 18-wheel rig driven by complainant John Braun before coming to rest on the northbound side of the highway.
Both complainants were killed as a result of the accident. Appellant escaped relatively unhurt and was treated and released from a local emergency room.
In February, 2000, a grand jury indicted appellant for the offense of criminally negligent homicide in cause numbers 0837061 and 0837062. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.05(a) (Vernon 1994). In October 2000, the grand jury re-indicted appellant for the greater offense of manslaughter in cause numbers 0859258 and 0859259. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.04(a) (Vernon 1994). The State proceeded to trial on cause number 0859259 on November 27, 2001.
At the close of evidence, the trial court presented its proposed jury charge to both parties. The proposed charge included the offenses of criminally negligent homicide and manslaughter. Although appellant objected to inclusion of the lesser offense, the jury received instructions on both offenses.
The jury convicted appellant of criminally negligent homicide and recommended a probated sentence. The trial court sentenced appellant to three years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice State Jail Division, but suspended the sentence and placed appellant on community supervision for three years. Appellant timely filed notice of appeal.
On appeal, appellant asserts (1) there is legally and factually insufficient evidence for a jury to find he committed criminally negligent homicide; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide; and (3) the trial court erred when it refused to quash appellant's indictment for manslaughter.
In his first point of error, appellant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a jury finding that he committed criminally negligent homicide. No evidence exists, argues appellant, that he was "criminally negligent" as this term is defined by Texas law. We disagree.
To determine legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). This standard of review applies to cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). On appeal, this court is not to reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; rather, we consider only whether the jury reached a rational decision. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. See Soto v. State, 864 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd).
To secure a conviction for criminally negligent homicide, the State must present evidence that a person caused the death of an individual by criminal negligence. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.05(a) (Vernon 2003). A person acts with "criminal negligence" when he or she "ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur." Id. at § 6.03(d); Cooks v. State, 5 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (). The risk must be of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(d) (Vernon 2003).
In the instant case, to survive a legal sufficiency challenge, there must be evidence in the record that (1) appellant caused the death of complainants; (2) appellant ought to have been aware there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from his conduct; and (3) appellant failed to perceive the risk and his failure constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would have exercised under like circumstances. See id.; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.05(a) (Vernon 2003). We conclude the State met this burden.
First, it is uncontroverted that appellant caused the death of both complainants.1
Second, there is evidence appellant "ought to have been aware" of the "substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death surrounding his conduct, and that his failure to perceive this risk deviated grossly from the standard of care exhibited by ordinary "big rig" drivers in like circumstances.
(1) Appellant "ought to have been aware" there was a substantial risk of death if he made an error crossing the bridge.
The following evidence suggests appellant "ought to have been aware" that failure to exercise proper care on the Spring-Stuebner overpass would result in a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death:
• Appellant had driven over the Spring-Stuebner bridge in the same or similar tractor trailer approximately 300B400 times;
• Appellant was familiar with the bridge; was aware the lanes on the bridge were narrow; knew the speed limit dropped immediately before the bridge's entrance; and knew the bridge had been the site of several fatal accidents;
• Appellant told two different witnesses the day of the accident that he had been afraid of the bridge "for a long time";
• Appellant was aware tractor trailers needed to be operated in a safer manner than other vehicles "because there was less room for error";
• Appellant usually drove on the bridge in the left-hand lane rather than in the right-hand lane next to the concrete barrier;
• Drivers who frequented that stretch of highway were aware the bridge was rough, narrow, and dangerous;
• The bridge's nickname in Spring, Texas—where the bridge was located—was "death bridge";
• There was construction at the bridge the day of the accident;
• The bridge had no shoulder at the site of the accident and the concrete barrier hit by appellant's rig was only 6 to 18 inches from the highway's edge;
• Tractor trailers should be driven 5 mph slower than posted speed limits in construction zones and tractor trailer drivers should slow down when they approach such overpasses—even when driving the posted speed of 55 mph;
• Experienced tractor trailer drivers (1) lose control in construction areas if they drive faster than 55 mph; (2) feel their trucks bounce if they drive too fast; and (3) slow down if their trucks begin to bounce; and
• Appellant's rig was bouncing and weaving as he approached the bridge, his speed was unsafe, and he "should have slowed down" in order to prevent his tractor trailer rig from striking the right-hand concrete barrier.
The foregoing evidence supports a finding that appellant "ought to have known" that if he drove too fast or went off the road even a couple of inches, there was a substantial risk of injury or death to others.
(2) Appellant "failed to perceive" the risk of death and this failure deviated grossly from the standard of care exercised by ordinary people under similar circumstances.
Although evidence suggests appellant ought to have been aware of the danger of death on the Spring-Stuebner bridge, his conduct indicates he failed to appreciate this danger:
• Appellant drove between 65 and 75 mph as he entered the bridge, despite a posted speed limit of 55 mph • Appellant maintained his speed as he approached the bridge, despite (1) the rest of the traffic slowing down; (2) his rig bouncing; (3) his awareness there was a possibility of his right front tire clipping the barrier; and (4) his awareness there had been numerous accident-related deaths on the bridge;
• Appellant changed lanes to pass another vehicle, even though his normal routine was to remain in the left-hand lane; and
• Appellant took his eyes off the road "just to see what was going on around [him]" and failed to keep a proper lookout as he approached the bridge, despite his knowledge that the lanes were...
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