Staedler v. Staedler

• Decision Date: 05 March 1951
• Docket Number: No. A--79,A--79
• Citation: 78 A.2d 896,6 N.J. 380,28 A.L.R.2d 1291
• Parties: , 28 A.L.R.2d 1291 STAEDLER v. STAEDLER.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 380

6 N.J. 380

78 A.2d 896, 28 A.L.R.2d 1291

STAEDLER v. STAEDLER.

No. A--79.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Jan. 29, 1951.

Decided March 5, 1951.

Vincent P. Torppey, Newark, argued the cause for the appellant; Joseph F. Walsh, Newark, on the brief.

Nathan A. Whitfield, Montclair, argued the cause for the respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OLIPHANT, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment Nisi entered in the Chancery Division setting aside and declaring null and void a decree of absolute divorce granted the appellant by the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of the State of Florida, dated January 28, 1948, and granting a divorce to the respondent on the ground of adultery but denying alimony to the respondent. The appellant appealed to the Appellate Division from the judgment Nisi on the question of jurisdiction, on the merits and the allowance and amount of counsel fee. The respondent cross appeals from the denial of alimony. These appeals were brought here on our own motion.

The parties were married on June 20, 1937, in East Orange, New Jersey, and lived in Verona as husband and wife later moving to Montclair, New Jersey, until the appellant left for Florida to obtain a divorce under circumstances related hereafter.

The appellant has been engaged for the last twenty-five years in the painting and decorating business in the northern part of this state under the trade name of the Verona Decorating Company with offices in Verona and Newark. He is also the controlling stockholder in the P. C. Staedler, Inc., Maintenance, Inc., and 500 Bloomfield Avenue, Inc. Through these New Jersey corporations the appellant operates a substantial business in his line and employs a considerable staff of men, both in the field and in the office. The respondent was actively engaged with him in the business as secretary and bookkeeper in the Verona offices.

There was considerable bickering during their married life and at various times the appellant asked the respondent for a divorce but the respondent always refused, whereupon he finally threatened to go to another state and procure one. In 1946, over one year prior to the Florida decree here in question, the appellant communicated with Morris G. Warner concerning a divorce in Florida. Warner is a member of the bar of this state and of Florida and later represented the appellant in the Florida proceedings. The respondent in the meanwhile had consulted with present counsel and when the appellant learned of this he threatened to leave the state, turn over his assets to a dummy corporation, get a divorce and leave her without anything. He said there was no need for two lawyers in the case, that his lawyer could take care of everything by an agreement.

Finally the appellant took the respondent to his lawyer Morris Rubin in Bloomfield and discussed with him their difficulties and affairs and Rubin drew an agreement which is the nub of this appeal. The agreement followed an oral discussion of the problems and a study of a preliminary draft thereof by both the parties. Rubin testified that he did not advise the wife as to her rights because she never asked him.

The written agreement was signed on October 17, 1947 and under its terms the appellant agreed to pay his wife $60 a week until the payments totaled $20,000. It further provided that, when and if their home on Park Street, Montclair, New Jersey, was sold, title to which was apparently in both names, $10,000 from the proceeds of the sale would be deposited in a trust fund to be paid to the wife in weekly payments of $60 except that she could draw therefrom $1,500 at any time. However, no weekly payments were to be made from this trust fund until the wife had been paid $10,000 in weekly payments of $60 as first mentioned above. In all the wife was to receive $20,000 to be secured by a non-interest bearing note signed by the appellant for $20,000. The wife also was to receive a 1946 DeSoto car valued at $2,500.

On her part she agreed to withdraw from the business and to waive, release, and bar herself of all right of dower or other claim in all real property the appellant then owned or thereafter acquired, if the appellant did not breach the agreement.

She also further agreed to the following terms and conditions which are pertinent here:

'5. It is further agreed that party of the second part shall have the right to occupy that part of the house on Park Street, in the Town of Montclair, which she presently occupies, until such time as the said house is sold, or at such time as the party of the first part procures a final decree of divorce from the party of the second part, or sooner than either of the periods above set forth, if she so desires, but not later than the periods above set forth.

'7. The party of the second part agrees promptly to execute any papers, and enter, or cause to be entered any appearance required in the divorce proceedings to be instituted by the party of the first part, without delay. Should the party of the second part oppose said divorce proceedings the said trust shall become inoperative, and the monies deposited thereunder shall be returned to the party of the first part.

'11. * * * If the party of the first part shall hereafter obtain a decree of divorce against the party of the second part, nevertheless, this agreement shall continue in full force and effect.

'12. It is further agreed that the party of the second part shall, at any time or times, make, execute and deliver any and all such further instruments as the party of the first part shall reasonably require for the purpose of giving full force to this agreement and to the terms and conditions thereof.'

The appellant testified that he left for Florida a few days after the agreement was signed but the correspondence he engaged in with his wife and his associates indicates that he arrived in Florida in the middle of November, 1947. By his own direct admission and his testimony as to the dates of the discussions which led to the consummation of the above agreement, the appellant certainly was not in Florida on or about September 18, 1947, as he testified in the Florida proceedings or as testified to here by his Florida attorney.

All during the time he was in Florida he constantly directed the business through instructions sent to the respondent up to December 31, 1947, when she by agreement withdrew from the business, and thereafter through the manager, Richard Coutant, who testified he consulted with the appellant in Florida by letter and telephone as to all business decisions and policies. The appellant maintained bank accounts in the Verona Trust Company, Federal Trust Company in Newark, and the Bank of Montclair. All these accounts were never closed and are open and in use at the present time. The testimony clearly shows that during the period in question, October 17, 1947 to May, 1948, the appellant directed and has been before and since actively associated with the business and has controlled all of its policies and activities.

About the time he left for Florida, the respondent wife finally consulted an attorney of her own choice, Charles E Garrett. He testified she had read the agreement and knew what it meant and wanted to go through with it. Shortly thereafter the appellant, in early December, called the respondent from Florida and told her there was being sent to her a power of attorney authorizing one Maxwell Hyman to represent her in the Florida proceedings and asked her to execute it. Subsequently Rubin called her and told her he had received the power of attorney, he in turn sent it to Garrett, and in answer to a call from Garrett she went to his office, executed it and mailed it to her husband. At about the same time, at the suggestion of his Florida attorney, the appellant admits he paid $60 to Maxwell Hyman a Florida lawyer to represent the respondent in the Florida action. He protested paying this since he considered that the $750 he had paid Rubin would include all the costs, because he understood it was a 'package deal' with everything taken care of by the one fee paid to Rubin.

With this attended to the appellant returned to the home in Montclair for the Christmas holidays. He and his wife attended a number of social functions together and apparently shared the same bedroom although he denies the inference that they resumed marital cohabitation.

He returned to Florida after the holidays and on January 11, 1948, he wrote his wife asking her to send an authorization to Maxwell Hyman to represent her and enclosed a copy of such authorization in his handwriting dated November 28, 1947, which she was to sign, which among other things stated 'I am enclosing herewith your fee for taking care of this and representing me.' This despite the fact that the appellant and Hyman knew he had already paid Hyman the fee. The respondent signed and mailed the letter to Hyman as required.

The Florida complaint for divorce was filed the next day, January 12, 1948. An answer was filed by Hyman on behalf of the respondent, wherein he admitted the jurisdictional allegations and residence of the plaintiff in Florida. The gravamen of the complaint was extreme cruelty. The proofs were taken before a Master. There was minimal perfunctory cross examination by Hyman who did little more than offer and prove his power of attorney to appear for the respondent. On the report of the Master, the Florida Circuit Court entered a decree of divorce A vinculo in favor of the appellant here. The fraudulent purpose of the appellant here was a Fait accompli due to the culpable failure of the appellant and the attorneys of both parties, here and in Florida, to discharge their sworn duties.

The proof offered on the merits in the Florida cause was that respondent here was unjustifiably charging him with having illicit relations with other women, including a Mrs. Klinge, which was making a nervous wreck of the...