Staffin v. Cnty. of Shasta
| Decision Date | 06 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:13-cv-00315 JAM-CMK,2:13-cv-00315 JAM-CMK |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER DALE STAFFIN, an individual, MEDICINE MAN COLLECTIVE, SPIRITUAL CENTER CORPORATION, a nonprofit corporation, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SHASTA, DAVID A. KEHOE, individually and as a Supervisor of the County of Shasta; LEONARD MOTY, individually, and as a Supervisor of the County of Shasta; GLENN HAWES, individually and as a Supervisor of the County of Shasta; LINDA HARTMAN, individually and as a Supervisor of the County of Shasta; LES BAUGH individually and as a Supervisor of the County of Shasta; TOM BOSENKO, Individually and as the Sheriff of the County of Shasta; DEPUTY TIMOTHY ESTES and DETECTIVE JOHN MEEKER, DEPUTY JESSE GUNSAULS, individually and as deputies of the Shasta County Sheriff's Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of Shasta; Board of Supervisors David Kehoe, Leonard Moty, GlenHawes, Linda Hartman, and Les Baugh; Sheriff Tom Bosenko; Deputy Sheriffs Timothy Estes and Jesse Gunsauls; and Detective John Meeker's (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. #6). Plaintiffs Dale Staffin and Medicine Man Collective, Spiritual Center Corporation (collectively "Plaintiffs") oppose the motion (Doc. #10) and Defendants replied (Doc. #12).1 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs originally filed this action on January 7, 2013, in Shasta County Superior Court against Defendants (Doc. #1). Defendant David Kehoe removed this action to this Court on February 14, 2013, based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction for the state law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Id. On February 21, 2013, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint (Doc. #6). In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege five causes of action against Defendants: (1) Deprivation of vested contractual rights under the California Constitution; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) intentional interference with contractual relation; (4) violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code Section 52.1; and (5) violation of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51.2 Compl. ¶¶ 45-82.
Plaintiffs allege that beginning in November 2009 Defendants began a harassment program in furtherance of a de facto policy to ban all medical marijuana cooperatives, collectives, dispensaries, operators, establishments, or providers. Id. ¶ 25.
On or about February 23, 2010, Defendants Board of Supervisors David Kehoe, Leonard Moty, Glen Hawes, Linda Hartman, and Les Baugh ("Defendant Supervisors") enacted an emergency Shasta County ordinance that created a moratorium on medical marijuana dispensaries for 45 days. Id. ¶ 26.
On or about April 1, 2010, Plaintiff Medicine Man Collective, Spiritual Center Corporation ("Plaintiff MMCSC") entered into a lease agreement for a commercial property on 37016 Main Street, Burney, California, ("Main Street premises") to be opened as a collective, whose purpose was to produce, secure, dispense, cultivate, and distribute medical grade marijuana. Id. ¶ 18.
On or about April 6, 2010, Defendant Supervisors extended the February 23, 2010, moratorium. Id. ¶ 27.
On or about April 20, 2010, Plaintiffs allege that code enforcement officer Jerry Bellinger cited Plaintiffs for not having a special use permit and being a public nuisance under the ordinances passed on April 6, 2010. Id. ¶ 28. Bellinger stated, "the boys upstairs sent him and you will now have to have a special use permit." Id.
On or about October 26, 2010, Plaintiff MMCSC filed articles of incorporation with the California Secretary of State and namedPlaintiff Christopher Staffin ("Plaintiff Staffin") chief executive officer and first officer of Plaintiff MMCSC. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. They entered into an oral contract to receive compensation for actual expenses, including a reasonable compensation incurred for services provided to the qualified members and patients of Plaintiff MMCSC. Id. ¶ 17.
On or about November 1, 2010, Plaintiff MMCSC obtained a seller's permit from the State Board of Equalization. Id. ¶ 19.
On or about November 3, 2010, Bellinger again cited Plaintiffs for not having a special use permit and being a public nuisance. Id. ¶ 30. On that same date, Bellinger allegedly brought with him four Shasta County deputies and a detective with Shasta County Sheriff's Department, who allegedly harassed Plaintiff Staffin. Id. ¶ 31.
On or about November 8, 2010, Plaintiff Staffin allegedly told Plaintiffs' landlord that they had been cited again for "operating an illegal operation." Id. ¶ 32. In December 2010, Plaintiffs allege that their landlord refused further rent from them. Id. ¶ 37.
In April 2011, Plaintiffs allegedly were served with an unlawful detainer. Id. ¶ 39. In May 2011, they were evicted from the Main Street premises. Id. As a result of the eviction, Plaintiffs allege they modified their business to a "cultivation and delivery business of medical grade marijuana." Id. ¶ 40. On or about June 4, 2011, Plaintiff MMCSCC, through Plaintiff Staffin, leased real property for the purpose of cultivating and producing medical grade marijuana. Id. ¶ 21.
On or about October 27, 2011, Plaintiffs allege thatDefendants Gunsauls and Estes stopped Plaintiff Staffin in a vehicle registered to Plaintiff MMCSC and seized 33 pounds of medical grade marijuana from the vehicle. Id. ¶ 41. The marijuana was never returned. Id. Plaintiff Staffin was charged with the possession for sale and transportation of marijuana among other crimes. Id. ¶ 42. On or about December 14, 2011, Plaintiff Staffin was bound over for trial on the transportation and possession for sale charges. Id. ¶ 43.
On or about December 31, 2011, as a direct proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs allege they were forced to cease all operation.
On or about December 31, 2011, Defendant Supervisors enacted Shasta County ordinance SCC 2011-05, "which would allow the cultivation of marijuana on 1 acre or less limited to 60 square feet up to 360 square feet of cultivation for parcels greater than 20 acres." Id. ¶ 24.
On or about June 12, 2012, Plaintiffs allegedly served on the County a claim delineating Defendants' offenses and the claim was denied on July 5, 2012. Id. ¶ 44.
A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on othergrounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Assertions that are mere "legal conclusions," however, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim supportable by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). "Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment." Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
Defendants argue that all of Plaintiffs' claims rest on the assumption that marijuana use and distribution is legal, even though neither California nor federal law authorizes the use or distribution of marijuana. Mot. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that this case is not based on the legality of medical marijuana. Although Defendants argue that neither Plaintiffs' federal law claim nor Plaintiffs' state law claims are viable because marijuana is illegal, the Court considers this argument only asto the federal claim—Plaintiffs' second cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which includes Contract Clause3, Due Process, and Monell claims. Therefore, the Court does not consider Defendants' argument regarding the legality of marijuana as to Plaintiffs' state law claims because as explained below it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1) and (c)(3). In addition, the Court finds, for the reasons stated below, that it need not address Defendants' legislative and qualified immunity arguments for the determination of this motion.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated the Contract Clause because "the Defendants used red tape to drive [Plaintiffs] out of business, a business that was allowed under State law" and thereby interfered with their vested contractual rights. Opp. at 9.
The Contracts Clause provides, in relevant part, that "[n]ostate shall enter into any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. To prove a violation of this constitutional provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a change in state law has "operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship." Matsuda v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 512 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). This inquiry is divided into three parts: "(1) whether there is a contractual relationship; (2) whether a change in a law has impaired that contractual relationship; and (...
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