Stafford v. Briggs Colby v. Driver

Decision Date24 April 1979
Docket Number78-303,Nos. 77-1546,s. 77-1546
PartiesWilliam H. STAFFORD, Jr., et al., Petitioners, v. John BRIGGS et al. William E. COLBY and Vernon A. Walters, Petitioners, v. Rodney D. DRIVER et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

In No. 77-1546, respondents, who had been among those subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury in Florida investigating a possible conspiracy to cause a riot, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners (the then United States Attorney and Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent) and a Department of Justice attorney, individually and in their official capacities, alleging a conspiracy to deprive respondents of various statutory and constitutional rights, and seeking damages and a declaratory judgment. Petitioners, each of whom resided in Florida, were served by certified mail, and the Department of Justice attorney, who resided in the District of Columbia, was served personally. Respondents relied on § 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 (Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which provides in part that "[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority . . . may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose . . ., or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action," and that delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer in such an action may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought. The District Court dismissed the action, ruling that venue was improper and that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 2 permits damages actions against federal officials to be brought in any district in which any one defendant resides, and that since the Department of Justice attorney was a resident of the District of Columbia venue there was proper. In No. 78-303, respondents, whose mail between the United States and the Soviet Union had allegedly been opened by the Central Intelligence Agency, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against petitioners (the then Director and Deputy Director of the CIA) and others, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that interference with respondents' mail violated their constitutional rights, and seeking damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Petitioners and the other defendants were served outside of Rhode Island by certified mail. The District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of process, but certified the questions involved for an immediate appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order as to petitioners, who were CIA officials when the complaint was filed, but reversed as to those defendants who had left their Government positions at the time of filing, holding that § 2 applied to damages actions against federal officials in their individual capacities and provided the mechanism for obtaining personal jurisdiction over them, and that accordingly venue was proper in Rhode Island because one of the respondents resided there.

Held: Section 2 of the Act does not apply to actions for money damages brought against federal officials in their individual capacities. Pp. 533-545.

(a) Section 2's language "is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority" can reasonably be read as describing the character of the defendant at the time of suit, and, so read, limits a covered "civil action" to one against a federal official who is at that time acting, or failing to act, in an official or apparently official way. Such a "civil action" is that referred to in § 1 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which gives district courts jurisdiction of "any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Pp. 536-543.

(b) The Act's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended nothing more than to provide nationwide venue for the convenience of individual plaintiffs in actions that are nominally against an individual officer but are in reality against the Government. A suit for money damages which must be paid out of the pocket of the private individual who happens to be—or formerly was—employed by the Government plainly is not one "essentially against the United States," and thus is not encompassed by the venue provisions of § 2. Pp. 536-543.

(c) If § 2 were construed to govern damages actions against federal officers individually, suits could be brought against those officers while in Government service—and could be pressed even after the officer has left service—in any one of the 95 federal districts covering the 50 states and other areas within federal jurisdiction. This would place federal officers, solely by reason of their Government service, in a very different posture in personal damages suits from that of all other persons, since under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) damages suits against private persons must be brought in the district where all the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. Such was not the intent of Congress. Pp. 544-545.

No. 77-1546, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 170, 569 F.2d 1; and No. 78-303, 577 F.2d 147, reversed and remanded.

Peter M. Brown, New York City, for petitioners in No. 77-1546.

Doris Peterson, New York City, for respondents in No. 77-1546.

Earl H. Nemser, New York City, for petitioners in No. 78-303.

Elinor H. Stillman, Washington, D. C., for United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court, and Melvin L. Wulf, New York City, for respondents in No. 78-303.

Mr. Chief Justice BURGER, delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in these cases to decide whether the venue provisions contained in § 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), apply to actions for money damages brought against federal officials in their individual capacities. 439 U.S. 1113, 99 S.Ct. 1015, 59 L.Ed.2d 71 (1979).

I

No. 77-1546

Stafford et al. v. Briggs et al.

In 1972, petitioner William Stafford was United States Attorney and petitioner Stuart Carrouth was an Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida. Guy Goodwin was an attorney in the Department of Justice.1 Together they conducted grand jury proceedings in Florida, inquiring into the possibility that various individuals had conspired and engaged in interstate travel with intent to cause a riot. Respondents were among those subpoenaed to appear. At the request of respondents' counsel, the District Judge responsible for the proceedings called Goodwin to the stand and asked him to state, under oath, whether any of the witnesses represented by respondents' counsel was an agent or informant of the Government. Goodwin replied that none was.

Respondents later brought this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Goodwin, Stafford, Carrouth, and petitioner Claude Meadow, an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Each was sued individually and in his official capacity. Respondents alleged that Goodwin had testified falsely in furtherance of a conspiracy among petitioners and Goodwin to deprive respondents of various statutory and constitutional rights. Each respondent sought a declaratory judgment, $50,000 in compensatory damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages. Petitioners, each of whom resided in Florida, were served by certified mail; Goodwin, whose residence was in the District of Columbia, was served personally.

Respondents relied on § 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, which, as amended and codified in Title 28 of the United States Code, provides:

"§ 1391. Venue generally

* * * * *

"(e) A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party.

"The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought."

Petitioners requested transfer of the action to the Northern District of Florida, or, alternatively, dismissal for improper venue and insufficiency of process. The District Court denied the motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that venue was improper and that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the petitioners.2 Respondents appealed the District Court's order dismissing the case against petitioners, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) permits damages actions...

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