Stafford v. George Wash. Univ.
| Decision Date | 23 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-7012 |
| Citation | 56 F.4th 50 |
| Parties | Jabari STAFFORD, Appellant v. GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Madeline Meth argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Riley Ross III, Brian Wolfman, Esthena L. Barlow, and Lauren Lang and Ezer Smith, Student Counsel.
Janai S. Nelson, Samuel Spital, Alexandra S. Thompson, and Michael Skocpol were on the brief for amicus curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in support of appellant.
Jason C. Schwartz argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Molly T. Senger, Andrew G. I. Kilberg, and Matthew P. Sappington. Michael R. Dziuban entered an appearance.
Before: Rao and Childs, Circuit Judges, and Tatel, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant, a student at George Washington University, alleges that the university discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Given Title VI's silence on the topic, we must determine whether the appropriate statute of limitations is the one-year period contained in the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (applied by the district court) or the three-year period contained in the District's residual statute, which covers personal injury actions (urged by appellant). For the reasons set forth below, and treading the path of the eight circuits to have addressed the issue, we hold that the proper limitations period for Title VI cases brought in this circuit is the three-year residual limitations period.
Jabari Stafford enrolled in George Washington University (GWU) and joined the men's tennis team in fall 2014. According to Stafford, who is Black, he almost immediately became the target of racist jeers and attacks from his fellow teammates. Stafford alleges that he sought help from several school officials, including head coach Greg Munoz and tennis team administrator Nicole Early. But no help came. In fact, Munoz did more than fail to stop the racist harassment: according to Stafford, he participated in it. By his senior year, Stafford's grades were suffering, and GWU placed him on academic suspension. Stafford's internal appeal of this suspension was denied, and he never returned to GWU.
Stafford filed suit in district court in November 2018, alleging that GWU's deliberate indifference to racial harassment created a hostile environment in violation of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which prohibits racial discrimination by institutions that accept federal funds. After the district court denied GWU's motion to dismiss on grounds not relevant to this appeal, the parties proceeded to discovery. GWU then moved for summary judgment, arguing that Stafford's claim was barred by the one-year limitations period contained in the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. Code § 2-1403.16. The district court, finding that none of the alleged misconduct occurred within that one-year period, granted summary judgment to GWU. Stafford v. George Washington University , 578 F. Supp. 3d 25, 41 (D.D.C. 2022). But recognizing the novelty of its holding, the district court went on to explain that if the three-year residual personal injury limitations period applied, it would have found a genuine issue of material fact and denied summary judgment. See id. at 44–45 (applying D.C. Code § 12-301(8) ).
Stafford appeals, arguing that the district court should have used the three-year limitations period, D.C. Code § 12-301(8). GWU defends the district court's use of the one-year statute and argues, alternatively, that summary judgment would have been appropriate even under the longer three-year period. "We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo." Lathram v. Snow , 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Congress often creates federal causes of action, as it has in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, without specifying a limitations period. In those situations, "we do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there be no time limit on actions at all." DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters , 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Instead, the "settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 266–67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). We must select the "most appropriate" or "most analogous" state statute of limitations. Id. at 268, 105 S.Ct. 1938 (internal quotation marks omitted). How to characterize a federal cause of action to determine which state statute is "most analogous" is "ultimately a question of federal law." Id. at 270, 105 S.Ct. 1938 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We "borrow the ‘appropriate’ state statute of limitations when Congress fails to provide one because that is Congress’ directive, implied by its silence on the subject." Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. , 483 U.S. 143, 164, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Congress has encouraged this practice in the civil rights context. Section 1988 of title 42, which applies to causes of action under titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes (), instructs courts to adopt "the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction ... is held" to provide any "provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses" as long as applying the state law is "[c]onsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Although section 1988(a) does not apply here—Title VI was enacted after the Revised Statutes—the Supreme Court has interpreted section 1988(a) as "endors[ing]" its long-standing "borrowing" practice. Wilson , 471 U.S. at 267, 105 S.Ct. 1938.
Accordingly, we must identify the state statute that is "most analogous" to Title VI. But we do not do so in a vacuum. The Supreme Court, in a trio of cases— Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) ; Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. , 482 U.S. 656, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) ; and Owens v. Okure , 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) —has given us ample guidance on the borrowing analysis in the civil rights context. Those cases establish an obvious direction: they apply personal injury statutes of limitations to federal civil rights causes of action. Or if the state has no general personal injury statute, like the District, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to apply the "residual statute of limitations governing personal injury actions." Owens , 488 U.S. at 245–46, 109 S.Ct. 573. Not only that, but every one of our sister circuits to have undertaken this analysis for Title VI claims has so ruled, see Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago , 990 F.3d 1098, 1099–1100 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing cases), as have we in an unpublished judgment, Dasisa v. University of District of Columbia , No. 06-7106, 2006 WL 3798886 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 2006) (per curiam). Agreeing with these decisions, we hold that the District's three-year residual statute of limitations applies to Title VI claims brought in the District of Columbia.
Our starting point is Wilson , where the Supreme Court held that the appropriate statute of limitations in a section 1983 case is that of the state's personal injury statute because the "essence" of a discrimination claim—the "nature of the ... remedy"—is personal injury. 471 U.S. at 268, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938. As the Court pointed out, the Constitution itself commands that "no person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 277, 105 S.Ct. 1938. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which reinforces the Fourteenth Amendment, similarly references each "person[’s]" rights. Id. Because the "unifying theme" of these laws is to "recognize[ ] the equal status of every ‘person,’ " "[a] violation of [these rights] is an injury to the individual rights of the person." Id. (emphasis removed).
A violation of Title VI is likewise an injury to the individual rights of the person. Before the enactment of Title VI, direct discrimination by state actors was prohibited by the Constitution and enforced by civil rights statutes, but federal funds continued flowing to other entities engaged in racial discrimination. Recognizing that this "indirect discrimination" was "just as invidious," 109 Cong. Rec. 11,161 (1963) (statement by President John F. Kennedy), Congress enacted Title VI to prohibit racial discrimination by all who accept federal funds. Like sections 1983 and 1981, Title VI adds to the protection of each person. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (emphasis added). Title VI acts as a "prohibition of racial discrimination" by organizations receiving federal funds "similar to that of the Constitution ." Regents of the University of California v. Bakke , 438 U.S. 265, 284, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added). Because Title VI shares the same essence as section 1983, it too is most analogous to a personal injury statute.
GWU relies on a decision by the D.C. Court of Appeals, Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia , 40 A.3d 356 (D.C. 2012), in which that court applied the DCHRA's one-year limitations period to a disability claim brought under both the DCHRA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 367–68. As explained above, however, selecting the appropriate statute of limitations in a federal civil rights action presents a question of federal, not state, law. Wilson , 471...
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