Stafford v. Klosterman, 24875.

• Citation: 998 P.2d 1118,134 Idaho 205
• Decision Date: 20 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 24875.,24875.
• Parties: Dwayne STAFFORD and Betty Stafford, husband and wife and Mike, Schlund and Dianne Schlund, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Kent L. KLOSTERMAN and Does 1 through 5, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

998 P.2d 1118

134 Idaho 205

Dwayne STAFFORD and Betty Stafford, husband and wife and Mike, Schlund and Dianne Schlund, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Kent L. KLOSTERMAN and Does , Defendants-Appellants.

No. 24875.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 1999 Term.

April 20, 2000.

Ingram Law Office, Burley, for appellants. Mark A. Ingram argued.

Parsons, Smith & Stone, Burley, for respondents. William A. Parsons argued.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

Kent Klosterman (Klosterman) appeals from the judgment entered against him in a quiet title action in which Dwayne and Betty Stafford (Staffords) and Mike and Diane Schlund (Schlunds) sought to enjoin him from using two roads for access to his residence.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Byron Peck converted much of his property into Brice Acres Subdivision in 1978. In designating the subdivision, Peck made the following written declaration:

Know all men by these presents, that the undersigned are the owners of the real property as shown on this plat. Be it further known that they agree to the designation of the real property as shown as Brice Acres Subdivision. Further that the owners grant give and dedicate to the public such portions of land as shown on said plat, as set apart for streets and easements for the use of the public forever in addition to those now on record or legally established.

The subdivision plat was recorded in Minidoka County, Idaho, on March 29, 1978. However, the Minidoka County Highway District did not endorse acceptance of the plat. The plat shows Peck Road running east and west through the subdivision and a sixty-foot easement running north and south along the eastern edge of the subdivision. Klosterman's property is not within Brice Acres Subdivision. Klosterman has used Peck Road and the sixty-foot easement for access to his property which lies east of the subdivision.

The Staffords and the Schlunds own property in the Brice Acres Subdivision which they purchased subsequent to the recording of the plat. They brought a quiet title action against Klosterman, seeking to enjoin his use of Peck Road and the sixty-foot easement. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted to the Staffords and Schlunds.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In ruling on a summary judgment motion this Court uses the same standard of review as used by the district court in its initial ruling. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994). The Court liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Id., citing Tolmie Farms v. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607, 609, 862 P.2d 299, 301 (1993). The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the standard of review; this Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 721, 874 P.2d 528, 532 (1994).

When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment "relying on the same facts, issues, and theories, the parties essentially stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the district court from entering summary judgment." Eastern Idaho Agric. Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 623, 626, 944 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1997). If the district court sits as the trier of fact, it may draw reasonable inferences based upon the evidence before it and may grant summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997).

III.

PECK ROAD AND THE SIXTY-FOOT EASEMENT ARE NOT PUBLIC ROADS.

The district court found that Peck Road and the sixty-foot easement were private roads and not public access roads. Consequently, the district court denied Klosterman the right of ingress and egress to his property along the two roads. The court based its holding primarily upon the fact that neither Peck Road nor the sixty-foot easement had been approved by the Minidoka County Highway District as required by Idaho Code §§ 50-1309, 50-1312 and 50-1313. The district court was concerned with the implications of creating public roads by a judicial ruling. The specific concern mentioned by the court was that "[t]he maintenance of said roads would then become the taxpayers['] obligation...."

A. Klosterman's Argument Regarding Peck Road

Klosterman argues that Peck Road is a public easement, dedicated under a common law theory of public easements. He relies upon Worley Highway District v. Yacht Club of Coeur D'Alene, Ltd., 116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d 111 (1989). In Worley, the Court concluded that a common law dedication existed where (1) the plat was filed and recorded and (2) lots were purchased with reference to the filed plat. Klosterman maintains that the rationale of Worley is applicable in this case because the plat was filed and recorded on March 29, 1978, and lots within the subdivision were purchased with reference to the plat.

B. Klosterman's Argument Regarding the Sixty-foot Easement

Klosterman asserts that the sixty-foot easement, like Peck Road, falls under the common law dedication of a public easement. He argues that the common law requirements of an offer to the public and acceptance by the public have been met. According to Klosterman, Peck (the grantor), intended to dedicate the two roads to the public, as evidenced by the language accompanying the plat, and the public accepted the roads through (1) the purchase of land with reference to the public roads and (2) use of the roads.

C. Analysis

A highway is defined in Idaho Code § 40-109(5):

... Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of a board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of commissioners, are highways.

The roads at issue in this case are not highways as defined in Idaho Code § 40-109(5).

An easement is defined in Idaho Code § 50-1301 as "... [a] right of use, falling short of ownership, and usually for a certain stated purpose." Generally, the responsibility for maintaining an easement falls on those who use the easement for access to property. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements § 98 (1996); (A servient owner has no duty to maintain or repair an easement).

Klosterman does not argue that Peck Road and the sixty-foot easement are highways within the meaning of I.C. § 40-109(5). He made this statement in the district court: "I'm not arguing—my argument is not that this is a public highway: [t]his 60-foot easement. My argument is that this is a public road easement, which is different. The definitions are different. My argument is that Peck Road and the 60-foot road easement are public road easements." Klosterman has stipulated with the Staffords and Schlunds that the public has no obligation to maintain the roads. According to Klosterman, that responsibility falls on the landowners adjacent to the roads.

Klosterman has not argued that he has easements personal to him or his successors, such as easements by agreement, by necessity, or by prescription, nor that these are private roads to which he has an entitlement. The question is whether he has established a different class of "public" road which is not the responsibility of the public but which must be maintained by adjacent landowners for the benefit of the public.

Klosterman argues that the flaw in the recording of the plat-the fact that the Minidoka Highway District did not approve the roadways-did not prevent Peck Road and the sixty-foot easement from becoming public roads by common law dedication. According to Klosterman, they became public roads outside the statutory definition and outside public responsibility for maintenance. He relies on Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 655 P.2d 86 (Ct.App.1983), in which the Court of Appeals acknowledged that a defective attempt to dedicate under a statute may still be effective as a common law dedication. According to Pullin, the essential elements of a common law dedication are: (1) an offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the land to a public use and (2) an acceptance of the offer by the public. Id at 881, 655 P.2d 86. The Court of Appeals stated that the dedication of a street may be made by either filing a plat, or it may be made orally, without a writing or recording. Id.

The general legal principles contained in the language of Pullin do not benefit Klosterman. In Pullin the Court of Appeals determined that there was a question of fact as to whether there had been an acceptance by the public entity of the platted streets. If there were an acceptance, those streets would become part of the public road system subject to public maintenance when opened, unlike the roads in this case which are not subject to public maintenance. If Klosterman or purchasers of property in the Brice Acres Subdivision were claiming public acceptance of the roadways so as to require the highway district to maintain the platted roads, Pullin might...