Stafney v. Standard Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 30 July 1941 |
| Docket Number | No. 6747.,6747. |
| Citation | 71 N.D. 170,299 N.W. 582 |
| Parties | STAFNEY v. STANDARD OIL CO. et al. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The occasion and circumstances under which a communication said to be libelous is made determine whether such publication is privileged.
2. A communication required to be made, and made in a proceeding authorized by law, is a privileged communication.
3. Where such privileged communication is made to a department of the state in the discharge of a duty under express requirement of law, such communication, if pertinent to the issue, is absolutely privileged.
4. An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion upon which it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action of libel.
5. In the case of such an absolutely privileged communication, no one may inquire as to whether the utterer was actuated by malice.
6. Where the occasion and the attending circumstances under which such communication is made are not in dispute, the question of whether the communication is absolutely privileged is for the court to determine.
7. A communication made by an employer to the Unemployment Compensation Division of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau of this state, under the provisions of Chapter 232 of the Session Laws of 1937 requiring an employer to make out and deliver to the Bureau and to a discharged employee a statement required by the Bureau, showing the discharge of said employee and the reason therefor, is an absolutely privileged communication when made in the manner and form required by law, and can not be made the basis of any action for libel.
Appeal from District Court, Grand Forks County; M. J. Englert, Judge.
Action by Jalmer B. Stafney against the Standard Oil Company, a corporation, and another, to recover damages for alleged libel. A jury returned a verdict for defendants and plaintiff made a motion for new trial. From an order granting the motion, defendants appeal.
Order reversed and action ordered dismissed.
Murphy, Toner & Kilgore, of Grand Forks, for appellants.
Chas. A. Lyche, of Grand Forks, for respondent.
The defendants appeal from an order granting a new trial.
The plaintiff seeks to recover damages for alleged libel. He was an employee of the defendant company, and alleges that on or about April 24, 1939, the defendants published and circulated, “under the false and malicious pretense of making a legal report, the false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory and libelous matter, referred to and stated in a certain paper, filed with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau of the State of North Dakota, a copy of which is marked ‘Exhibit A’, hereto attached and made a part hereof.”
Exhibit A is as follows:
“Notice of Separation
4. Reason for separation
(Check one):
+---------------------------------------+
¦( )¦Quit voluntarily without good cause¦
+---+-----------------------------------¦
¦(X)¦Misconduct connected with work. ¦
+---+-----------------------------------¦
¦( )¦Labor dispute. ¦
+---------------------------------------+
I certify that the information furnished is true and correct and that the above named worker was separated from employment on the date shown above and for the cause checked which the employer believes may disqualify him.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
¦Employer Standard Oil Company Address¦910 So. Michigan Avenue ¦
+---------------------------------------+-------------------------¦
¦ ¦Street ¦
+---------------------------------------+-------------------------¦
¦Account No. 52-80-112 ¦Chicago, Illinois ¦
+---------------------------------------+-------------------------¦
¦ ¦City ¦
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
Place of worker's employment if different
from address of employer Valley City, N. Dak.
Certified correct by: Name Standard Oil Company By: R. H. Dodd
Date April 24 1939 Title Manager (Fargo)
Take this notice to the nearest Employment Service Office immediately. See instructions on reverse side.
Falsification of audit report”
He then alleges: “That the viciousness and extent of said libelous publication has been greatly augmented and aggravated by the slanderous repetition thereof by the Defendants, their agents, servants, at all times, by the route of the so-called ‘grapevine’ communication and transmission, initiated and carried on by them.”
The “Defendants admit that they filed with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau at Bismarck, North Dakota, Unemployment Compensation Division, a notice of the severance of relations between the plaintiff and the defendant Standard Oil Company which was in the form of Exhibit A attached to the complaint”, and as defenses, allege the truth of the statement therein contained, and that such notice, Exhibit A, was filed “pursuant to the requirements of the law and was made and filed with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau of the State of North Dakota in good faith and without malice towards the plaintiff.
Defendants further allege that at the time of the filing of the notice of separation with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau of the State of North Dakota, referred to in the complaint, and for a long time prior thereto, there was in full force and effect a statute passed by the Congress of the United States commonly known and referred to as the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.]; and during said time there was also in full force and effect a statute of the State of North Dakota known as the Employment Compensation Law, being Chapter 232 of the Session Laws of North Dakota for the year 1937, as amended by Chapter 215 of the Session Laws of the State of North Dakota for the year 1939. That under the federal and state statutes aforesaid the federal agency in charge of the administration of the said Federal Act, known as the Social Security Board, and the Workmen's Compensation Bureau of the State of North Dakota, Unemployment Compensation Division, were authorized and empowered to adopt rules and regulations that might be proper and necessary for the administration of the laws of the United States and of the State of North Dakota in relation to the payment of unemployment compensation. That pursuant to the authority aforesaid the federal and state agencies hereinbefore named adopted a rule, regulation and requirement for the filing by employers of a separation notice in the form of Exhibit A attached to the complaint in cases of the severance of relations between employers and employees. That it became the duty and obligation of the defendant company, under the laws and the rules and regulations promulgated as aforesaid, to file the said report in the form of Exhibit A attached to the complaint with the said Workmen's Compensation Bureau upon the severance of relations between the plaintiff and the defendant company on the 21st day of April 1939.
That the filing of the notice of separation as aforesaid was a privileged communication under the law and the defendants are in no manner liable to the plaintiff in damages therefor.”
The case was submitted to the jury, and a verdict returned for the defendants. Judgment was entered accordingly.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial, specifying six grounds, that the verdict was not justified by the evidence; that the court erred in admitting evidence over the objection of plaintiff; that the court erred in refusing to admit evidence offered by the plaintiff; that the court erred in its instructions to the jury; error in law occurring in the trial and excepted to by the plaintiff; and accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not guard against.
The alleged accident and surprise consists in the main of two grounds, First, that one of the counsel for the plaintiff had retired from the trial of the case, during the trial; and that the plaintiff had expected the defendant to have present at the trial an employee in its service station at Jud, North Dakota; and because of this, had not subpœnæd this witness.
In view of our holding regarding Exhibit A, the absence of the witness and the absence of one of the counsel for the plaintiff during a portion of the trial could not in any way affect the case.
A good deal of the time used in the trial, a proportionate portion of the charge to the jury, and a large portion of the briefs are devoted to the defense of truth so as to justify the execution of Exhibit A. The objection to the introduction of evidence offered by the defendant is based on the same theory, for it deals with the question of malice, and that some of the exhibits consisted of transcribed matter ostensibly taken in shorthand during some of the conferences between the plaintiff and the defendants prior to his discharge. None of that testimony on either side deals with the question of whether Exhibit A was absolutely privileged.
The trial court came to the conclusion that the verdict was not justified by the evidence, was contrary to law, and that there was error in the trial because of the admission of the transcribed notes and of testimony relating thereto. The court...
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