Stager v. United States

Decision Date09 May 1916
Docket Number111.
Citation233 F. 510
PartiesSTAGER v. UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Gerry &amp Wakefield, of New York City (Henry A. Wise and Carl E Whitney, both of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

H Snowden Marshall, U.S. Atty., of New York City (Frank E Carstarphen, Asst. U.S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for the United States.

Before COXE and WARD, Circuit Judges, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, District judge.

AUGUSTUS N. HAND, District Judge.

The defendant, Charles I. Stager, an examiner of merchandise at the appraiser's stores at New York, was indicted under section 37 of the United States Criminal Code for conspiring with George Silva and Henry Blumfeld Sciama to defraud the United States. The indictment alleged that:

'The said Silva and the said Sciama agreed with the said Stager that the said Stager should obtain secret and confidential information given by other importers of merchandise in connection with the importation of merchandise at the custom house at the port of New York, and should inform the said Silva and the said Sciama of the said confidential and secret matters and information concerning the said other importers of merchandise; and the said defendants then and there conspired and agreed together that the United States should be deprived and defrauded of the said confidential information which it had obtained from the said importers other than the said Silva and the said Sciama and that the said Silva and the said Sciama should obtain the said secret and confidential information concerning other importers.'

The indictment further alleged that the Treasury Department had promulgated rules that:

' * * * Information as to valuations placed by exporters and importers upon merchandise imported into the United States shall be secret and confidential, and shall not be disclosed by officers and employes and other persons connected with the said Treasury Department, and that subordinate officers of customs shall not be permitted to give information to importers concerning the valuations placed upon merchandise imported by other importers.'

The defendant, Charles I. Stager, on motion of the government for a severance, was tried alone and convicted.

It is well settled that the government need not show pecuniary loss in order to establish a conspiracy to defraud. The Supreme Court held in Hass v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 30 Sup.Ct. 249, 54 L.Ed. 569, 17 Ann.Cas. 1112, that the statute was broad enough to include any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of government, and that a conspiracy to obtain crop reports from a statistician of the Department of Agriculture in advance of the time allowed by the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, fell within the prohibition of the act.

Question has been made as to the technical sufficiency of the indictment and as to whether the statute of limitations is a bar to the action. In our opinion the indictment is sufficient, and while the statute of limitations would be a bar if nothing had been done since the date of the original conspiracy alleged to have been formed December 29, 1911, the overt acts set forth in the indictment and proved would show a continuance of the conspiracy sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations. Wilson v. United States, 190 F. 427, 111 C.C.A. 231. Without regard to these considerations, however, we think the judgment must be reversed, because the evidence offered against Stager so far failed to establish the existence of any conspiracy as to leave no question for the jury and material errors were committed at the trial.

Charles I. Stager was shown to have been an appraiser of feathers at the appraiser's stores, and to have appraised various goods entered at the custom house in New York, in September, 1912. It also appeared that the public were not admitted to the floor where the appraising was done except under special permits in cases where the applicants had business requiring their presence. Besides Stager and his clerk, there were numerous employes who were upon this floor, and after the appraisals were completed, the goods were returned to the custom house where the invoices and appraisals might become known to still other persons.

The invoice valuations and the appraisals by Stager of a number of invoices in September, 1912, were set forth in a letter dated ...

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8 cases
  • United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • June 15, 1946
    ...551, Fed.Cas.No.15,686; Burns v. United States (C. C.A.8) 279 F. 982, 986; Dolan v. United States (C.C.A.9) 123 F. 52; Stager v. United States (C.C.A.) 233 F. 510. "Declarations made by one conspirator to another are not competent evidence to establish the connection of a third person with ......
  • State v. Pierson
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 20, 1938
    ...v. Austin, 183 Mo. 478; State v. Pugh, 296 S.W. 138; Pope v. United States, 289 F. 312; Hauger v. United States, 173 F. 53; Stazer v. United States, 233 F. 510; State v. Proctor, 196 S.W. 158. (8) Prejudicial argument and acts of the assistant circuit attorney constitute a reversible error ......
  • Minner v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • March 29, 1932
    ...C. Neb.) 149 F. 443; Burns v. United States (C. C. A. 8) 279 F. 982, 986; Dolan v. United States (C. C. A. 9) 123 F. 52; Stager v. United States (C. C. A. 2) 233 F. 510. Declarations of one conspirator to another are not competent evidence to establish the connection of a third person with ......
  • Thomas v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • April 11, 1932
    ...Fed. Cas. No. 15,686; Burns v. United States (C. C. A. 8) 279 F. 982, 986; Dolan v. United States (C. C. A. 9) 123 F. 52; Stager v. United States (C. C. A.) 233 F. 510. Declarations made by one conspirator to another are not competent evidence to establish the connection of a third person w......
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