Staggers v. Becerra
| Decision Date | 17 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action ELH-21-0231 |
| Parties | JERMAINE STAGGERS, Plaintiff, v. XAVIER BECERRA, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff Jermaine Staggers an employee of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the “Department” or “HHS”), filed suit against Norris Cochran, then the Acting Secretary of the Department, alleging employment discrimination based on gender (Count I) as well as retaliation (Count II), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). ECF 1 (the “Complaint”).[1]Staggers, a male employee, is a GS-13 Health Insurance Specialist at the Department, in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). He seeks both legal and equitable relief. Id. at 8-11. I shall sometimes refer to CMS and HHS interchangeably as the “Agency.”
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative for summary judgment. ECF 3. The motion is supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 3-1) (collectively, the “Motion”), as well as twelve exhibits. ECF 3-3 to ECF 3-14. Plaintiff opposes the Motion (ECF 6), supported by a memorandum (ECF 6-2) (collectively, the “Opposition”) and a Declaration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). ECF 6-1. Defendant has replied (ECF 9, the “Reply”) and submitted an additional four exhibits. ECF 9-1 to ECF 9-4. In addition, plaintiff has filed a “Motion for Leave to File Surreply.” ECF 10 (the “Motion for Surreply”). The Motion for Surreply is accompanied by the proposed surreply (ECF 10-1, the “Surreply”) and five exhibits. ECF 10-2 to ECF 10-6.[2]
No hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion for Surreply; construe the Motion as a motion to dismiss; and grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.
The filing of a surreply is within the Court's discretion. See Local Rule 105.2(a). “But, they are generally disfavored.” EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F.Supp.2d 783, 801 (D. Md. 2013), aff'd in part, 778 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., Chubb & Son v. C & C Complete Servs., LLC, 919 F.Supp.2d 666, 679 (D. Md. 2013). A surreply is ordinarily permitted when the party seeking to file the surreply “would be unable to contest matters presented to the court for the first time” in the opposing party's reply. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 22 F.Supp.3d 519, 529 (D. Md. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted).
This is the unusual circumstance in which permitting a surreply is appropriate. As I discuss, infra, a significant point of disagreement between the parties concerns whether conversion of the Motion to one for summary judgment is appropriate. In the Opposition, Staggers argues that summary judgment is premature, given the need for discovery. ECF 6 at 18-20; ECF 6-1. In the Reply, defendant counters that Staggers had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery during the administrative stage. ECF 9 at 7-12. This contention was raised for the first time in the Reply, and the Surreply seeks to respond by making specific arguments as to the inadequacy of discovery during the administrative process. See ECF 10-1.
It is appropriate to permit Staggers to make these arguments, which provide vital context as the Court considers whether summary judgment is premature. Accordingly, I shall grant the Motion for Surreply.
The plaintiff, Jermaine Staggers, “is an African-American male.” ECF 1, ¶ 4. At all times relevant to this action, he worked in the “Division of Issuances, Issuance, Records, and Information Systems Group, Office of Strategic Operations and Regulatory Affairs” (“OSORA”) at CMS. Id. ¶ 6. Since 2010, he has been a “Health Insurance Specialist” at the grade of “GS-0107-13.” Id.
At all relevant times, except between March and October 2018, Janis Nero, a female, was plaintiff's “direct line supervisor.” Id. ¶ 7. Materials that I may consider indicate Nero's title was “Acting Director, Division of Issuances, ” and “Deputy Director, Issuances, Records, and Information Systems Group.” ECF 3-9 at 2; ECF 3-10 at 2. Between March and October 2018, plaintiff's “second line supervisor, ” Carlos Simon, acted as plaintiff's “first line supervisor due to the issues created by Ms. Nero's mistreatment of Mr. Staggers.” ECF 1, ¶ 15.
On or about August 25, 2017, Nero “decided to add Mr. Staggers to the Manual Updates Team and sent Mr. Staggers and two others an email announcing her plan.” ECF 1, ¶ 9.[4] Although the Complaint offers little detail on the work of the Manual Updates Team, the team seems to have handled updates to various CMS policy manuals so as to provide “accurate information to Medicare and Medicaid stakeholders and beneficiaries.” ECF 3-9 at 2.
Staggers responded in an email of August 28, 2021, claiming that he was already “carrying a full workload, ” and “that there were other members of his department . . . that had lighter workloads, ” and they “were better equipped to take on the updating tasks that Ms. Nero planned to assign” to plaintiff. ECF 1, ¶ 10. However, Nero “ignored [these] legitimate issues, ” directed Staggers to report for training, and “informed him that the assignment was mandatory and that if he refused it, he could be subject to disciplinary action.” Id. ¶ 11. According to Staggers, after he was forced to take on these additional assignments related to manual updating, “he began to have difficulty completing all of the tasks he had been assigned in an appropriate and timely manner.” Id. ¶ 12.
Further, plaintiff alleges that Nero assigned work to him that was outside of his “position description, ” including work that was supposed to be performed by her. ECF 1, ¶ 13. Following an internal grievance filed by Staggers on September 22, 2017, Nero changed plaintiff's position description “without telling him or providing him with a copy of his new position description in violation of the Master Labor Agreement, Article 28, ¶¶ 3A-B.” Id. ¶ 14. However, no further information as to this internal grievance, the change in the position description, or the “Master Labor Agreement” and its contents is provided in the Complaint.
On or about March 29, 2018, Staggers contacted Michael Tutnauer, an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor at the Agency, “to lodge a complaint regarding his unlawful treatment at the hands of Ms. Nero.” ECF 1, ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that “the Agency became aware of Mr. Staggers' protected activity by no later than March 29, 2018.” Id.
In April 2018, Staggers communicated with Nero and Simon by telephone and email regarding what he characterizes as his “excessive workload.” Id. ¶ 17. He sought “guidance regarding the order of priority of the many assignments he had been given, and to implore them to divide the work fairly among the available Agency employees, ” including his asserted comparators, discussed infra. Id.
Simon “summoned” Staggers to a meeting on April 6, 2018, at which he “scolded Mr. Staggers with his voice raised and threatened Mr. Staggers with termination if he was unable to complete the unreasonable amount of work he had been assigned.” Id. ¶ 18. Thereafter, on April 11, 2018, Simon, “upon information and belief at the request of Ms. Nero, directed Mr. Staggers to provide him with a status report as to his work five times a day “until he decided Mr. Staggers was handling his assignments in an acceptable manner.” Id. ¶ 19. Specifically, Staggers was to provide Simon with a status report each day at 8:00 a.m., 10:00 a.m., noon, 2:00 p.m., and 3:00 p.m. Id. Staggers alleges that this caused him “embarrassment and emotional harm, ” and also diverted him from time he could devote to his actual assignments. Id. ¶ 20.
On April 13, 2018, Simon referred Staggers to the Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”). Id. ¶ 22. According to Staggers, Simon failed to recognize that plaintiff's inability to timely complete his work was due to his excessive workload and Simon's reporting requirements. Id. Instead, Simon “concluded that Mr. Staggers' health, well-being and inability to balance his work and familial responsibilities were preventing him from performing at an acceptable level.” Id.
Throughout the summer of 2018, Nero and Simon continued to make disproportionate assignments to plaintiff, and ignored his requests as to “why he was being singled out” for the volume of work and what work he should prioritize. ECF 1, ¶ 26. At one point, Ronda Bonner-Allen, a colleague of Staggers and one of his asserted comparators, approached Staggers to inquire why he was assigned his work “separately from the rest of the team” and why he was “not included in team meetings.” Id. ¶ 25. However, no other allegations are included in the Complaint as to any exclusion from meetings.
As noted, Staggers had contacted an Agency EEO counselor in March 2018, but “efforts to resolve the complaint were unsuccessful.” Id. ¶ 34. On June 26 2018, the Agency notified Staggers of his right to file a formal complaint of discrimination. Id. Staggers did so on July 19, 2018, which was “accepted in part” by the Agency, “as communicated in a letter” of August 21, 2018. Id. ¶ 35.[5] The complaint alleged sex discrimination and retaliation based upon the events recounted above, but claimed that Staggers was assigned excessive work beginning in July 2017. ECF 3-11 (the Agency complaint) at 3, 6-8. Thereafter, Staggers amended his complaint three times: August 28, 2018; September 20,...
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