Staggers v. State
| Decision Date | 08 May 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 683S215,683S215 |
| Citation | 477 N.E.2d 539 |
| Parties | Alvin Wayne STAGGERS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, C.H. Gardner, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant (defendant below).
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for Appellee (plaintiff below).
Following a trial by jury, Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of burglary, a class B felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-43-2-1 (Burns Supp.1984) and robbery, a class C felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns Supp.1984). He was sentenced to eighteen (18) years imprisonment upon the burglary conviction
and eight (8) years imprisonment upon the robbery conviction, said sentences to be served consecutively. His direct appeal presents five (5) issues for our review, as follows:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in granting, on the first day of trial, the State's motion to compel fingerprint exemplars;
(2) Whether the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of two police officers, inasmuch as they had not been listed as witnesses by the State prior to the first day of trial;
(3) Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence State's Exhibits 4, 5, and 6, two latent fingerprints and the envelope which contained them;
(4) Whether the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant's objection to the testimony of F.B.I. Agent Bell on redirect examination;
(5) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.
The record discloses that on April 30, 1982, between 10:30 and 10:40 p.m., Denise Eck and Steven Hall entered her apartment in South Bend, Indiana and noticed a light on in the bedroom which Eck had turned off before leaving the apartment earlier in the day. Entering the bedroom, they discovered that a storm window and a screen from the bedroom window were propped against the bed and that the drawers had been ransacked. As they looked around the apartment, a black man stepped out of a closet and said, "Move, and you're dead." The intruder then took Hall's wallet and moved toward the front door where he hit Hall and ran out of the apartment, carrying a pillow case. Eck telephoned the police who subsequently arrested the Defendant.
On the first morning of trial, the State filed its "Motion to Compel Fingerprint Exemplars." Although the Defendant's fingerprints had been taken on at least one occasion previously, the defense refused to stipulate that those prints had been taken in conjunction with the arrest for the instant offenses. The trial court granted the motion, and the Defendant argues that in so doing it denied him the opportunity to prepare adequately for the introduction of the fingerprints.
The factual background in this case is nearly identical to that in Scott v. State, (1982) Ind., 434 N.E.2d 86, 88, wherein the appellant objected, at trial, to the admission of a set of fingerprints which had been provided to defense counsel during pretrial discovery and which identified the appellant as a person who was in custody for an offense unrelated to the instant one. The court sustained the objection and then granted the State's motion requiring the appellant to provide new finger and palm prints. It did, however, grant a motion for a continuance. We found no error in the trial court's ruling. Neither do we find error here. If, in fact, the Defendant needed additional time to prepare his case, he should have requested a continuance. This he did not do.
Although pursuant to a pretrial discovery order, the State was required to list the names of all of the witnesses it intended to call, on the first and second days of trial the State filed additional witness lists, each bearing the name of a police officer whose testimony was to help establish the chain of custody for the latent fingerprints which the State sought to introduce into evidence. The trial court granted both requests, and Defendant assigns such rulings as reversible error.
In Lloyd v. State, (1983) Ind., 448 N.E.2d 1062, the prosecutor, on the third day of trial, informed defense counsel that he planned to call an additional witness, one who had previously testified at a hearing, but whose name was not on the witness list. The trial court granted an overnight continuance, and we found no error in its refusal to impose other sanctions requested by the appellant. We observed:
In the case at bar, with respect to the addition of the first police officer to the witness list, defense counsel specifically stated that he had no objection. With respect to the second named officer, the State indicated that his name had been inadvertently omitted from the witness list, but that the defense was familiar with his role in the case inasmuch as his name appeared on the back of the property receipt. Defendant did not argue at trial that he was surprised by the addition of these witnesses or that he was unprepared for their testimony. Neither did he request a continuance. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling.
Defendant argues that inasmuch as an insufficient chain of custody was established, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence State's exhibits 4, 5, and 6, latent fingerprints found at the scene of the crime and the envelope which held them. Officer Gnoth recovered the prints from a box found on Eck's dresser and gave them to Officer Markovich at approximately 11:15 p.m. on April 30, 1982. Markovich turned them over to Officer Laurita at 4:00 a.m. on May 1, 1982. Laurita placed the envelope in the property room at 6:30 a.m. on May 1, 1982, and Officer Verash removed them from the property room on May 3, 1982. On May 25, Officer Brassell obtained the prints from the property room and sent them by registered mail to the F.B.I. Defendant argues that the State failed to show the whereabouts of the prints from 4:00 a.m. to 6:30 a.m. on May 1, 1982 or what was done with the prints between May 3 and May 25, 1982.
In Dier v. State, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 we observed:
Therein, State's exhibit No. 9 was a fingerprint impression which had been lifted from a door at the scene of the crime. We stated that there must be some showing that the prints exhibited were, in fact, the ones retrieved from the crime scene. In that case the print was lifted and mounted onto a white card. On the card, an officer noted a number and the location from which the print was taken. He placed the card, along with other items, into an envelope upon which notations were made to identify the case and which was then sealed and taken to the Technician Unit Office where it was kept until the following morning when it was released to the supervisor of the fingerprint agency for the police department. Even though there was no accounting for the exhibit's whereabouts at all times, we found a sufficient chain of custody had been established.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mediate v. State
...reach stolen article, buttressed by defendant's familiarity with premises and knowledge of best moment to commit crime); Staggers v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 539 (police officer saw defendant near crime scene at time crime committed, storm window and screen of bedroom window had been ......
-
Spaulding v. State
...each element of the crime charged may be found therefrom, beyond reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Staggers v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 539, 543.2 The trial court also refused Spaulding's tendered instruction number one which Spaulding now concedes is an incorrect s......
-
Wiseheart v. State
...undisclosed State witnesses may also testify when there is no showing of surprise or prejudice to the defendant. Staggers v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 539 (defendant deemed not to be surprised when on the first and second day of trial State filed an additional witness list of police of......
-
Kimp v. State
...matters within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Staggers v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 539. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing redirect examination here because it was outside the s......