Staggs v. Smith & Wesson
| Decision Date | 14 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-2535 (JEB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | DAYNA STAGGS, Plaintiff, v. SMITH & WESSON, et al., Defendants. |
On October 1, 2019, Plaintiff Dayna Staggs, a security guard employed by American Security Programs, suffered severe leg injuries when his MP9 pistol accidentally discharged during a routine shift. Staggs has brought this pro se suit for the injuries he sustained against the gun manufacturer Smith & Wesson; his employer at the time, ASP; and ASP's insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance. Defendants now separately move to dismiss the Complaint on independent grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction preemption, service failures, and pleading deficiencies. The Court agrees that ASP and Liberty Mutual prevail, but it will permit jurisdictional discovery as to Smith & Wesson.
Assuming the facts in the Complaint to be true, as it must at this stage, the Court begins with Staggs, who was a security guard working for ASP, a company that is insured by Liberty Mutual. See ECF Nos. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 5; 19 (Pl. Liberty Mutual Opp.) at 14. Plaintiff was stationed at the Government Accountability Office, located at 411 G Street, N.W., here in Washington. See Compl., ¶¶ 13, 18. On October 1, 2019, he arrived at work in the uniform of another federal contractor, carrying a pistol issued by that firm. Id., ¶¶ 17, 18. His superior instructed him to change into the ASP uniform and duty gear instead, which he did around midnight in the GAO armory. Id., ¶ 18. ASP provided Staggs with a plastic holster and a Smith & Wesson MP9 pistol. Id., ¶¶ 5, 18, 19. When Plaintiff holstered the gun, it accidentally discharged and shot him in the leg, leading to long-term, debilitating physical injuries as well as severe emotional and mental distress. Id., ¶¶ 5, 6, 19, 32, 33.
Staggs filed his Complaint on September 29, 2021, against four Defendants: Smith & Wesson, ASP, Liberty Mutual, and an individual, Clem C. Trischler, who was voluntarily dismissed on October 18, 2021. See Compl. at 1; ECF No. 3 (Notice of Voluntary Dismissal). The Complaint alleges seven counts: strict product liability (Count I), negligence (Count II), breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Count III), breach of express warranty (Count IV), violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Count V), gross negligence (Count VI), and resulting legal damages (Count VII). See Compl., ¶¶ 55-96. Smith & Wesson is named as a Defendant in all seven counts. Id. ASP is named in Counts II and VII, and Liberty Mutual in Counts VI and VII. Id. All three Defendants separately move to dismiss Plaintiff's suit, asserting a number of infirmities. See ECF Nos. 6 (Smith & Wesson MTD); 10 (ASP MTD); 14 (Liberty Mutual MTD). The Court addresses all counts below save for VII, which is in actuality a prayer for relief and not a cause of action.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, ” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a claim for relief when the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, [if] accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Though a plaintiff may survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely, ” the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
A defendant may also move to dismiss a suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) if the court lacks personal jurisdiction over her. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2021), and its requirements “must be met as to each defendant.” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). In deciding whether the plaintiff has shown a factual basis for personal jurisdiction, courts resolve factual discrepancies in his favor. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). When personal jurisdiction is challenged, “the district judge has considerable procedural leeway in choosing a methodology for deciding the motion.” 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1351 (3d ed. 2021). The court may rest on the allegations in the pleadings, collect affidavits and other evidence, or even hold a hearing. Id.
Complaints filed by pro se parties are to be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In recognizing that Plaintiff is pro se, the Court will consider both facts that he has put forth in his Complaint and those in his Oppositions. See Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Each Defendant moves separately to dismiss, and for different reasons. The Court thus addresses each Motion in turn.
ASP contends that the claims against it are preempted by D.C.'s workers'-compensation statute. The Workers' Compensation Act, D.C. Code § 32-1503(a)(1), applies, in relevant part, to “injury . . . of an employee that occurs in the District of Columbia if the employee performed work for the employer, at the time of the injury . . . while in the District of Columbia[.]” It also preempts tort claims that fall within the Act's orbit. See id., § 32-1504(a) (). Other courts in this District have held that “the law in this jurisdiction is clear that the WCA is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, with the result that common law tort claims arising from such injuries . . . are barred in civil actions.” Lockhart v. Coastal Int'l Sec., Inc., 905 F.Supp.2d 105, 117 (D.D.C. 2012); see also, e.g., Vanzant v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 557 F.Supp.2d 113, 118 (D.D.C. 2008) (); Tatum v. Hyatt Corp., 918 F.Supp. 5, 8 (D.D.C. 1994) (same); Doe v. United States, 797 F.Supp.2d 78, 82-84 (D.D.C. 2011) ().
This conclusion is undergirded by the policy and efficiency goals of workers'-compensation law in general. In the words of Chief Judge Beryl Howell, “The exclusivity of remedy to employees is a fundamental part of the bargain reflected in workers' compensation laws, which necessarily entail a quid pro quo from both employers and employees.” Lockhart, 905 F.Supp.2d at 116. So long as “[t]he WCA's application does not present a substantial question warranting a stay to enable an administrative agency to determine coverage in the first instance, ” judgment for defendants is appropriate in cases of WCA-barred tort claims. See Vanzant, 557 F.Supp.2d at 118. In sum, if Staggs's claim is covered by the WCA, he cannot proceed against ASP.
Such is clearly the case here. The WCA covers “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, ” D.C. Code § 32-1501(12), as well as “claims for emotional distress or mental anguish where the underlying cause or tort is covered by the WCA.” Vanzant, 557 F.Supp.2d at 117. Under § 32-1501(12), “arising out of” and “in the course of” are treated as two separate prongs that jointly establish a workers'-compensation claim, but “frequently proof of one will incidentally tend to establish the other.” Kolson v. D.C. Dep't of Emp. Servs., 699 A.2d 357, 360 (D.C. 1997) (citation omitted).
The “arising out of” requirement “refer[s] to the origin or cause of the injury.” Id. (quoting Southern Motor Lines Co. v. Alvis, 104 S.E.2d 735, 737 (Va. 1958)). There are three categories of risk here: (1) “risks distinctly associated with the employment”; (2) “risks personal to the claimant”; and (3) “‘neutral' risks - i.e., risks having no particular employment or personal character.” Bentt v. D.C. Dep't of Emp. Servs., 979 A.2d 1226, 1232 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Georgetown Univ. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp. Servs. 971 A.2d 909, 920 n.10 (D.C. 2009)). The first category (employment-associated risks) is universally compensable under the WCA. Id. The accidental discharge of Staggs's duty-issued gun, while on premises and during work hours, plainly falls within such category, as it is a risk distinctly associated with his employment as an ASP security guard, making it automatically compensable under the WCA. See Compl., ¶¶ 5, 18, 19. Even if the discharge were to be characterized as a neutral risk, the injury would not have happened but for the fact that obligations of Staggs's employment - namely, holstering the MP9 pistol provided to him for his patrol while changing gear at the request of his supervisor...
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