Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 1117,D,1117
• Citation: 117 F.3d 76
• Parties: 48 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 93 Eleanor M. STAGL, Appellant, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., Appellee. ocket 96-9087.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 76

117 F.3d 76

48 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 93

Eleanor M. STAGL, Appellant, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., Appellee.

No. 1117, Docket 96-9087.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued March 26, 1997.

Decided July 7, 1997.

Benjamin Greshin, Greshin, Ziegler & Pruzansky, Smithtown, NY, for Appellant.

Marguerite D. Peck, Downing & Mehrtens, New York City, for Appellee.

Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge, CALABRESI, Circuit Judge and HURLEY, District Judge. ^*

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge:

Eleanor Stagl appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Manuel L. Real, Judge ¹), granting a motion by the defendant, Delta Air Lines, Inc. ("Delta"), for judgment as a matter of law at the close of her presentation of evidence at trial.

In June 1993, Stagl filed a personal injury action against Delta alleging that she was injured in an accident that resulted from Delta's negligent supervision and management of its baggage retrieval system. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (John R. Bartels, Judge) granted summary judgment to Delta and dismissed Stagl's action on the grounds that Stagl had failed to establish that Delta had a duty to make safe the baggage retrieval area, and that, in any event, Delta had fulfilled its duty to act reasonably under the circumstances. On appeal, this court vacated the grant of summary judgment, reversed the court's denial of Stagl's cross-motion to compel additional discovery, and remanded for further proceedings. We held that Delta owed Stagl a duty to maintain its luggage retrieval area in a reasonably safe condition and that there might exist genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether Delta had discharged its duty and whether Delta's conduct was the proximate cause of Stagl's injuries. See Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 52 F.3d 463 (2d Cir.1995).

On remand, the district court conducted a jury trial. At the end of Stagl's case-in-chief, the court granted Delta's motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury determination that the accident was foreseeable since no evidence had been presented that similar prior accidents had occurred. Stagl appeals this judgment. She argues that the judgment is inconsistent with this court's opinion in Stagl and with New York tort law. She further contends that the district court violated the doctrine of the law of the case and the Federal Rules of Evidence when it found that Grahme Fischer, a mechanical engineer, was unqualified to give expert testimony at trial. Finally, Stagl objects to the district court's exclusion of other evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding her accident. Because we find that the district court erred in excluding this other testimony, in ruling that Fischer was unqualified to give expert testimony, and in concluding that evidence of prior accidents was necessary to prove negligence, we vacate the district court's judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

We assume familiarity with the facts of this case set forth in our prior opinion, see Stagl, 52 F.3d at 465-66, and therefore only briefly summarize the circumstances giving rise to this action. On May 1, 1993, Stagl, an elderly woman, was injured near the baggage carousel after landing in LaGuardia Airport on a delayed Delta flight from Orlando, Florida. She brought this diversity action in the district court, alleging that the airline had negligently failed to take any measures to control the crowd at the baggage carousel or to provide a means by which elderly and disabled people could retrieve their luggage safely. She further alleges that Delta's inaction proximately caused her physical injuries.

At trial, Stagl testified that at the baggage carousel, there was a crowd of passengers, many of whom were "pushing and shoving." She stated that there were no announcements, signs, or Delta personnel near the carousel discouraging this behavior. According to her testimony, when a passenger retrieved his bag from the carousel, his bag hit another bag which in turn hit Stagl, knocking her down and breaking her hip. Two Delta employees testified with respect to the conditions near the baggage carousels. During the testimony of Stagl and the Delta personnel, the court, on the ground that such testimony was irrelevant, refused to allow answers to many questions about the conditions at the airport at the time of the accident.

In response to a motion in limine by Delta, the district court also excluded the testimony of Stagl's expert, Grahme Fischer. It held that Fischer was "not qualified to give an opinion with reference to the facts of this case or to help the jury in the determination of the facts of this case and the cause of the accident to Mrs. Stagl ... [because] [h]is expertise is not in this area." No other expert testified on behalf of Stagl.

At the end of Stagl's case-in-chief, the court granted judgment in favor of Delta as a matter of law, ruling that, since there was no evidence that prior accidents of this sort had occurred, no reasonable jury could conclude that Stagl's accident was foreseeable.

II. DISCUSSION

As amended in 1991, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1) states the following:

If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim ... that cannot under the controlling law be maintained ... without a favorable finding on that issue.

In examining a defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to this rule, the district court "must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and grant that party every reasonable inference that the jury might have drawn in its favor." Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir.1994). A district court may grant a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to this rule only if no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. See Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1993). We apply the same standards when we review a district court's grant of a judgment as a matter of law. See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir.1995).

In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence under New York law, Stagl must demonstrate: "1) the existence of a duty flowing from defendant to plaintiff; 2) a breach of this duty; 3) a reasonably close causal connection between the contact and the resulting injury; and 4) actual loss, harm or damage." Febesh v. Elcejay Inn Corp., 157 A.D.2d 102, 104, 555 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (1st Dep't 1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 801, 566 N.Y.S.2d 586, 567 N.E.2d 980 (1991).

Stagl suggests that when the district court found her evidence of negligence insufficient as a matter of law, it violated the law of the case established in our prior holding in Stagl. We disagree.

Under the "law of the case" doctrine, "[w]here a case has been decided by an appellate court and remanded, the court to which it is remanded must proceed in accordance with the mandate and such law of the case as was established by the appellate court." United States v. Fernandez, 506 F.2d 1200, 1202 (2d Cir.1974) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, we retain the authority to ensure that our mandate is not misconstrued and is given effect. See In re Ivan F. Boesky Secs. Litig., 957 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir.1992); Carroll v. Blinken, 42 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.1994). "Indeed, because the district court has no discretion in carrying out the mandate, the appellate court retains the authority to determine whether the terms of the mandate have been scrupulously and fully carried out." In re Ivan F. Boesky Secs. Litig., 957 F.2d at 69 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our prior holding in this case was that, under New York law, Delta owed Stagl a duty of reasonable care and that the presence of an intervenor, the passenger whose bag removal from the carousel allegedly led indirectly to Stagl's injury, did not as a matter of law break the chain of causation. We therefore found that the question of proximate cause was one for the jury to decide. See Stagl, 52 F.3d at 473-74. On the prior appeal, we also assessed whether the affidavits submitted by Stagl in opposition to Delta's motion for summary judgment were enough to demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact and held that they were. On remand, the issue for the district court was whether the evidence presented by Stagl at trial sufficed to get to a jury. Though a record sufficient to warrant jury consideration is usually assembled in the aftermath of a reversal of summary judgment, that outcome is not inevitable, and, in any event, is to be determined by the record that is made, not by the law of the case doctrine. It is therefore clear that the law of the case did not require the district court to conclude that a reasonable jury could have found that Stagl's evidence sufficiently established Delta's negligence.

The district court nevertheless was mistaken in its principal holding that without evidence of prior accidents Stagl could not meet her burden of proving (a) that the accident was foreseeable, and hence (b) that Delta had breached its duty of reasonable care. The court was perhaps misled in this respect by the fact that, in our earlier opinion, we noted that the plaintiff was seeking discovery to see whether such accidents had happened before and that the district court had erred in not letting her do so. Id. at 474. We pointed out that the existence of such accidents would be relevant to the issues of negligence and of proximate cause. Id. But our discussions of Delta's alleged breach of duty and Stagl's cross motion...